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A NOTE ON CHINESE-ENGLISH TRANSLITERATION
Throughout this work, I primarily used the pinyin system to romanize
Chinese names, book titles, and place names. For certain Chinese indi-
viduals, such as Sun Yat-sen or Chiang Kai-shek, I used the Wade-Giles
system because their names were much more familiar to the West in this
form. Chinese personal names are generally written with family name
first, given name last, unless an individual, such as T.V. Soong or WW.
Yen, preferred the westernized form when writing in English. I eschewed
the use of pinyin to write out Koo's full name since he generally signed
personal English correspondence, published articles, and treaties with
V.K. Wellington Koo, and was known in the West by that name.
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Chapter 1
THE MAKING OF A CHINESE PATRIOT
THE WORLD INTO WHICH V.K. Wellington Koo was born in 1888
contrasted starkly with that of most Chinese boys, whose existence seemed
rather bleak. After many years as a deputy purser with the China Mer-
chants' Steam Navigation Company, Koo's father ran a hardware store
before working as a tax collector and serving as president of the Bank of
Communications. Such occupations provided the Koo family with the
means to purchase a mansion in Shanghai's International Settlement,
complete with a host of servants as well as property in cities outside of
Shanghai.1 Within the family compound, Koo never experienced hunger
or want. Nor would his hands ever become calloused like those of peas-
ants or his skin sunburned like the coolies, human mules, who with bit-
ter strength carried commerce and people on their backs or pulled vessels
up the Yangzi River. And for the rest of his life, the family wealth and rich
wives ensured Koo of a life of comfort and ease.
Financial security, however, could not dispel the crisis of imperial-
ism that existed in late nineteenth-century China. Y a^rs before Koo's birth,
China's defeat in the Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and 1856-1860 led to
the signing of "unequal treaties" with the Europeans and the United States.
The Chinese viewed the treaties as a national humiliation. They weak-
ened China's political and economic independence. For example, they
robbed China of its tariff autonomy. The treaties allowed foreigners to
reside in various coastal cities that became treaty ports. Foreigners en-
joyed special privileges, such as extraterritoriality in which foreigners
accused of crimes could only be tried in accordance with foreign, not
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Chinese, courts. The Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion that fol-
lowed were among several crises that sapped the Qing Empire's power.2
Then in 1894-1895, just a fewyears after Koo's birth, China fought
a war with Japan over the right to politically dominate Korea and lost.
Tokyo not only exacted more indemnities and rights, but also acquired
Chinese territory. In 1898, the major Western powers demanded their
own territorial concessions in what became known as the "scramble for
concessions." In addition to its colony at Hong Kong, Britain acquired a
99-year leasehold in the Kowloon Territories across from Hong Kong
Island and a twenty-five year lease on Weihaiwei in Shandong Province.
Germany had a ninety-nine-year leasehold at Jiaozhou Bay also in
Shandong. Russia held a twenty-five year leasehold on the Liaodong Pen-
insula including the harbors of Liishun (Port Arthur) and Dalian
(Dairen), and France possessed a ninety-nine-year leasehold on the port
of Guangzhou Bay (Kwangchou-wan) in Guangdong Province, across
from Hainan Island. The powers also claimed spheres of influence in
different areas in China: Britain in the Yangzi River Valley and around
Canton; Japan in southern Manchuria and Fujian and Guangdong Prov-
inces; Russia in northern Manchuria; and France in Yunnan Province along
the border of French Indochina. In both the leaseholds and their spheres
of influence, the powers were permitted to maintain a military presence to
protect their political, economic, religious, and education interests.3
The increased foreign presence combined with famine in Shandong
Province led to the Boxer Uprising of 1899-1900 in which a movement
built around the martial arts sought to drive the foreigners out. The Qing
Dynasty declared war on the foreign imperialists only to be defeated by a
foreign coalition. In 1901, the powers imposed on China the Boxer Pro-
tocol, which required China to pay the foreign powers an indemnity of
$333 million with interest over thirty-nine years, to allow establishment
of a Legations Quarter in Beijing permanently defended by the powers
and to establish a Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
As a result of Western and Japanese application of political pres-
sure and military force, the unequal treaties made China into a
semicolony. In Beijing, the powers maintained a Diplomatic Body made
up of the representatives of the eleven countries who were signatories to
the Boxer Protocol of 1901. Of those, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, Ger-
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many, France, and the United States exerted the most influence. To keep
the peace between them, the powers created an imperialist system in
which, by way of bilateral agreements, they recognized one another's
spheres in China. By laying down the limits to each country's power in
China, the imperialist system maintained the status quo and, at least in
theory, prevented one power from expanding at the expense of the oth-
ers. In 1910, the powers established a Six-Power Consortium in rder to
reduce the commercial rivalry among themselves by cooperating in pro-
viding loans to China through this consortium.4 All of these arrange-
ments did not partition China as much as Africa had been, but the powers
did carve up China into buffer zones to prevent great power conflict.
One Chinese city where imperialism laid a heavy hand was Koo's
hometown of Shanghai. Growing up in Shanghai, young Koo came into
daily contact with Western culture. Shanghai ultimately became the fast-
est growing, richest and most modern city in all of China. This eminent
"Paris of the East" had the highest population of foreigners in all of the
Chinese empire. Like other treaty ports, the West directly impacted the
city's culture, blending together Western and Chinese notions of sover-
eignty. And like other treaty ports, Shanghai was a major transit point
between the hinterland of China and the world outside. Unsurprisingly,
the residents of Shanghai were generally more interested in that other
world than they were about events in their own country. Whereas most
Chinese boys rarely had the opportunity to see, much less associate with,
foreigners, Koo grew up in an atmosphere in which foreigners and for-
eign ways dominated Shanghai life. This interesting, if not bizarre, blend
of Chinese and Occidental lifestyles influenced Koo's thinking toward
things non-Chinese. Chinese boys who lived in the hinterland tended to
see foreigners as devils who engaged in evil magic and who sought to
exploit others for great profit.5 Koo on the other hand never viewed them
as foreign devils or barbarians.
Along with the treaty port atmosphere, Koo's merchant father prob-
ably instilled in Koo a greater spirit of toleration of foreigners. During
much of the nineteenth century, there were Chinese in the treaty ports
known as compradores who served as middlemen between foreign and
Chinese merchants. By Koo's time, gentry merchants, who interacted di-
rectly with foreign merchants and represented an important segment of
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the new treaty port urban elite, replaced the compradores. Koo's father
was such a gentry merchant since he purchased his own civil service
degree and engaged in business with foreign clients or customers. Treaty
port Chinese merchants, as well as most treaty port intellectuals, tended
to be progressive and cosmopolitan in the sense that they were more
open to foreign ideas and more Westernized in dress and habits com-
pared to Chinese in the hinterland.6 Whether Koo's father was in every
respect such a merchant is unknown, but the fact he allowed his sons to
be educated by foreigners and that he admired the Duke of Wellington
enough to make his name that of his son's suggests that Koo's father was
hardly a xenophobe.
If Shanghai instilled a toleration for foreigners, its dominance by
foreigners created the basis for Koo's patriotism. Chinese living in the
treaty ports were ambivalent toward the Western presence. Although they
engaged in cultural borrowing, treaty port Chinese retained an affinity
for their culture that varied from person to person. The Westerners, who
carried about them an air of cultural superiority that disparaged Chi-
nese culture, stirred up feelings of patriotism among Shanghai's Chinese
population.7
Besides the attacks on their culture, the manner in which the West-
erners ran Shanghai under the protection of the unequal treaties guar-
anteed the promotion of patriotic feelings. Although Shanghai was not a
colony like Hong Kong, the foreigners controlled Shanghai politically
even though the Chinese population far exceeded the city's foreign popu-
lation. In the section of the International Settlement where Koo lived,
the Shanghai Municipal Council made the laws that governed foreign
and Chinese alike. Unlike most Chinese boys that grew up accountable
to only Chinese laws, Koo lived by rules and regulations made by for-
eigners.8 And the manner in which the British made and enforced the
laws did not endear him to this foreign system. Koo later acknowledged
that he could understand his countrymen's antipathy for the British who
always held themselves "aloof from Chinese society and the Chinese
people" and who took measures to maintain law and order in ways that
"did not seem justifiable to the Chinese."9
Although willing to adopt foreign ways, the treaty port urban elite
were quite patriotic. In the nineteenth century, treaty port intellectuals
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and merchants demanded recognition of Chinese sovereignty as a re-
sult of their exposure to Western ideas and conceptions of interna-
tional law. They railed against extraterritoriality, called for tariff
autonomy and opposed foreign domination of China's domestic ship-
ping. They also used their knowledge of Western law to protest foreign
mistreatment and humiliation of Chinese. Treaty port merchants joined
in the effort to recover China's loss of rights and urged that China's bor-
derlands, such as Korea and Vietnam, be safeguarded against imperialist
intrusion.10
Treaty port Chinese patriots were not nativist in the sense of seek-
ing to throw the foreigners out. Their patriotism differed from that of
some Chinese intellectuals who possessed an attitude of militant conser-
vatism. Ideologically, militant conservatives preferred to rely solely on
the cultural superiority of Confucianism in dealing with the barbarians.
Xenophobic to the extent that they rejected Western technology and ideas,
militant conservatives were prepared to use military force to drive the
imperialists out. Such a bellicose attitude led these officials to urge war
against France over Vietnam in 1884-1885 and to support a declaration
of war on the imperialist powers during the Boxer Uprising only to be
defeated.11
Treaty port intellectuals rejected that approach. Instead, treaty-port
patriotism resembled that of Chinese intellectuals who Michael Hunt
has described as "cosmopolitans." They realized that nineteenth-century
China was too weak militarily to force the imperialists and their unequal
treaties out of the country. Cosmopolitans were influenced by the ideas
of Wei Yuan who, writing in the aftermath of the first Opium War, ar-
gued that China could only save itself by borrowing technology from the
West, strengthening its military defenses and navy, and using diplomacy,
in particular the manipulation of the powers. Cosmopolitans of the mid-
nineteenth century implemented the Self-Strengthening Movement of
1862-1894. The Chinese officials behind that movement, such as Li
Hongzhang, were far more accommodating in their attitude toward the
foreign devils. The Self-Strengthened believed in Chinese cultural supe-
riority, but recognized that only by becoming a student of the mighty
Western imperialists could China survive. The Self-Strengthened relied
on other stratagems, including a theory of a balance of power that was
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implemented by attempts to play one power off against the other. Trade,
not the cannon, was seen as a preferable weapon for eliminating imperi-
alism. Similar ideas were found among treaty port intellectuals such as
Koo's father.12
In any case, the imperialist system in Shanghai ensured that its
Chinese inhabitants, such as Koo, developed patriotic feelings. The for-
eign system in Shanghai adversely affected Chinese boys psychologically.
They feared to look upon the Westerners that owned or occupied the
best buildings and whose regulations ensured racial segregation by de-
nying Chinese and dogs entrance into certain public parks. Koo got a
taste of this foreign injustice when, at the age of nine, a British police-
man fined him for riding his bicycle on the sidewalk, whereas an English
boy bicycling in front of him went unpunished.13 Koo never forgot this
incident that was, for him, irrefutable evidence of the inequality between
Shanghai's foreigners and Chinese inhabitants. He spent his life trying
to knock down the obstacles that created the superior/inferior relations
between foreigner and Chinese in order to have more equality.
Foreign Shanghai alone, however, did not instill a sense of humili-
ation that Koo felt over the foreign treatment of Chinese. The atmo-
sphere of crisis in which he grew up contributed to his sense of patriotism.
To learn from history textbooks of China's humiliation after the Opium
Wars was enough to "lose face" over China's fate, but to come of age in a
time of imperialist success against one's country had an unforgettable
psychological effect on Koo. Later in life, Koo told his daughter that "The
first 15 years of a child's life makes a deep impression upon him and
more or less set the mould in which his future life is to be cast, as far as
character, habits, taste and viewpoints are concerned."14 The Sino-Japa-
nese War, the "scramble," and the Boxer Uprising left Koo with a deep
sense of humiliation. Indeed, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Koo
on several occasions referred to discussions of Japan's victory and the
'scramble for concessions' as a revival of "unpleasant memories."15 West-
ern imperialism and China's weaknesses tended to undermine a young
Chinese's view of China's great past, and Koo devoted his career to re-
covering that former greatness.16
Koo's father shared his son's loss of face over China's inability to
protect the empire from foreign encroachment. Before those series of
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disasters befell China, the elder Koo provided his son with a classical
Chinese education in order to prepare for the civil service examination.
For a time, young Koo attended local Chinese schools designed, in his
words, to provide a "greater concentration on the Chinese classics and
the art of writing the conventional eight-legged essays." The study of
both was essential for Chinese boys aspiring to pass the civil service ex-
ams and enter into government service. Each day, the students memo-
rized the Five Classics, which were associated with Confucius, and the Four
Books, which were commentaries written by the Song dynasty scholar
Zhuxi, and recited them for the teacher. Koo later acknowledged that memo-
rizing essays helped him become "a good writer and scholar." As a child,
however, he viewed such an exercise "as a waste of time and effort."17
In 1901, young Koo enrolled at St. John's College, an American
missionary-operated school in Shanghai. For a Chinese father to allow
his son to acquire a foreign education and reject the traditional Confu-
cian education system deemed necessary to pursue a career in govern-
ment suggests that Koo's father, like many other fathers, was seared by
China's defeat in 1895. After the Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer Up-
rising, Christian schools like St. John's were extremely popular as Chi-
nese elites looked to the West for answers to the problems plaguing China
at the time.18 The elder Koo came to the conclusion that China's dis-
tresses reflected the archaic nature of China's traditional education sys-
tem. His daughter-in-law described his attitude as being that of most
Chinese: "China should become a world power and not be partitioned."19
And years before the Qing Dynasty reached the same conclusion and
abolished the civil service examinations, Koo's father deemed a foreign
education more beneficial for his son than a classical one.
The education Koo received at St. John's can only be described as
cultural imperialism. Founded by the American Episcopal Church, St.
John's College was established to replace with Western ideals the "false
history, false science, false geography, false chronology, false philosophy
. . . [and] false religion" that pervaded Chinese society.20 In other words,
the missionaries carried about them an air of cultural superiority; some
even charged that China never invented anything but simply stumbled
onto gunpowder, the magnetic compass, and the printing press. By the
time Koo matriculated at St. John's, the school had moved beyond train-
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ing only Christian converts to seeking to provide an education in the
arts and the physical sciences to young Chinese in general. The secular
Western curriculum accompanied an emphasis on instilling Christian
values. The daily routine consisted of compulsory prayer time, Bible
reading, and attendance at Sunday worship services. Those who failed to
comply with the rules were seldom spared the rod.21 St. John's College
never converted Koo to Christianity, but he internalized the mission-
ary/imperialist discourse that denigrated his culture's spiritual beliefs.
He later claimed, "many of my superstitions were dispelled from my
mind."22
Although the study of English was in high demand in treaty ports
such as Shanghai, the school ensured that English took precedence over
Chinese. In 1887, Dr. Francis Hawks Pott, an alumnus of Columbia Uni-
versity who was president of the institution for many years, asserted
that instruction in English language and literature would broaden Chi-
nese students' horizons and eliminate the antiforeign prejudice. By the
1890s, the majority of courses offered at St. John's, including Chinese
history, were taught in English, and all official documents and an-
nouncements were written in English. Students were permitted to pub-
lish articles written in English, not Chinese, in the campus monthly St.
John's Echo and the school yearbook, Dragon Flag. In fact, the Echo
proudly claimed itself to be the "first paper published in the Orient by
Chinese youths in a tongue foreign to them and only acquired after hard
years of study."23
Although the predominance of English attracted students such as
Koo who came from treaty port families, the practice sparked criticism.
Students recalled that they understood more about U.S. geography or
Bible stories than they did the geography and literature of their own
country. Some St. John's students left the school with a better grasp of
English than Chinese. Koo remembered only receiving instruction in
American and British history, not Chinese, and that after seven years of
study at St. John's, students only had a first-year understanding of the
Chinese language. "Apparently, the aim of a missionary school," recalled
Koo, "was to train Chinese not with a view to what China needed as a
nation, but what the missionary movement needed."24
Koo's resentment was evidence of an incipient patriotism against
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the kind of Westernization, not Westernization itself, that St. John's forced
on young Chinese boys. To be fair, St. John's recognized that students
needed a background in Chinese language and history. The lack of inter-
est in those areas on the part of students may not have been entirely the
fault of St. John's. "Even if this be the very moment of China's
partitionment," wrote one of the editors of the St. John's Echo, "it is re-
gretted that Chinese do not study China's history." Chinese students had
to be dispelled of the notion that reading Chinese history was not as
pleasurable as Western history.25 Likewise, students needed to grasp the
importance of having a foundation in the Chinese language. In 1901,
Pott made the study of Chinese mandatory, placing it on an equal par
with English after the school's authorities realized that students study-
ing Chinese were less motivated than those studying English. And in
1902, St. John's attempted to improve its Chinese program by hiring
Chinese teachers, several of whom were students returned from Japan.
Koo, like other students, supported this reform and new emphasis on a
Chinese education, but these Chinese teachers were deemed too radical
and patriotic for St. John's taste and the teachers left the school over time.26
St. John's viewed itself as training students to become business-
men, to contribute to their communities and to assist students in devel-
oping relations with foreigners. Fluency in English supposedly facilitated
that process. In Koo's case, training in the language certainly made study
abroad and his career as a diplomat much smoother. He was so fluent in
English that one could forget that he was Chinese particularly when over
90 percent of his diary was written in English, not Chinese. Fluency in
English also made St. John's graduates, especially the affluent students
from Shanghai, feel as if they were a select group. Koo and other such
notables as W.W. Yen, who was not an alumnus but a teacher there, Alfred
Sze, or T.V. Soong, became known as the "St. John's clique."27
St. John's Americanization of Koo extended beyond language.
St. John's proved to be a conduit for transmitting ideas about govern-
ment and reform. From 1898 onward, two questions remained upper-
most in the minds of the faculty and students of St. John's: Was China on
the verge of being partitioned by the powers, and what reform measures
should China implement to prevent partitioning from becoming a real-
ity? Through their debating societies, the students took these questions
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head on and divided over the issue of whether China should have a con-
stitution and/or a republican form of government. In the context of the
Boxer Uprising, constitutionalism and republicanism were viewed as
dangerous by many because there was a belief that China was not ready
for either. Koo and his classmates generally blamed the conservatism,
superstition, and what was described as the social and educational tyr-
anny in Chinese government and society for China's ills. They were in-
troduced to the writings of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, the men
behind the failed Hundred Days Reform movement of 1898, which called
for a constitutional monarchy. For students and young Chinese like Koo,
Liang Qichao represented new ideas for making China a stronger coun-
try that could resist imperialism.28
This did not mean that Koo and his classmates were revolutionar-
ies. Although some believed revolution was necessary, many wanted only
political and educational reform. Koo recalled that he and his peers did
not seek to overthrow or eliminate the Qing. His educational atmosphere
did not promote revolution or radicalism. Reflecting the long-held Ameri-
can precept that the only good revolution was an orderly one, St. John's
frowned on radical revolution, such as the French revolution.29 Instead,
the American institution encouraged students to seek change gradually
with Japan as a model, though the faculty opposed Japan's imperialistic
expansion into China. What St. John's hoped to produce were, as Ed-
ward Xu has written, "'practical patriots' and 'intelligent reformers' not
'hot-headed fanatics.'" Pott exemplified such thinking when he strongly
advocated "law and order," and believed the best form of democracy was
leadership of the ignorant masses by the best and wisest. He supported
the Western colonization of China, if not direct political control by the
Western powers, in order to introduce that superior Western culture to
China. However, Pott did not believe that the republican institutions of
the United States could be instantly transplanted to China. Teaching stu-
dents to become gradual reformers fit many students' psychology, in-
cluding Koo's, because they came from rich families who had no interest
in overturning their political and social system. Many students opposed
revolutionary change, as did Koo, and preferred a more conservative,
pragmatic approach to reform.30
St. John's gave young Koo an American education, and whatever
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misgivings about St. John's curriculum he maintained then or later, he
was diligent in his studies. In 1904, his peers voted him the "brightest
student."31 St. John's also gave him the educational background neces-
sary for study abroad. The Boxer Uprising underlined the necessity of
modernization and the need for Chinese students to go abroad to learn
from Japan and the West. The hope was that a new generation of young
Chinese, with their modern education, would rise up to save China.32
Between the Sino-Japanese War and the Revolution of 1911, more than
25,000 Chinese students traveled to Japan, some receiving a general edu-
cation while others were trained in military schools. Japan attracted the
Chinese because it was there that they could learn about the Western
ideas that enabled Japan to become a great power in less than fifty years.33
Several St. John's students hoped that China and Japan could form their
own alliance.34
While most students went to Japan, there were young Chinese who
preferred the United States. American missionaries and missionary
schools in China were willing to foot the students' bills if they opted for
an education in America. After 1908, over 2,000 students studied in the
United States because Washington returned an $11 million surplus of
the Boxer Indemnity to China for educational purposes. And there were
Chinese whose patriotic opposition to Japanese imperialism in China
influenced their choice of America over Japan.35
Young Koo's motivations for seeking an education in the United
States were not monetary in nature. His motivations were ideological to
the extent that he did aspire to greatness and at the same time truly de-
sired to help his people. China's moments of crisis and despair made an
impact on the young Koo who knew enough about China's great heri-
tage and history to understand that China had fallen from a high pedes-
tal. As a child growing up in the foreign settlement of Shanghai, he
resented the imperialist system. A seed of ambition was sown within
him to remove the humiliations imposed on his people during his child-
hood. The unequal treaties, the foreign privileges, the predominance of
the foreign powers over China's political structure and institutions, and
the persistent threat of the empire and later the republic dissolving away
compelled Koo to make China "a free and independent country,
undominated by any foreign nation; and enjoying the fundamental lib-
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erties and freedoms under the rule of law."36 His former wife later wrote
that he chose to study abroad in order to raise "China to its proper posi-
tion among world powers." And he himself exhorted Chinese students
in America to "make service to your mother country the aim of your
studies" and to fulfill their "task to help China ascend to that position in
the forefront to which she is entitled."37 Since he had been trained in an
American school, it made sense for him to travel to America. So in 1904,
Koo graduated from St. John's College and headed for the United States.
After spending a year at Cook Academy in Montour Falls, New York, he
entered Columbia University in September 1905.38
As a student there from 1905 to 1912, he immersed himself into
American culture. Unlike Chinese students who lacked time or confi-
dence to participate in American social functions, Koo proved quite out-
going, made many friends, and participated in numerous extracurricular
activities. Koo's involvement in so many extracurricular activities possi-
bly stemmed from more than just an extroverted or gregarious nature.
The answer may have resulted from a phenomenon that Ashis Nandy
has described as the "psychology of colonialism." Although China was
never formally colonized by the powers, one can say that Chinese like
Koo who grew up in the treaty ports experienced a colonization of the
mind. The foreigners criticized and ridiculed Chinese society and cul-
ture to such a great extent that many young Chinese internalized those
criticisms. In an atmosphere of crisis in which China seemed on the verge
of breakup and formal colonization, such criticisms seemed apt and led
some Chinese to become cultural dependents of the West. Just as Indi-
ans viewed the British as agents of progress and "saw in turn their salva-
tion in becoming more like the British," Koo may have felt the need to
become like the Americans by participating in athletics, debating societ-
ies, and drinking parties.39
Study abroad was a mind-opening experience for Koo and his Chi-
nese classmates. In its mere one-hundred-plus years of existence, the U.S.'s
political and industrial development far outdistanced China. And Ameri-
cans were not loath to wave that fact in the faces of Chinese students.
American travelers to China returned home ambivalent about the Chi-
nese. Whether holding the Chinese in respect or contempt, they agreed
that Chinese society was, across the board, in a state of arrested devel-
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opment.40 Arthur Smith, who later looked on the Chinese with greater
esteem, wrote in his book Chinese Characteristics that the Chinese people
showed a disregard for time and accuracy, a talent for misunderstand-
ing and indirection, and an absence of public spirit, sympathy, and
sincerity.41
Koo internalized such attacks on his culture and civilization in a
rather interesting fashion and accepted the claims that his country was
backward. In 1908, Koo returned to China. He traveled through the
Suez Canal, Colombo, Singapore, and Hong Kong before landing in
Shanghai. Shocked by the "poverty of the peoples of Asia," Koo later
described his voyage "as a disheartening spectacle all along the voyage
to see how poor the common people were in contrast with the pros-
perity and affluence of the West." When he arrived in Shanghai, the
contrast between his hometown and America was "sharp" making Koo
"realize how backward Shanghai was and how much needed to be done
to bring the country and the people into approaching the conditions
of living abroad." Although happy to see his family, the visit left Koo
frustrated and with a "desire to play my part later in the moderniza-
tion and rebuilding of China."42
The next year, Koo explained to John R. Mott of the YMCA that
others like himself had "to set aside [their] former prejudice and pride
and see China in her true condition." The modernity of the United States
led him to despair over "the utter helplessness of his country, perhaps
pouring forth a violent tirade against everything Chinese." Anger toward
China's backwardness did not mean that Koo and his compatriots lost
their affection for China. Their "love at heart for China" remained, Koo
continued, and they were spurred to "greater activity in the service of
[their] country." In comparison to Chinese who never went abroad, the
students' loved their country just as much. The only difference was that
the students were "only less clamorous and more careful."43
Living in the West clearly changed some of Koo's views about his
culture, but there were limits to his cultural borrowing. America affected
Koo's views of religion in general and Christianity in particular. Koo
seriously considered converting to Christianity in order to "purify me of
all worldly thoughts and enable me to devote the rest of my life to the
work of social welfare amongst the Chinese people." The insurmount-
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able obstacle was a promise to his mother to perform ancestral worship
by praying for her "departed spirit."44
Although unable to embrace the Christian spirit, he became West-
ernized in the manner dictated by the imperialist discourse. Before leav-
ing China, Koo cut off his queue, the symbol of subservience to the Qing
Dynasty, and bought Western-style clothing as required of all students
traveling to the United States. Yet, wearing Western clothes, sporting an
American haircut, playing poker or golf, and smoking cigars were merely
the facade of Westernization in Koo's mind. One had to adopt from the
West the ideas of modernization, progress, and democratization. Koo
and other students internalized American if not European imperialist
discourse that China was culturally backward if not bankrupt. And he
believed that Chinese students in America had the obligation to "trans-
port to their country Western thought and Western ideals;" "see to it
that. . . China does not fail to secure that form of constitutional gov-
ernment which will work for the greatest happiness for the greatest
number of people;" and "sweep away permanently such injurious so-
cial customs as opium-smoking and foot-binding." He did add the ca-
veat that China was "not like the potter's clay which will yield to any
form that may be applied to it." Koo did not support throwing away
everything Chinese, nor did he favor inundating China with every-
thing foreign.45
The cultural imperialism and racism that he experienced in the
United States did not transform him into an antiforeign nationalist, but
a patriot who wanted to save his country. To cure the ill, he put his finger
on the problem: "the weakness, inefficiency, and corruption of the
Manchu dynasty." He later claimed "that China could not be strong with-
out overthrowing this alien regime" and that "something was radically
wrong with the government" since it discouraged reforms. Yet, Koo also
believed that the root cause of Asia's backwardness in general and China's
in particular was foreign imperialism. The places that he passed through
on his trip home in 1908 "were colonies of the Western powers, either of
Great Britain or France, and I felt that was probably one of the main
reasons for their condition." China was no different. Koo and other Chi-
nese like him "felt that China's troubles were due to exploitation by the
Western powers."46
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Study abroad convinced Koo and his fellow compatriots that they
were, as one Chinese student at Yale put it, one of the "unique classes" in
Chinese society contributing to the "nation's development." Koo be-
lieved that the torch had been passed to his generation. Chinese stu-
dents like himself would become "the future leaders of China; her
statesmen and diplomats; her lawyers and engineers; her teachers and
professors; and her engineers and scientists of all kinds." They were given
the difficult responsibility of building "a new, strong and powerful na-
tion out of the old, tottering China, a nation which will be able to defend
her own rights, whenever necessary, and ready to assist in upholding
justice and peace throughout the world." And their duty was "to protect
and promote the prestige of China without and to evolve a modern state
within."47
While at Columbia, Koo made the decision to become a diplomat.
Koo's choice reflected the attitude of some at the time that diplomats
and diplomacy were potential saviors of the nation. Instead of using brute
military force to overthrow the imperialist system, diplomacy offered
more peaceful options. His desire to be a diplomat reflected some of the
changes occurring in China. Early in China's long history, certain offi-
cials were selected to learn the art of diplomacy and served in a profes-
sion deemed honorable and prestigious. In time, however, diplomacy
lost its allure, and few Chinese officials relished the idea of being dis-
patched to a far land to engage in talks with barbarians. By the nine-
teenth century, the Chinese bureaucracy was bereft of men who held an
informed opinion of foreign affairs. Instead, cosmopolitans like Li
Hongzhang surrounded themselves with a coterie of foreign affairs ex-
perts. During the Self-Strengthening Movement, Li implemented a num-
ber of foreign policy reforms including the creation of China's first foreign
office in 1861 and the establishment of China's first permanent diplo-
matic legations abroad. The need for diplomats, especially those well-
versed with the imperialists, grew.48
Yet, Koo also chose to become a diplomat because he wanted to
help his people. He later said that he "wanted to do something in a way
that would improve conditions in [China]." His goal was "to bring about
reforms, especially in the conduct of foreign relations." Count Cavour,
the man who worked to unify Italy in the nineteenth century and was a
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hero for Koo and other Chinese students, served as an example. Koo
learned that Cavour "was convinced that it (the unity of Italy) could
only come through diplomacy."49 Cavour was a model for Koo whom he
described as having one purpose in life: "free Italy from foreign oppres-
sion and unite all her parts into one compact State." Koo reached the
conclusion that as a diplomat he could play a role in the salvation of
China. At one point in his college career, he was asked by an American
classmate if he wanted to be "a pink-tie diplomat or render real service
to China." Koo replied, "[I am] all in earnest."50
His education assisted him in pursuing his career goal in several
respects. As a student at Columbia University, Koo edited the campus
newspaper and worked for the New York Herald, so he understood the
power of the press and propaganda to influence public opinion. He later
observed that many of the old diplomats of his early years "did not see
the importance of publicity abroad." Throughout his long career, he ran
propaganda machines, cultivated ties with foreign journalists, and sup-
plied materials to those he knew could influence world opinion in China's
favor. Koo was not above painting an untruthful picture of China in
order to get support for whatever regimes he represented. Koo tried to
use public opinion at home and abroad against the powers, though he
would learn after 1919 that public opinion often set limits on what he
could accomplish as a diplomat. He also believed that the diplomat was
an "intelligence officer." He had to be observant and search for hidden
meanings in the words used by the powers. Reading the foreign press
could give insights especially into a country's public opinion and public
understanding that was "reflected in the newspapers."51
Columbia also afforded Koo the opportunity to hone his skills as
orator and debater. Koo won numerous prizes while a student. Years later,
one classmate described Koo as Columbia's best orator "largely because
of his successful use of the debating technique of offering his oppo-
nents polite Oriental concessions and then demolishing them with a
sly and devastating thrust of logic."52 Koo was at his best when dealing
with Americans. Later, when Koo was Chinese minister to Washing-
ton, one observer noted that Koo "had as much of America in him as
he had of China. It was hard to think of him as an envoy from an East-
ern land." He proved an accomplished speaker in the West because of
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his firm grasp of English. His correspondence with Westerners was
written in perfect English. One of Koo's professors once remarked that
Koo wrote "English better than do most of those whose native tongue
is English."53
As a diplomat, Koo drew heavily on his oratory and debating skills,
but he also possessed a vast knowledge of international law. It was no
coincidence that Koo chose to study international law as a way to raise
China' status. From China's point of view, international law was of great
import. During the Self-Strengthening Movement, schools for the teach-
ing of Western languages and Western law were established to create a
new generation of professional diplomats. Efforts were made as well to
translate Western works on international law into Chinese. The Chinese
cosmopolitans concluded that their ignorance of Western law contrib-
uted to the signing away of their political rights and power to other coun-
tries. After 1898, Liang Qichao saw international law as China's road to
salvation. Since the Western powers viewed international law as one of
the "standards of civilization," China needed to embrace international
law if it were to achieve revision of the unequal treaties.54
For a young Chinese studying politics and international law, the
United States provided exceptional academic opportunities. Organized
in 1880, Columbia University's School of Political Science possessed a
number of prominent thinkers to introduce Koo to the latest ideas in
social science, law, and political science. And during Koo's Columbia years,
the study of international law enjoyed its heyday in the United States.
Between 1900 and 1910, Public International Law became a professional
discipline in which international lawyers, academics, and private citi-
zens, who were all interested in preventing war and promoting peace,
started journals, taught courses, and wrote books on the field. Many
American international lawyers saw arbitration as a method for creating
a new world order, though there were some who were dissatisfied with
arbitration as the sole legal tool for redressing disputes. Reflecting the
domestic preoccupations of progressive reformers of the day, these le-
galists wanted to bring order and rational thinking based on law to in-
ternational society. Most American legalists called for an international
court to settle disputes between nations. They believed that public opin-
ion, i.e., the views of the great powers, would be sufficient to enforce the
The Making of a Chinese Patriot 19
rules and punish offenders. But there were other ideas disseminated pub-
licly. In 1905, the year that Koo arrived in the United States, the Ameri-
can Society for International Law was created to become a forum for
discussing and debating the Hague Peace Conferences, world court, ar-
bitration, disarmament, and a "league to keep the peace."55
One of the creators of the new society became Koo's teacher, advi-
sor, and mentor. That individual was John Bassett Moore, who came to
Columbia in 1891 to occupy the Hamilton Fish Chair of International
Law and Diplomacy after serving as Assistant Secretary of State in the
Grover Cleveland administration. In years to come, the study of interna-
tional relations and the name of John Bassett Moore became synony-
mous, particularly after publication of his eight-volume Digest of the
International Law in 1906. He was later remembered as a "true gentle-
man and scholar who had a social and human approach that made con-
tact with him an inestimable privilege always remembered." Each year,
he taught four courses: a history of diplomacy, a history of American
diplomacy, international law, and a seminar on international law.56
If Koo wanted to pursue a career in diplomacy, Moore was the right
man under whom to study. Many international lawyers, including Elihu
Root and James B. Scott, distrusted diplomacy and diplomats, believing
that international law was a business solely for men of the bar.57 Moore
did not subscribe to their point of view. By contrast, he held several fa-
mous American diplomats such as John Hay and Benjamin Franklin in
high esteem and held them up for emulation. And Moore had practical
experience to pass on to Koo. What Moore learned from his experience
was that "diplomacy is war, war in peacetime and its weapons are differ-
ent." Koo combined Moore's description of diplomacy with the ideas of
the famous Chinese military strategist Sunzi who spoke of the need of
understanding yourself as well as your enemy. In diplomacy, one had to
"size up the opposing party and also your own strength."58
The "dear old professor," as Koo remembered him, also taught the
young Chinese that the story of international law was one of progress. A
major change in international politics was that the use offeree had proved
archaic and that many of the justifications for war had ceased to exist.
Evidence of international law's progress was seen as well in the emer-
gence of new rules of international behavior from congresses, such as
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the one at Vienna in 1815 and numerous treaties signed throughout the
nineteenth century that codified new rules for conducting war and peace.
The Western nations were also cooperating more than before, particu-
larly during the Age of Imperialism, which made the great powers more
interdependent, requiring more cooperation instead of conflict. If dis-
putes arose, the powers tended to rely on arbitration. Since arbitration
played such a prominent role in international politics, Moore argued for
a permanent system of arbitration in order to prevent disputes from
escalating into war and to prevent popular hysteria from pushing coun-
tries into war by allowing time for deliberation. To enforce decisions,
Moore advised reliance on "the most efficient of all sanctions, public
opinion."59
For Koo, international law and Moore's Digest were weapons to
wield in diplomatic warfare. The powers imposed unequal treaties on
the Chinese in part because they accused China of having a barbaric law
system. Before there could be order, there had to be law. According to
Moore, Japan became a member of the concert of nations because it
accepted international law, showing that the "standard of international
law" was a litmus test of a nation's "advancement in law, in morals, and
in civilization."
Koo's embracing of law in general and international law in par-
ticular revealed his desire to help China's international relations achieve
a status of civilized state. The notion of a "family of nations" was a West-
ern construct, not a Chinese one, but Koo wanted China to become a
member of the family of nations. China failed to meet such a litmus test
and American international lawyers were not above looking down their
noses at the Chinese. Indeed, one of Koo's American classmates remem-
bered that when, as a student at Columbia, Koo attended the American
Society of International Law conference in Washington, "the presence of
a Chinese member was looked upon as a not altogether welcome nov-
elty."60
Although constructs like the "family of nations" and the "standard
of international law" were imperialistic discourse, Koo assumed that if
China passed the litmus test, it would have a firmer basis upon which to
attack the unequal treaty system. In particular, he sought elimination of
extraterritoriality, which after all was premised on the powers' image of
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Chinese inferiority in civilization and in law. Whether through arbitra-
tion or appealing to a league to enforce peace, Koo doggedly sought to
make China a "free and independent country" by whatever diplomatic
means available. If the powers could be held to their rules of interna-
tional behavior, then China had less to fear with regard to its national
security. Koo claimed years later that the only solution for dealing with
the imperialist powers "was to stand firm on the country's rights and
negotiate without yielding any important ground."61 A strong China could
avoid compromise, but not a weak one. Throughout his long career, Koo
almost never negotiated from a position of strength. The result was that
Koo became the master of legalistic formulas designed to save face and
provide legal loopholes through which Koo could pursue a patriotic
agenda.
There was no contradiction between the imperialist discourse that
he internalized and his patriotism. Koo's thinking was similar to that of
the eminent Chinese intellectual Hu Shi, a graduate of Cornell and a
Ph.D. from Columbia University, who defined patriotism as love for one's
native land, but rejected "nationalism," which he viewed as a perverse
blind faith in the righteousness of one's cause. Koo could be patriotic
while accepting the rules of international behavior established by the
great powers. Such acceptance carried no pejorative connotations.62
Another aspect of Koo's thinking that carried no pejorative conno-
tation was his belief that China could look to, if not use, the United States
to secure patriotic goals. Throughout his long career, Koo used the Chi-
nese stratagem of playing one power against others. An acquaintance
remembered that in his speeches and talks given during his student years,
Koo often referred to China as a 'great helpless country.'63 Naturally, the
helpless needed a helper. In this regard, one can conjure up Koo's hero,
Count Cavour. Serving as both prime minister and foreign minister of
Sardinia, Cavour agreed with Italian nationalists of the nineteenth cen-
tury that the Austrians had to be driven out of Italy and that Italy must
be reunified. From his professors at Columbia, Koo learned that Cavour
"did not believe that unity could be secured without foreign aid." Cavour
declared, "Whether we like it or not, our destinies depend upon France;
we must be her partner in the great game which will be played sooner or
later in Europe."64
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Years of living and studying under American tutelage in Shanghai
and New York reinforced the notion of a "special relationship" between
the United States and China and the idea that the United States would
look after China's interests. Unlike the other powers in East Asia, it was
claimed that America would not exploit Beijing's weaknesses. Many
Americans, including Moore, sincerely believed that America's traditional
policy toward China, from the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia (the first Ameri-
can treaty with China) to John Hay's Open Door Notes of 1899-1900,
was to ensure freedom of trade and protect the independence of China
by opposing the partitioning of the Middle Kingdom.65 Theodore
Roosevelt's decision to return the surplus from America's part of the
Boxer Indemnity to the Qing Dynasty so that Chinese students could
afford study in the United States added another dimension to that spe-
cial relationship.66 Collaboration with a friend could only bring about ben-
efits for China. The Chinese Students' Monthly, of which Koo was once an
editor, declared that an alliance between the United States and China would
check "the unhealthy ambitions of some Powers" and bring about "speedy
reforms for China, a great market for America, and a real open door for
the world." Another editorial at that time declared, "The best friend our
country has is undoubtedly the United States of America. All through our
intercourse with each other, friendliness and justice have been the guiding
principles." Editorial cartoons in the Monthly reflected such sentiments.
One such cartoon, presumably done by a Chinese student, portrayed sleep-
ing China being awakened by Uncle Sam and his dogs. The dogs repre-
sented Young China and each dog wore a coat printed with the name of a
particular American university. China looks up at Uncle Sam and says,
"Hello, Sam! Glad you have so many barking dogs to wake me up."67
Long before the Chinese Communists began to use the pejorative
label "running dogs of the imperialists," Chinese students viewed such
images in a positive light. Like Koo, most Chinese students did not fear
the United States, but instead welcomed American hegemony in the Pa-
cific because it would bring peace to the region.68 Cavour depended on
France; whether he liked it or not, Koo depended on and manipulated
the United States for almost his entire career to save China from the
imperialists.
After completing the required class work for the doctorate degree,
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Koo researched and wrote his dissertation, which was eventually pub-
lished under the title The Status of Aliens in China. Koo chose this topic
for several reasons. One was his experience of being fined for breaking a
law of the Shanghai Municipal Council that Koo was not aware of be-
forehand and one that he thought largely unfair. Another was that the
topic was suggested by Winifried Scott, Moore's research assistant, who
advised Koo that if he wanted to be a diplomat, the topic "would put
[him] in the best position to deal with China's foreign relations later—
to see how China was mistreated, denied the rights to which a sovereign
nation was entitled under international law."69 Then there was, as Koo
wrote, the topic's relevance to the present: "Commerce, religion, travel
and other interests are drawing increasing numbers of foreigners into
China, and the question of their precise status, while residing or being
with her territory becomes today not only one of enhanced interest, but
one of growing practical importance." Such contact naturally led to "com-
plex problems" that could only be solved by possessing "an accurate
knowledge of the rights, privileges and immunities which they [foreign-
ers] are entitled to enjoy under laws and treaties, and of the limitations
and restrictions arising from the same sources of sanction, upon such
rights, privileges and immunities." Finally, Koo argued that his work filled
a gap on the literature on extraterritoriality because he was not "aware of
any work in existence which considers the status of aliens in China as a
class, or from the Chinese point of view."70
The Status of Aliens in China is an important work because its con-
clusions say more about the author than they do about the Chinese them-
selves or the foreigners in China. The heart of the book examined
extraterritoriality and the protection it afforded foreigners as well as its
limitations. The book attacked the whole imperialist system. Koo wrote
that unlike Turkey, China never had the custom of granting extraterrito-
riality to aliens. Instead, China early in its history granted aliens "many
privileges and ample protections" and placed few restrictions on the right
of aliens to travel within the empire. China eventually shifted to what
Koo described as a "closed-door policy," but this was done for defensive
purposes. By the 1500s, Europeans were already engaged in imperialism
in Asia, and China experienced internal strife. China's rulers, "keenly
apprehensive lest the strangers from the West might take advantage of
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China's weaknesses and resort to schemes of occupation and conquest,"
placed restrictions on foreigners. The Chinese also took a more conser-
vative stance as a result of the "bloody contests of mercantile avarice, the
conspiracy and intrigue, to which the Portuguese, the Dutch and the
English did not blush to resort for the purpose of excluding one another
and thereby securing a monopoly of trade."71
China's closed-door policy increased dissatisfaction on the part of
foreign merchants who, "driven by the spirit of mercantile avarice" and
unwilling to submit to Chinese laws as the foreign missionaries did,
wanted more privileges than the Chinese were willing to grant. The Chi-
nese sought to maintain their "territorial sovereignty" by making impe-
rial laws supreme. When the Chinese implemented antiopium policies
in the 1830s, they operated on the assumption that China was simply
"exercising a right appertaining to a sovereign and independent nation."
Hence, foreigners did not enjoy the privilege of extraterritoriality until
China signed, "without her consent and countenance," treaties with the
Western powers beginning with that "expensive and ignoble" Opium War
of 1839-1842. Koo argued that foreigners wantonly ignored and vio-
lated Chinese laws and exaggerated when they condemned China's law
system as barbaric, claiming it took "life for life" in cases of involuntary
manslaughter. Koo defended China, saying that the Chinese law system
was not as harsh as claimed nor as barbaric as the British law system that
put people to death for numerous reasons, some quite trivial.72
In reading Koo's description of how the unequal treaties came to
be imposed on China, Koo's disdain for the British and his view of the
United States as a friendly power were evident. Koo labeled British disre-
spect for Chinese law as "characteristic Anglo-Saxon pride and faith in
the superiority of their own race and in the supremacy of their own
institutions that they could not see how any of their countrymen could
have committed a crime in China "He declared that the extraterrito-
rial system that Great Britain, not the United States, erected in China
was done "without sanction of the law of nations and in defiance of the
Chinese government" and that recognition of extraterritoriality "had ul-
timately been wrung out from the Chinese Emperor only by force of
arms." True, the United States enjoyed the privilege of extraterritoriality.
But the Treaty of Wangxia operated on the erroneous assumption that
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extraterritoriality existed previously in Europe, Asia, and Africa until it
disappeared from Europe with the creation of modern nation-states that
"developed a common law of nations, with its doctrines of equality and
territorial sovereignty." Christian nations deemed extraterritoriality as
the "rule of international law" in dealing with pagan states that had prac-
ticed extraterritoriality. China, Koo argued, was different from the Middle
East and Africa in that it "had already developed into a well-organized
political entity" that did not have the custom of extraterritoriality. More-
over, American merchants, unlike their British counterparts, showed no
inclination to be exempted from Chinese law, though the Chinese had
already decided to grant to the Americans what had been given to the
British.73
In line with Koo's patriotism, the book attacked the unequal treaty
system by looking at two particular groups that benefited from extrater-
ritoriality—merchants and missionaries. Foreigners used past Chinese
antiforeignism as an excuse for maintaining the system, but Koo de-
clared that despite "frequent allegations that the Chinese are exclusive
and antiforeign, foreigners in China enjoy very many rights and privi-
leges which are not accorded to aliens in other countries." Koo admitted
that such rights as extraterritoriality were the products of treaties forced
on the Chinese by the foreigners, but he claimed "that their peaceful
enjoyment of it has been made possible only by the favorable disposition
toward them alike of the Government and people of China." No matter
whether before or after 1842, Koo claimed that the Chinese overall main-
tained a "favorable disposition toward foreigners as such which led China
to accord them the privilege of unrestricted intercourse with her own
subjects and place them on an equal footing with the latter."74 Although
the Chinese imposed restrictions on foreigners at various times, they did
so not because of any xenophobia inherent in Chinese culture. Instead,
such measures were adopted "for protection against their [rights and
privileges] abuse of the extraordinary immunities which they [foreign-
ers] enjoy."
As for attacks made on Christian missionaries, Koo acknowledged
their seriousness and the "disastrous consequences to China" brought
about by such events. The Boxer Uprising was a prime example. How-
ever, Koo argued that the Chinese people did not attack missionaries
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because of an inborn xenophobic mindset, but because of the "igno-
rance of the masses." And in many cases, such local incidents were ex-
ploded into international crises "whenever any of the treatypowers sought
to make political capital out of the unfortunate killing of one or two of
its venturesome missionaries."75 Koo pointed to the fact that since the
Boxer Uprising, there were few instances of attacks made against mis-
sionaries because of efforts on both sides to maintain peaceful rela-
tions.
In making his arguments, Koo clearly imposed his own disposition
and world view on the Chinese at large. He was not antiforeign per se,
but more cosmopolitan than the average Chinese. More so than most, he
welcomed the missionary and the merchant. Both contributed to China's
social and economic progress. Koo was willing to open China's door to
foreigners, particularly to the China market. Businessmen went to China
thinking that since China had such a huge population, there was a po-
tential market for whatever goods they possessed.76 The China market
never fulfilled expectations and proved largely to be a myth. For much of
the twentieth century, though, many foreign and Chinese businessmen
accepted that notion as valid including Koo. Throughout his career, he
would argue that the Chinese people, since they numbered in the mil-
lions, could produce enough goods to compete with the outside world.
He would also turn that notion on its head and appeal for foreign help to
deal with many crises by waving the China market in the powers' faces.
In other words, Koo tried to lure the other powers into aiding China in
checking Japanese colonialism, for example, by pointing to how Japan
threatened the China market. And, he was willing to threaten a country's
access to the China market with boycotts as a form of economic coer-
cion to obtain political goals.
In any case, Koo acknowledged the need to reform Chinese laws
that limited interaction between Chinese and foreigners, but asserted
that until the system of extraterritoriality was eliminated, "it is unlikely
that China will be anxious to level down the barriers which now stand in
treaties between the open ports and the interior, or to remove the re-
strictions, which are now found in her laws, upon the freedom of the
foreign merchant to share in the unprecedented opportunities for trad-
ing and investment throughout the country." If the foreigners wanted to
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engage in trade in the great China market, extraterritoriality had to go.
China only desired a quid pro quo relationship with the foreign powers:
let us enforce our own laws and we can permit you your "desired free-
dom and free development of commerce."77
Koo's analysis also reflected some ideas current among American
internationalists, particularly the notion that trade barriers led to war.
One tenet of the American peace movement at this time was that access
to markets prevented conflict between states. Some in the American peace
movement referred to this concept as economic internationalism when
arguing that commercial relations bound all merchants, manufacturers
and laborers of all nations together "in a community of interests which
has made and is evermore making powerfully for peace." In Britain,
Norman Angell described the world as so financially interdependent that
market downturns in one country could spread in ripple-like fashion to
other countries.78 In defense of his country, Koo claimed that China "has
in recent years opened up on her own initiative, a number of new places
to foreign trade and has already set herself to the task of improving her
mercantile system to meet the needs of foreign commerce."79 Coopera-
tion between the foreigners and China promoted commerce and peace.
During his years as a diplomat, Koo often used the concepts of the China
market and of interdependence in order to persuade the other powers of
the necessity of preventing the colonization of China on the grounds
that the only outcome would be war and financial distress.
Koo had faith in the idea that China and the world could cooperate
in a way that fulfilled mutual interests. Probably he was trying to dispel
the Western stereotype of Chinese as barbarous and savage in the man-
ner of Genghis Khan.80 Koo and others often tried to convince their lis-
teners that Chinese were lovers of peace. Koo claimed that the social
unrest that affected foreign interests in recent years was more a result of
a weak central government than a culturally inbred hostility.
Before Koo completed his dissertation, revolution against the Qing
Dynasty broke out on October 10,1911, and by December, Sun Yat-sen,
who for years had been trying to overthrow the Qing regime by force,
was made provisional president. In 1909, Sun visited Koo at Columbia
and shared his political philosophy with the young man. Reflecting on
the Revolution, Koo wrote that the "people of the nation have overthrown
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the worn-out regime of hoary antiquity and are erecting on new foun-
dations a strong and efficient government." With the "moral support" of
the powers, "the rise of a powerful and progressive China will surely be
hastened a hundredfold. And China in progress and power means the
Far East in permanent peace."81 The notion of a benign China is impor-
tant because it is a theme that appears often in Koo's later speeches. Al-
though usually not very specific about the idea, Koo implied that China
would never engage in territorial expansion beyond its borders and
threaten other nations.
Koo had nearly completed his dissertation in March 1912 when he
was offered the position of English secretary to Yuan Shikai. Yuan be-
came president of the new Republic of China after Sun Yat-sen stepped
down as president in favor of Yuan in an effort to establish unity be-
tween the north and south. Tang Shaoyi, who was premier and once a
student in the United States himself, recommended Koo to Yuan. Koo
first met Tang in 1908 when the latter was in the United States to discuss
the remission of the Boxer Indemnity surplus with President Roosevelt
and to persuade the U.S. government to invest capital in Manchuria.
Before traveling to the United States, Yuan told Tang "to look out for
bright young men with a view to recommending them for service in
China." The purpose was to fill posts throughout the bureaucracy with
individuals who had majored in political science, international law, di-
plomacy or the humanities.82 In other words, the new government looked
for experts in their fields who would be loyal to the government and give
the government a veneer of legitimacy.
Personal relationships or connections (guanxi) were also vital. Two
relationships besides family were important for success in government:
a schoolmate connection and a locality connection.83 Koo did not have
many classmates in the foreign ministry, but there were people like W.W.
Yen—who had a teacher/student relationship with Koo—and Alfred
Sze—Koo's relative—who represented the so-called St. John's faction.
And, many in the government—Tang Shaoyi, Lu Zhengxiang, W.W. Yen
and Alfred Sze to name a few—were from Shanghai. When Tang Shaoyi
arrived in the United States, Yen was the Washington Legation's Secre-
tary and he made arrangements for young Chinese men throughout the
United States to meet with Tang. Koo impressed Tang so much that he
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chose the young man to be his son-in-law and later recommended him
to Yuan Shikai.84 Before traveling to the United States, Koo's father ar-
ranged a marriage with a traditional Chinese woman in Shanghai whose
father was a physician, but in 1908, Koo secured a divorce from the
woman. Koo claimed he "was too modern and too imbued with western
ideas" to accept an arranged marriage, especially one with someone who
lacked a cosmopolitan background or education. Not long after, Koo
remarked that "the influence of modern civilization" had nearly destroyed
the social system of matchmaking, which he described as making "hun-
dreds of thousands of families . .. unhappy and millions of lives of the
ill-mated couples... miserable."85 At any rate, Koo married Tang's daugh-
ter, May, in June 1913. May, like her siblings, had been taught English,
studied Chinese history, and was encouraged to take interest in current
events. Besides her strengths as a future diplomat's wife, this consumma-
tion with May Tang was viewed by some foreign observers as "politically
wise," with the foreign and Chinese communities generally assuming that
the main motive was that the bride's father was an influential man in Chi-
nese politics who could prove "useful to [an] aspiring young man in the
Chinese diplomatic service." In a country where personal connections were
essential to success and where nearly all marriages were made on the basis
of convenience, not love, (though it is apparent that Koo did love or come
to love May Tang), marriages like his to May Tang were not atypical.86
As a young man committed to making China free in his lifetime,
Koo jumped at the offer to serve a man whom he, as chairman of the
Patriotic Committee of Chinese Students in the United States, asked the
United States to accord diplomatic recognition.87 The Chinese minister
advised Koo to "purchase all the indispensable works on international
law and diplomacy, with particular reference to China." Koo bought a set
of Foreign Relations of the United States and Moore's Digest of Interna-
tional Law, submitted his dissertation upon his return to Columbia and
arrived in China in May 1912, where he went to work for the new presi-
dent of China.88 Koo embarked on a diplomatic career that would span
over forty years. He came of age in an atmosphere of crisis, and he re-
turned to a China where the fear of partitionment pervaded the govern-
ment. And unknown to Koo, his country would soon be confronted with
the crisis of Japanese imperialism.
Chapter 2
CHINA AND WORLD WAR I
IN 1912, KOO WENT TO WORK for a government that was faced with
numerous problems and was searching for solutions. The new govern-
ment needed a constitution, diplomatic recognition, and a loan. The
powers refused to grant the new government recognition and money
until it proved to be stable and willing to abide by the unequal treaties.
Internal stability proved more difficult to achieve. Soon after Koo went
to work, Tang Shaoyi broke with Yuan Shikai when the latter refused to
appoint a fellow revolutionary to take over the military governorship of
Zhili Province, where Beijing was located. Although Koo tendered his
resignation, he was back in Beijing working in the foreign ministry within
a few weeks, much to Tang's regret. And he remained loyal to Yuan even
after Sun Yat-sen's political party, now renamed the GMD, won a majority
in parliament and expected one of its members to replace Yuan as presi-
dent. Instead, the man was assassinated presumably at the behest of Yuan
who did not believe in constitutional succession of power, particularly in
his own case. The assassination led to a civil war that Yuan easily quashed.
The GMD was outlawed and Sun Yat-sen spent some time in exile.1
Besides these internal problems, the specter of partition remained.
In 1913, the Treaty Study Commission, of which Koo was a member,
observed that the powers delayed recognition of Yuan's government be-
cause they had territorial ambitions and really did not want see a stable
government in China. Russia sought sovereignty over Mongolia, which
declared independence in 1911, and Britain pursued sovereignty over
Tibet which declared independence in 1913.2 Although a republic, men
30
China and World War I 31
QAHAR p
J
HEBEI
,•;•
HENAN \
' • • • \
n
' • • . . . . - - • • • . . . . . . . . /
Beijing V '
/y^BoHa
( v Bay
f) '"*/ j s
SHANDONG j
...... JIANGSU f/
NHUI^^X.IA
LIAONING
Wei ha i
^^^-^Br i t i sh leasehold)
VQingdao
)> (German leasehold)
Yellow
Sea
\ 0 50 100
miles
Map 2. Shandong Province Railroads
like Koo believed that China's boundaries should be that of the old Qing
Empire. At his presidential inauguration in 1912, Yuan Shikai described
the Chinese republic as a unified state that included Manchuria, Mongolia,
and Tibet. And foreign-educated or native, the consensus among gov-
ernment officials was that China could not suffer further foreign en-
croachment, and territories lost had to be recovered. In Koo's mind, every
loss enabled an imperialist power to make inroads into the country at
China's expense.3
Foreign affairs naturally captured most of Yuan Shikai's attention,
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and fortunately he possessed much experience in that arena. Born in
1859, Yuan chose a military career and oversaw much of the military
modernization that took place in the final years of the Qing Dynasty. In
1907, Yuan was named head of the ministry of foreign affairs. For the
next two years, he attempted to recover China's rights and at the same
time tried to use U.S. investments in Manchuria to offset Japanese en-
croachment in the northeast. Although some Chinese elites were critical
of his close association with the Western powers, Yuan saw the folly of
trying to throw the foreigners out of China as the Boxers had attempted
to do a few years before, and recognized the potential benefits that coop-
eration with friendly powers could entail.4
Like his subordinates, Yuan wanted to bring Mongolia and Tibet
back into the ROC's control, and he wanted to eliminate the specter of
partition. To assist him, Yuan Shikai filled the foreign ministry bureau-
cracy with Western- and Japanese-educated Chinese men. In this way,
Yuan surrounded himself with men whose foreign affairs expertise and
skills he could draw upon. He needed U.S.-educated men like Koo be-
cause China dealt with Western imperialist powers, in particular Britain
and the United States. Koo spoke their language and was trained in Anglo-
American history, diplomacy, and rules for international behavior. He
better understood Anglo-American thinking and could better advise the
president. Moreover, the selection of foreign-educated men to govern-
ment posts, especially those with a law background like that of Koo's,
showed the foreign powers that China was civilized and had a firm foun-
dation in Western law. Finally, by appointing foreign-educated Chinese
to positions of power, Yuan hoped to improve relations with particular
countries. Yuan's decision to employ Japanese-educated men was calcu-
lated to provide peace and stability in Sino-Japanese relations. In the
same respect, the employment of Koo and others like him was done in
order to win American financial backing, and Yuan often reminded Ameri-
cans that his government relied heavily on U.S.-trained specialists.5
Some of Yuan's Chinese protagonists faulted him at the time for
gathering about him foreign-educated men that lacked the qualifications
to serve in government. Fortunately for Koo, Yuan permitted these young
men to obtain diplomatic experience. He met with his "brain-trust" of
foreign-educated officials in order to get their input before making some
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major decisions, a n d worked closely wi th his subordinates , hover ing in
the background whenever they engaged the foreign powers . W h e n Yuan
assigned Koo to negotiate wi th the British minister, Yuan carefully went
over their notes of conversation, mark ing in red or b lue poin ts to be
ignored or emphasized. "In short," Koo remarked later, "President Yuan
was painstaking in his handl ing of foreign relations and m a d e himself
responsible for wha t the government did." The result was a deep loyalty
for a m a n later r emembered o n b o t h sides of the Taiwan Strait as dicta-
tor and "father of the warlords." In Koo's est imation, Yuan was "a m a n of
great ambition and determination, a born leader of men," a "man of
action," and a "good administrator." He was "fairly modern, even liberal"
while at the same time authoritarian, and he was "a patriot in the sense
that he was most jealous of China's sovereignty in conducting foreign
relations."6
In 1913, Koo was promoted to counselor to the foreign ministry,
being responsible to the foreign minister and ultimately to Yuan Shikai.
The promotion put Koo in a position to gain needed diplomatic experi-
ence and to put his book knowledge of diplomacy and international law
to use. China's foreign minister for most of the 1910s was Lu Zhengxiang,
a former Chinese minister to Holland and Russia who married a Belgian
woman and converted to Catholicism. Lu wanted the foreign ministry to
mirror that of the West and wanted diplomatic posts filled by profes-
sionals trained for or experienced in diplomacy. Koo assisted Lu in es-
tablishing a new foreign ministry. Some Qing officials were retained
because of their knowledge of certain diplomatic cases between China
and the powers.7 In an effort to manipulate U.S. public opinion, Koo
convinced the foreign ministry to fund the Far Eastern Information Bu-
reau, which was originally created by the Chinese legation in Washing-
ton to counter criticisms of the new ROC. The Bureau sold news copy to
newspapers in the United States including editorials that urged Ameri-
can businessmen to invest their money in China, or launched attacks
against the unequal treaty system.8
During the time in which Koo experienced promotion, Yuan Shikai's
position seemed more secure. The United States under Woodrow Wilson's
leadership broke from the Six-Power Consortium, which he deemed
imperialistic and a monopoly, and unilaterally recognized Yuan's gov-
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ernment. The powers followed suit late that year, and the Consortium
granted Yuan a Reorganization Loan. Unfortunately, the peace and sta-
bility that Yuan's government needed to solidify its hold over China was
shattered the next year with the outbreak of World War I. War in Europe
magnified the specter of China's destruction. Since the combatants had
imperial interests in China, the threat of the European conflict becom-
ing a world war was real. If China joined the allies by declaring war on
Germany, Yuan feared that it would only arouse Japanese suspicions.
Instead, he advocated a policy of neutrality. On August 6,1914, the Chi-
nese officially declared their territory and territorial waters off-limits to
belligerent operations by the warring powers.9
The war in Europe gave Japan a golden opportunity to pursue im-
perial aspirations in China. To protect Britain's colony in Hong Kong
and its concession at Weihaiwei, the British proposed that the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance be invoked to defeat Germany's China naval squadron
and protect British commercial shipping in Chinese waters. Japan in-
tended to use the alliance to fill the imperial political vacuum in Asia
created by the European War.10 In mid-August, Japan demanded the sur-
render of the German fortress at Qingdao.
Yuan tapped Koo's skills during this national crisis. Utilizing his
international law background, Koo authored the twenty-four article
document announcing China's neutrality. Yuan also used Koo to approach
the U.S. embassy in Beijing. Yuan recognized that the United States in-
creasingly viewed Japan as a competitor, and tried to take advantage of
U.S.-Japanese tensions. In the days before Japan's ultimatum to the Ger-
mans, Beijing requested that the United States and Japan assist China in
obtaining the consent of the other powers to respect China's neutrality.
The same day that China proclaimed neutrality, Koo expressed to an
American diplomat the Chinese hope that the United States would offer
its good offices in limiting the war theater to Europe by neutralizing the
foreign concessions and proposing that the warring powers maintain
the status quo in East Asia. Japan's ultimatum for a German surrender
however undercut the Chinese effort.11 Explaining that Japanese capture
of Qingdao menaced China's independence, the Chinese implored Wash-
ington to approach Britain and Germany with a proposal to immedi-
ately transfer the leased Shandong territory to China in order to avert
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hostilities. Washington viewed such steps to be provocative and refused
to take action.12
Neutrality and attempts to use the Americans to restrain Japan hav-
ing failed, Yuan Shikai called a cabinet meeting to discuss China's next
move. When Yuan solicited his opinion, Koo argued for war. Yuan re-
jected that option because of China's military weakness. On September
3, Yuan established a war zone around Qingdao so as to restrict Japanese
military operations. This move allowed China to maintain neutrality and
avoid responsibility for damages incurred by the warring powers. Once
more, Yuan tried to bring the United States into the conflict. Koo inter-
preted the 1908 Root-Takahira Agreement, in which both the United
States and Japan agreed to respect China's territorial integrity as stating
that Japan needed to consult the United States before landing troops on
Chinese soil. The Americans quickly disabused Koo of such notions,
pointing out that Japan and the United States would only consult one
another in "the case of internal disorders in China." Washington was not
about to be dragged into a war to defend China's territorial integrity
against Japan and Great Britain.13
On the day that the war zone was established, the Japanese navy
landed troops on Shandong's coast. In November, the German garrison
surrendered, presenting the Chinese with the specter of Japanese expan-
sionism into Shandong Province and elsewhere. The Chinese had good
reason to be fearful. In the aftermath of Qingdao's fall, some Japanese
military men spoke of an "Asian Monroe Doctrine" in which Asia would
be controlled by Asians, not the white man. For Koo, Japan's capture of
Qingdao was another humiliation for China, and marked the beginning
of an eight-year effort to resolve the Shandong Question.14
Having failed to prevent Japanese expansion onto Chinese soil, Koo
and his compatriots were not defeatists. Using publicity to influence world
opinion, he supplied material to journalists who he knew would be criti-
cal of Japan. And in an effort to manipulate the United States, Koo met
with Paul Reinsch, the U.S. minister to China, on a regular basis. The
young Chinese recognized that the former University of Wisconsin pro-
fessor possessed a "great sympathy for the Chinese people and the Chi-
nese cause" and was popular with Chinese in and out of the government.
Little wonder since a subordinate described Reinsch as seeming "to have
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accepted quite without criticism the handy popular division of the na-
tions of the world into the predatory, the non-predatory and the altruis-
tic, i.e., ourselves." Because of his feelings for China and manipulation
by men like Koo, Reinsch sent Woodrow Wilson numerous telegrams
complaining that Washington did nothing for a people who allegedly
modeled their government after that of the United States.15
Understanding that the United States would not act anytime soon,
the foreign ministry established a commission, of which Koo was a mem-
ber, to analyze how to resolve the Shandong Question. The government
believed that China needed to attend the future peace conference sure to
be held once hostilities in Europe ceased. China had to have a seat and a
say at such a conference and not allow Qingdao's fate be determined by
others. With their knowledge of international law and diplomatic his-
tory, the Chinese outlined several strategies for making sure that neutral
China obtained a seat, and if not, made its voice heard. They feared not
only injustice, but also that the powers would obstruct China's efforts to
participate in the peace process.16
While in the midst of preparing for the future conference, Japan
dealt China another blow. With the shift in the balance of power in Japan's
favor, Tokyo took advantage of its hold on parts of Shandong Province
and the political vacuum in East Asia to assert its power over China. On
January 18,1915, Japan presented China with the infamous Twenty-One
Demands. The demands required China not only to agree to allow Japan
and Germany to determine the final disposition of the former German
leasehold in Shandong, but to concede more rights in Manchuria. The
harshest demands, Group V, sought to turn China into a Japanese pro-
tectorate. Japan told Yuan that China had to accept the demands if better
relations were to exist between the two countries. If China did not agree
to the demands, Japan would back Chinese revolutionaries interested in
Yuan's overthrow.17
Koo and the rest of Yuan Shikai's advisors suggested stalling in ne-
gotiations and leaking the existence of the demands and details of the
negotiations in the hope that the powers would act in concert to restrain
Japan. If stalling and the leaks failed, war with Japan was preferable to
becoming a colony. War was not an option for Yuan Shikai. Years later,
Koo recalled that Yuan was not surprised by Japan's actions because the
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other powers were preoccupied in Europe.18 Yuan believed that Japan
would be seen as a threat to the O p e n Door in China, and hoped that the
United States would pu t pressure o n the Japanese. Meanwhile, Yuan had
his negotiators stall for t ime while waiting for favorable reactions from
abroad.
Negotiations commenced and the Japanese demanded secrecy. Yuan
originally picked Koo to be one of the Chinese negotiators, bu t the Japa-
nese diplomats, for reasons unexplained, rejected his presence. Never-
theless, Koo played a vital role dur ing the negotiations. Koo believed
that Washington needed to be made aware of the demands as did Great
Britain with its economic interests in the Yangzi River valley. He made
frequent visits to the American and British legations, and leaked infor-
mat ion to Western news agencies, m u c h to the irri tation of the Japa-
nese.19 And to a certain extent, the publicity worked. The Americans and
the British alike initially treated the rumors of Group V as exaggerated. As
knowledge of the demands slowly reached Washington, the White House
grew so concerned that President Wilson issued a note on March 13 that
upheld the principle of the Open Door. Unwilling to confront Japan,
Wilson refused to go further. Britain issued a note of its own, bu t the
British preferred to preserve the Anglo-Japanese Alliance rather than
having a showdown with its ally at a m o m e n t when it fought for survival
in Europe.20 Even so, the notes issued by the British and Americans were
effective in convincing the Japanese to drop Group V.
To everyone's surprise, though, Japan issued an u l t ima tum to the
Beijing government to accept the amended demands , less Group V, by
May 9 or face war. The United States urged bo th sides to cont inue nego-
tiations and no t resort to war. The British, on the other hand , advised
the Chinese to acquiesce in order to keep the peace. Yuan's generals leaned
toward war with Japan, bu t Yuan and the rest of his cabinet opposed
conflict because China was too weak militarily to resist. He could expect
no more than protests from the United States and advice from Britain.
O n May 25, Yuan acceded to the demands , except Group V, which were
to be negotiated later.21
Koo wrote the Chinese reply to the Japanese u l t imatum. The reply
was a crucial documen t in that Koo looked to the future peace confer-
ence to right this wrong. In his reply to the Japanese u l t imatum, Koo
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made it clear that China had been "constrained to comply with the full
terms of the Ultimatum." This statement was critical because at the Paris
Peace Conference, Koo argued time and again that China was forced by
threat of arms to sign this treaty with Japan. Koo hoped to create a legal
loophole by which he could argue for the return of Qingdao to China.
His reply also stated that the Chinese "disclaim any desire to associate
themselves with any revision" of past agreements between the powers to
protect China's territorial integrity and maintain the "principle of equal
opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China."22 In
this respect, Koo clearly wanted to drive a wedge between Japan and the
Western powers by convincing the West that Japan, not China, was a
revisionist country and threatened Western order in Asia.
Realistically speaking, though, Koo's reply did not change the situ-
ation on the ground. The Japanese threat remained in place. For the
Chinese people, the treaty was another national humiliation, and many
blamed Yuan. Eugene Chen, editor of a local Chinese newspaper, told
one foreigner that "the only man" in the "rotten" foreign ministry was
V.K. Wellington Koo. From Yuan Shikai's point of view, he succeeded in
avoiding war with Japan. As for the powers, the British were pleased that
war had been averted, and that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remained
intact. The United States issued its reservation and refused, much to
Japan's chagrin, to recognize the agreement because, in American eyes, it
undermined the Open Door principles. Such statements sowed seeds of
suspicion and rivalry in U.S.-Japanese relations, but not enough to lead
to a break in relations.23 Otherwise, Japan still occupied Qingdao and
other areas of Shandong. The distant peace conference remained a faint
hope at best. China did not have the political and military power to fight
either for Shandong's liberation or to lure allies against Japan. Discover-
ing some other approach was necessary if China was to roll back Japa-
nese expansion.
Yuan's fear of Japan did not diminish after May, but rather was
enhanced. China stood on the brink of destruction from forces within
and without. The best solution in his mind was to establish a monarchy.
Yuan considered a monarchy to be superior to a republic. Just months
after becoming president, his U.S.-educated secretary, Admiral Cai
Tinggan, told an American engineer that a "limited monarchy would be
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better than a Republic of China," and confidently predicted that China
would have a military dictatorship. In the three years that Koo served
Yuan Shikai, Yuan showed little respect for the institution of the presi-
dency to which he swore an oath, the Provisional Constitution of 1912,
or the power of China's Parliament. After the Twenty-One Demands
episode, Yuan observed that since China was a republic and Japan a
monarchy, there was "no meeting of the minds." Monarchy in China could
improve Sino-Japanese relations. Yuan also made it known to his Chinese
and foreign associates that he favored restoring the monarchy in order to
unify the country and be in a position to be better able to "enforce his will"
on a people who did not understand the meaning of "president."24
If the monarchy was to return to China, Yuan needed the support
of Chinese officialdom and the foreign powers. And the man selected in
August 1915 to sell Yuan's decision to the United States was V.K.
Wellington Koo. Yuan held Koo in high regard. While complaining to
George Morrison, an Australian political advisor, that China had few
men "of character, knowledge and judgment," Yuan remarked that "of all
the foreign trained students, he had met only two who had acquired
knowledge and the ability to apply it," one of whom was Wellington Koo.
But foremost in Yuan's mind was the fact that Koo had been a loyal ser-
vant. Despite Yuan's trashing of republicanism, Koo, who had rhetori-
cally supported a republic over a monarchy and wore the symbols of the
republic, such as a short haircut and Western clothing, said nothing nor
did he resign in opposition. Then there was the fact that Koo spoke ex-
cellent English, was U.S.-educated, and knew many important people in
the U.S., including Woodrow Wilson.25
On August 5, 1915, Koo left China for Washington, and officially
became Chinese minister on October 25. His salary was $1,800 per month
with an entertainment allowance of $2,400. Koo's primary task was to
persuade Americans that China's first republic had no choice but to re-
turn to the monarchical form of government. Koo's mission was to lay a
public relations groundwork in the United States in preparation for Yuan's
assumption of the throne as well as to gauge public opinion. Whether
Koo had any qualms about the monarchical movement is unclear. He
may have agreed with his former professor, Frank Goodnow, who ar-
gued that China's historical and cultural heritage, as well as its present
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political, economic and social condition, militated against the viability of
a republican form of government for China. Goodnow pointed to Portu-
gal, Mexico and other countries as lessons in the failure of republicanism.
Indeed, Koo first received his appointment as Chinese minister to Mexico,
and the British minister explained that Koo's mission was to obtain
"unfavourable reports of the working of Republican institutions in that
country, which may prove useful in promoting the . . . re-establishment of
Monarchical Government in China." Whatever Koo's thoughts about the
Monarchical Movement, Koo feared a backlash against Yuan's desire to
be emperor, and admitted to Paul Reinsch that Yuan himself was dubi-
ous of success.26
Selling the monarchical movement to the United States proved to
be no easy task. The powers opposed Yuan's scheme, fearing that it would
create instability in China. The U.S. State Department agreed that Yuan's
ascension to the throne would lead to insurrection. President Wilson
preferred a postponement, but felt that China's change in form of gov-
ernment was a Chinese domestic question and that to make protests was
an infringement of Chinese sovereignty. Yuan agreed to delay his plans
but tried to throw his lot in with the allies and declare war on Germany.
He now saw that China's entrance into the war would be advantageous
in many respects: China could end its unequal treaties with Germany
and Austria, profit from arms sales to the allies, and have a voice at the
peace conference, assuming the allies were victorious. The Western pow-
ers were supportive, but Japan nixed the proposal on the grounds that
China's participation in the conflict would only undermine peace and
stability in China.27
In the meantime, the monarchical movement was still on. Ignoring
his doubts about the movement's chances, Koo used his rhetorical skills
to persuade Americans to welcome the retreat from republicanism. In
January 1916, Koo told the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence that his people fully supported Yuan Shikai's move to become em-
peror, though he failed to point out that there were now signs of
opposition. He told his audience that the Chinese only wanted to "be let
alone and given a free hand to work out their country's destiny,
unharassed by fear of aggression from the strong, and assured of a just
and equitable treatment in the hands of all." In another speech, Koo de-
China and World War I 41
clared that China faced the same problems that confronted the infant
United States of 130 years before. Just as there was disunity among the
thirteen states, China consisted of twenty-two provinces including Ti-
bet, Mongolia, and territory in Central Asia, which were roughly divided
into north and south. Unifying the country "required the foresight and
wisdom of a veteran statesman to . . . save the country from disintegra-
tion." Comparing Yuan Shikai to George Washington, Koo remarked that
the people wanted and needed peace "to put the country in order and
adjust her financial system, her national defense, her industries, her edu-
cational system, her communications, her commerce, her laws, to the
requirements of modern conditions."28
Koo's rhetoric proved to be for naught. By spring 1916, Yuan Shikai
was dead, and Koo was soon diplomatic representative to a government
torn by civil war. Yuan's death ushered in what has become known as the
warlord era in which military governors who competed for territory and
revenue ruled China. The warlord era was marked by instability in China
due to intensive fighting between warlord factions or cliques who com-
peted for control of northern China while several weak warlords, as well as
Sun Yat-sen, remained in the south. One particular objective of the north-
ern warlords was the control of Beijing. The warlord who dominated
Beijing not only received the prestige of foreign diplomatic recognition
and legitimacy, but also the right to use the revenue acquired through
the Maritime Customs Administration, all of which could be used to
strengthen his power vis-a-vis the other warlords. In this respect, diplo-
mats like Koo were indispensable because they had the training and skills
necessary to deal with the powers on behalf of whatever warlord hap-
pened to be in power.29
Whatever faction that controlled Beijing found itself, by will or cir-
cumstances beyond its control, embroiled in imperialist rivalry. There
was imperial competition not only in the realm of finance, but warlord
regimes in the last years of the European War stood by helplessly as the
powers determined China's fate by way of secret agreements. In 1916,
Japan made a series of political maneuvers throughout the year to en-
sure its hold on Qingdao and its other interests on the continent. The
Japanese were not about to break with their allies, but engaged in con-
versations in order to send a message to Britain that Japan's importance
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in Asia should not be taken for granted. Not only were there rumors of
German-Japanese negotiations in which Germany and Japan were sup-
posedly planning to divide China amongst themselves into spheres of
influence, but Russia and Japan agreed to recognize their respective rights
and privileges in the Far East, particularly in Manchuria and Mongolia.
Although the alliance accomplished little for Japan, particularly after the
March 1917 revolution overthrew the tsar, those Japanese officials who
supported the treaty believed the agreement increased Japan's power in
Manchuria.30
More obvious was Japan's financial dominance over China. The
warlord in charge was Duan Qirui, and government finances were in a
desperate state. Naturally, Beijing's desire to secure loans wherever pos-
sible led to a great deal of rivalry between the powers who wanted their
bankers to get a share of the market. Duan, however, looked to Japan.
The new government that came to power in Tokyo in October 1916 was
willing to make loans to China because it had embarked on a friendlier
policy toward China. The new leadership intended to protect its inter-
ests in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Fujian, but took a different ap-
proach from that of the previous government that presented the
Twenty-One Demands. Between 1916 and 1918, Duan secured various
loans from Tokyo. Koo opposed borrowing money from Japan, believ-
ing that Japan would use China's dependency to acquire political capital
in China. He encouraged U.S. businessmen to invest in China and ob-
tained a loan for $5 million from a Chicago bank, but it was impossible
for Koo to offset Japanese money with American money.31
In 1917, the international environment offered the Beijing govern-
ment a window of opportunity to take steps toward improving China's
international status. In February, Germany announced the return to
unrestricted use of submarines against belligerent ships, including pas-
senger liners. The Wilson administration severed diplomatic relations
with Germany and called on other neutral powers, including China, to
follow suit. Wilson insisted that neutrals had the right to sail on belliger-
ent passenger liners. While Paul Reinsch tried to get Beijing to associate
itself with the United States, the Japanese, who previously opposed China's
entrance into the war, made an about-face. In January and February, the
allies secretly agreed to allow Japan to retain Qingdao after the war. Ja-
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pan and its allies hoped that China would emulate the United States in
breaking relations with Germany and become an ally by declaring war.
The Beijing government demanded loans and a seat at the peace confer-
ence. On March 1, the allies accepted China's demands. Two days later,'
Beijing decided to break relations with Germany, and China's parlia-
ment made it official on March 14, 1917.32
Beijing however balked at declaring war. The cabinet was divided
along two lines of policy: those opposed to declaring war and those in
favor. Those leaning toward war included Duan Qirui who believed that
the allies would eventually win the war, especially once the United States
became a belligerent. Another motive involved the peace conference.
These officials recognized that China had little voice, as long as it re-
mained neutral. Opponents of war feared domestic rebellion as well as
being crushed by Duan Qirui and his Japanese aid. There was a third
road that simultaneously opposed joining the allies, but favored declar-
ing war and aligning with the United States. American advisers to the
Beijing government and nongovernment officials preferred this third
road. V.K. Wellington Koo was also among their number.33
On April 2, 1917, Wilson went before Congress asking for a decla-
ration of war against Germany in order for the United States to "make
the world safe for democracy." The United States did not, however, enter
the conflict as an ally, but as an "associate" in order to disassociate itself
from the allies' imperialistic war aims. Wilson told Congress that the
United States was fighting for not only democracy but for the "rights
and liberties of small nations." On April 6, the United States officially
declared war on Germany.34
Now that the United States was in the war and fighting for war
aims that appealed to Koo, the Chinese diplomat believed that China
should likewise become a participant in order to resolve the Shandong
Question and raise China's international standing. However, he initially
opposed joining the allies and wanted to come into the war on the side
of the United States. Koo believed Japan planned to use the alliance to
dominate China while Britain and France stood by. And with "Britain in
Tibet, Russia in Mongolia, Japan in Shandong, Portugal in Macao," the
only country that did not entertain some "dark scheme" against China
was the United States. Koo argued in favor of aligning with the United
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States because Washington would protect China's interests. As an ally of
the Entente powers, China would sacrifice some of its rights. President
Wilson declared that the United States entered the war in order to make
a better world, and Koo believed that if China sided with America, it
would reap many benefits. After the United States officially declared war,
though, Koo concluded that Beijing had to declare war, be it as ally or
associate, in order to get a seat at the peace conference.35
Internal Chinese disunity prevented Beijing from declaring war until
August now that Sun Yat-sen established a separate government in
Guangzhou. The instability in China led Washington to issue a note on
June 4, much to the consternation of some of its "associates," declaring
that stability in China was more important than China's entry into World
War I. The allies ignored the note, and pressed for China's entrance into
the war. Deeply disappointed by the civil war in China, Koo implored his
government to bring about peace and unity in China. Otherwise, the
powers would take further advantage of China's weakness.36
Tensions between Japan and the United States led both sides to talk
over their differences. The rivalry between both countries as to who
should lead China into World War I embittered the Japanese, who wanted
U.S. recognition of Japan's paramount interests in China. Those talks
resulted in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in which the United States rec-
ognized Japan's special interests in China especially in Manchuria. In
return, the Japanese agreed to adhere to the Open Door principles. A
secret provision attached to the agreement committed both sides to not
use World War I to make gains in China at the other's expense. The Lan-
sing-Ishii Agreement disappointed Koo because it looked as if China
was Japan's sphere just as Central and South America were spheres of the
United States. When Koo expressed his government's reservations, Sec-
retary of State Robert Lansing bluntly told Koo that the "time had passed
when China could play off the United States against Japan." In response,
Koo issued a memorandum to Washington that his government refused
"to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations."37
In 1918, Koo's government selected him to be a delegate to the Paris
Peace Conference even though Germany had not yet been defeated.
Preparing for the conference was not easy because there was much to
distract him. In less than two years, he suffered the loss of two people
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very dear to him. The first was his father who passed away in the sum-
mer of 1917. Then in October 1918, May Tang unexpectedly died, one of
the many thousands of victims of the flu epidemic. "Mrs. Koo was ill
only one week," Koo explained to John Bassett Moore, "and her death
was so sudden that even now I cannot fully convince myself that she has
left me forever." He added: "She was such a devoted companion and helper
to me in all my work and leisure that I now feel everything is different
without her."38
Despite these personal losses, Koo had to get on with the business
at hand. One measure of preparation taken was publicity. Koo and Tho-
mas Millard, the American founder and editor of the English-language
paper, Millard's Review, worked together to create an Information Bu-
reau that would be attached to the Chinese delegation. Another man
associated with the Bureau was Hollington Tong, a University of Mis-
souri graduate who became a friend of Koo's when Tong worked on the
staff of the New York Times and the New York Evening Post. Essentially,
the Bureau was a propaganda organ that would attempt to win world
opinion to China's cause. Koo advocated a propaganda policy in order to
drive a wedge between the powers, primarily Britain and the United States,
and Japan, and he continued to pursue such a policy at Paris.39
More importantly, Beijing wanted to revise the imperialist system.
As a member of the delegation, Koo likewise thought it was time that
China aired "her grievances internationally at the coming peace confer-
ence in order to win back some of her lost rights." The Chinese patriotic
program first pursued the elimination of the foreign concessions. By 1917,
there were ninety-two treaty ports, with sixteen having foreign settle-
ments. Koo viewed the international concessions and settlements as an-
tiquated and an unnecessary "infraction upon the territorial integrity of
China." The leased territories "served to create a balance of power in
China, but a balance of power not between China and other Govern-
ments but between different Governments who had interests in China."
Koo believed that abrogation of those territories and elimination of the
spheres of influence would maintain that balance of power while restor-
ing China's political integrity. Along with the foreign concessions, extra-
territoriality had to go too because it, likewise, was "a hindrance to the
free and full development of China." Finally, China needed to have full
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control of its tariff if it was to raise the necessary revenue to govern a
state whose burgeoning population drained national resources.40
In Koo's opinion, the foreign concessions, extraterritoriality, and
lack of tariff autonomy prevented China from industrializing. China
possessed no investment capital and was forced to borrow money from
foreign banks on "harsh terms." The low tariff prevented development.
And foreign manufacturers, who established factories in the foreign con-
cessions, were able to prosper because they were "beyond the taxing power
and regulatory power of the Chinese government." Chinese factories could
not compete with the predominantly British and Japanese manufactur-
ers in China.41 Since this was China's program, Koo spent much of his
time searching international law for precedents that would strengthen
his case.
With regard to Qingdao, Koo understood the limitations of inter-
national law. The Japanese could claim Qingdao as a right of conquest. If
diplomacy failed to secure the return of the territory, Koo had another
option: Woodrow Wilson. As a student at Columbia, Koo met Wilson
when the latter went there to present lectures on government and ad-
ministration and even had the opportunity to join Wilson for dinner,
where the future president plied Koo with questions "about China and
the possible political development of the Chinese people." In his tenure as
president, Wilson presented himself to the world as an anti-imperialist
and antimilitarist. In his China policy, he had broken away from the con-
sortium, unilaterally recognized China, and unilaterally issued denun-
ciations of Japan. Like other educated Chinese enamored to the man,
Koo held Wilson in a certain reverence.42
The extent to which Koo looked to Wilson for help at Paris was
revealed in 1918. On January 8, Wilson put forth his famous Fourteen
Points before Congress, and called for, among other things, open treaties
and open diplomacy; arms reduction; and a free, open-minded, and ab-
solutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims in which questions
of sovereignty are determined by the interests of the populations con-
cerned. Many of the ideas laid down in the speech were not new to Wil-
son and had been espoused by internationalists and Wilson for some
time. Events in Russia forced Wilson to restate American war aims. The
previous year, Vladamir Lenin and the Bolsheviks succeeded in over-
China and World War [ 47
throwing the Provisional Government in Russia that came to power ear-
lier in March and eventually got Russia out of the war with Germany.
Within weeks after the Bolshevik Revolution, Leon Trotsky, the Com-
missar for Foreign Relations, published the treaties signed between Tsarist
Russia and its allies, which proved the allies were just as imperialistic in
their war aims as the Germans were. Publication of those treaties was
part and parcel of Trotsky's "New Diplomacy," which opposed the old,
secret diplomacy in an effort to foment revolution abroad. The Bolshe-
viks demanded to know to what democratic and liberal end the allies
were fighting to convince Russia to stay in the war. Wilson laid down his
Fourteen Points to answer this challenge as well as rally people at home
and abroad behind war aims that sought to create a better world and
sow dissension between Germany and Austria-Hungary by offering peace
terms to both.43
One other aspect of Wilson's Fourteen Points that held out hope to
Koo was Wilson's desire to create a league of nations to provide mutual
guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great
and small states alike. One can speculate that Koo viewed the organiza-
tion as giving China prestige, a voice in world affairs, and security, espe-
cially if it was a "Wilsonian" league. In telegrams to Beijing, Koo
differentiated between the Americans and the other powers by pointing
to Wilson's commitment to establishing a league, the existence of which
he asserted was opposed by other powers. Koo understood too that in-
ternational law needed to undergo some sort of transformation so that
small and weak nations coexisted with the great powers with a relative
sense of peace and security. Like some internationalists, he leaned to-
ward the "league" concept or something that could improve on interna-
tional law.44
Overall, Wilson's Fourteen Points were a statement of Wilson's anti-
imperialism. This explains why Koo later referred to the Fourteen Points
as "a ray of hope for the oppressed nations in Asia." In fact, when Wilson
gave the speech, he did not have Asia, Africa, or Latin America on his
mind. Wilson's words were directed at Europe, where boundaries would
be redrawn and new nation-states created. His anti-imperialism
amounted to merely stopping the imperialism of Europeans against Eu-
ropeans. Although Korean, Indian, Vietnamese and Chinese nationalists
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fighting colonialism or semicolonialism took his words to heart, Wilson
had no intention of freeing Asians from the throes of imperialism.
This fact did not stop Wilson from assuring Koo of his support for
China. Before traveling to Europe, the American president told Koo "that
there would be nothing for China to fear from the discussions at this
conference." Wilson admitted that it would not be easy to apply his prin-
ciples to the Far East, but declared "that mere difficulty was no good
reason for not applying them there." But at Paris, Wilson justified his
stance to not deny Japan's claim to Qingdao, because he could not see
how the Fourteen Points applied. Hence, Koo made the mistake of argu-
ing for the return of Qingdao on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points.
Given the circumstances of Japan's strong legal case and the collusion
between Japan and the allies, Koo had little choice. Wilson offered to
transcend the old rules and old diplomacy and create new rules and a
new diplomacy that would give China justice. With his government pow-
erless to drive Japan out and given his opposition to collaboration with
Tokyo, Koo went to Paris hopeful that Wilson's Fourteen Points would
fulfill his patriotic aspirations. He sowed the seeds of his own failure
when he cabled the foreign ministry that China "could count upon Ameri-
can support alone" at the conference.45
On November 9, 1918, a civilian government forced the military
leadership of Germany from power by seeking an armistice on the basis
of Wilson's Fourteen Points. Two days later, an armistice was reached.
The next month, Wilson announced the controversial decision of going
to Paris as head of the American delegation. There was no tradition of
American presidents traveling abroad to attend peace conferences, but
Wilson insisted that he had to be in Paris to ensure the success of his
foreign policy and the fulfillment of his Fourteen Points. Wilson's deci-
sion gave Koo a decided advantage, because the man in whom he placed
so much hope would be there to assist in the struggle to recover Qingdao.
At this point, no one foresaw disaster in 1919, most of all Wellington
Koo. He assumed that Wilson would remain committed to his own prin-
ciples and would persuade the other powers to embrace a peace based
on the Fourteen Points. Egging Koo on in maintaining such illusions
were members of the American delegation, who reiterated that China
should trust America.46
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After the Chinese delegation assembled in Paris, everything began
to go wrong. Initially, the conference allotted China's delegates five seats
only to reduce them to two on the grounds that China's contribution to
WWI was minimal. Lu Zhengxiang headed the delegation followed by
C.T. Wang, a Yale-educated GMD politician who sat on the delegation as
representative of Sun Yat-sen's government. Although Koo was junior to
Alfred Sze, Koo insisted that he be the number three man because of his
close ties with Wilson and the U.S. delegation. Koo also looked down his
nose at Wang because he claimed that Wang was a diplomat, not because
he had acquired "at least a basic knowledge of international law and dip-
lomatic history," but only because he could speak English and possessed
an academic degree from abroad. C.T. Wang and Alfred Sze increasingly
opposed Lu Zhengxiang's leadership, whereas Koo supported Lu with
the result that there was much competition for leadership of the Chinese
delegation.47
Besides the friction within the Chinese delegation, there were ob-
stacles to China's pursuit of a patriotic agenda. One problem for the
Chinese delegation was that the Asian questions arising out of the war
were peripheral to the major questions to be discussed at the conference:
Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, Poland, Czechoslova-
kia, and other issues. There was the question of what kind of league to
establish, an issue on which the powers were not agreed, and what kind
of covenant would govern this league. The allies were not fond of Wilson's
Fourteen Points nor his league. And the conference operated in an at-
mosphere of fear because the Bolsheviks provided an ideological chal-
lenge and threat to Europe and Asia in calling on the peacemakers to
seek a peace without territorial aggrandizement and in spreading revo-
lution to a discontented Europe. The allies and their associates inter-
vened in the civil war by sending forces and various aid to Russia. They
hoped the White Russians would crush the Bolsheviks.48
More importantly, Koo's own government completely gutted his
legal case. Duan Qirui needed Japanese arms and money if he were to
carry out his policy of reuniting the country by force, and he signed a
series of loans with Japan on September 28,1918. They included an ex-
change of notes that said the Chinese government "gladly agreed" to per-
mit Japan to station troops in Shandong to protect the Jiaoji Railway.
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Although the government made extensive preparations to argue for the
return of the old German leasehold, Duan told the cabinet that the Chi-
nese delegation should limit itself to revising the unequal treaties. With
regard to the Shandong Question, Duan argued that China should trust
Japan, which promised to return the territory, and hinted that China
should not challenge Japan's claim to Jiaozhou Bay and Qingdao until
the government understood Japan's intentions. Supporting Duan's posi-
tion was Cao Rulin, the Japanese-educated official who believed in Sino-
Japanese cooperation and who was responsible for negotiating the loans
that benefited Duan Qirui. As Lu Zhengxiang traveled to Paris, he stopped
in Japan where he reached an agreement that China would support Japan's
claim to Qingdao in return for Japanese support of China's patriotic pro-
gram of revising the unequal treaty system. In Paris, Lu informed them of
the September 28 treaty, but he could not divulge the treaty articles to
them. According to George Morrison, the Chinese delegation's unofficial
foreign advisor, a box containing treaties and other documents relevant to
China's case turned up missing, possibly stolen.49
Koo had no inkling of the events that had occurred, and if he had,
he would have opposed the policy because he distrusted Japan too much
to consider cooperation with the Japanese. A member of the foreign
ministry suggested to Koo that China not participate in the peace con-
ference in order that "Japan may not claim to represent our interests" at
the conference, but instead seek a Far Eastern conference separate from
the upcoming Paris conference. Koo adamantly opposed the idea. Chi-
nese nonparticipation at the Paris conference might be viewed as will-
ingness to let the powers settle questions related to China "without our
voice." Koo also believed that a special Far Eastern conference "may lead
to international tutelage like Turkey" and, more importantly, "actualize
[Japan's] hegemony in Asia." After Lu informed the delegation of recent
events, Koo argued that now was the time for China to press its case for
Qingdao, because the conference dealt with problems arising out of the
war. Otherwise, China would not be able to reclaim her territorial sover-
eignty.50
In late January, the conference took up the issue of Germany's colo-
nies. The Japanese delegation presented its claims to Germany's former
leased territory in Shandong on the basis of right of conquest. Before
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Japan could return the territory to China, Tokyo had to reach an agree-
ment with Germany, transferring Germany's rights to Japan. Possessed
with the knowledge that Lu Zhengxiang did not intend to demand the
return of Qingdao, Koo took matters in his own hands. He became, in
the words of George Morrison, the "most aggressive member of the Del-
egation." After the Japanese delegates made their claim to Germany's
former concession in Shandong, the Chinese delegation asked for, and
received, permission to present their case prior to the conference mak-
ing a decision. Woodrow Wilson, who was "surprised and angry" at Japan's
claim to inherit Germany's rights in Shandong, assured the Chinese of
his desire to help and advised Koo of the necessity of putting forth China's
case as succinctly as the Japanese had done. In the meantime, Lu
Zhengxiang asked Beijing for permission to bring the 1918 treaty before
the conference as a way of appealing to public opinion and possibly hav-
ing the treaty made null and void by the conference.51
The following day, Koo presented China's case for recovering its
territory. Unaware of the September treaty's articles, Koo argued that the
1915 treaty should not be binding since Japan forced China to sign. Then
speaking for China's "400 millions," Koo referred to Shandong as the
"cradle of civilisation, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius, and a
Holy Land for the Chinese." Koo added that, "China had a right to the
restoration of these territories." In an exchange with Baron Makino, the
Japanese delegate, Koo called for direct restitution of Qingdao on the
basis of rebus sic stantibus, a notion in international law that treaties could
be revised or eliminated because the conditions in which they were writ-
ten had changed. Koo argued that China's entry into the war "had in
itself put an end to the leases obtained by Germany in Chinese terri-
tory."52
It was the greatest speech of his career, presented in what one Ameri-
can described as "perfect English, and in a cool, lucid and logical argu-
ment which carried the members of the Council right along with him."
One member in particular who "sympathized with the Chinese point of
view" was Woodrow Wilson, who was annoyed by his fellow peacemak-
ers. He described himself as in the minority in regard to "captured colo-
nies," because the "majority of the delegates wanted to 'divide the swag,'
and then have the League of Nations created to perpetuate their title."
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Koo's speech forced the Japanese delegates to admit that Japan had a
treaty with China and led Wilson to ask Japan to make the treaty public.
Wilson also made promises he could not fulfill. Wilson assured the presi-
dent of China, "that in all circumstances you can count upon the good
will of the United States and the interests of her Government in the in-
dependence, safety, and prosperity of China." In the days following Koo's
speech, euphoria and optimism abounded "that China would win her
case at the Conference," but that euphoria was based largely on the as-
surances made by the U.S. delegation.53
Fortunately for Koo, the speech was well received in China, where
the Beijing government only admonished the delegation against being
overzealous. Koo's actions infuriated the Japanese, who thought they had
reached a deal with Beijing to not contest Japan's claim to Qingdao. Koo
met with Wilson and pleaded for assistance, because Japan was no doubt
incensed by his presentation. And he warned Robert Lansing as well that
he "greatly feared the Japanese would attempt to intimidate the Beijing
Government, and persuade that Government to disown [his] represen-
tation here." Koo was right: Japan threatened military intervention and
to make Shandong a permanent part of the Japanese empire.54
Another negative consequence of being the "man on the spot" was
that the other Chinese delegates were either resentful of Koo's close rela-
tionship with the Americans or simply jealous of Koo's instant stardom.
C.T. Wang and Alfred Sze were furious with Koo, who they believed was
running the delegation. Sze threatened to resign if he continued to be
pushed aside. Some in the Chinese delegation distrusted Koo because he
relied so heavily on Wilson. In an effort to impugn Koo's character, C.T.
Wang told the delegation that Koo intended to marry Cao Rulin's daugh-
ter, suggesting that Koo would represent the pro-Japanese elements in
Beijing.55 For his part, Koo believed Wilson afforded China a wonderful
opportunity to resolve the Shandong Question even though the British
and French warned the delegation that they had treaties with Japan. Koo
did not believe Japan would simply hand Qingdao back without some
kind of catch. Some have criticized Koo for not allowing Japan its claim
to Qingdao in return for Japanese support of China's patriotic program.
Yet the powers, least of all Japan, were not interested in treaty revision,
so there was no real trade-off. One can fault Koo, though, for thinking
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that Wilson's popularity and prestige could overrule the interests of the
allies. Through both the speech and relying on the Americans, Koo dug a
hole for himself. And the Americans were the only ones around to keep
the Japanese from burying him in it.56
For the next few weeks, the Shandong Question remained on the
backburner. There was the question of what kind of league to create.
Koo saw that it was in China's interest to express support for Wilson's
league and use the Chinese press at home to rally Chinese public opin-
ion behind the league. Wilson's league called for an Executive Council of
five great powers and four small powers. The alternative was a league
run by the great powers. Koo and the other small power representatives
voiced support for Wilson's plan. Koo warned that a league based on
only the great powers would "allow a gulf to grow" between the great
and small because the latter would feel "they were outsiders . . . and not
fully part and parcel of the League." Otherwise, the only time the small
powers had any voice in the league would be when they were "either
aggressive or victims of an aggressor." And if the great powers clashed
while in executive session, the "Council would be deprived of the influ-
ence of world opinion and find it difficult to effect a settlement of the
question." David Hunter Miller, coauthor of a plan that called for a league
based on only great powers, commented that Koo "made one of the best
speeches of the Commission" when he advocated small power represen-
tation. Ultimately, the small powers won their victory when a majority
voted in favor of Wilson's plan.57
On the controversial issue of racial equality, Koo sided with the
Japanese. In February, the Japanese asked for inclusion of a racial equal-
ity clause in the League of Nations Covenant. Initially, when the Japa-
nese delegation asked the Chinese for their support, Koo was sympathetic
"but felt that China had more important questions at stake and had to
look out for them first." The British and Woodrow Wilson opposed the
amendment, and the racial equality clause was not included in the cov-
enant, though the Japanese delegates reserved the right to raise the issue
later. In April, when they brought racial equality back to the table, a mem-
ber of the Japanese delegation looked at Koo with an expression that
persuaded the Chinese diplomat to stand up and support the clause.
Although he felt that the many problems that revolved around the Japa-
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nese amendment would be solved in time, he declared that he was "very
glad indeed to see the principle itself given recognition in the Covenant."
Despite a majority vote in favor of the Japanese proposal, the British,
backed by Wilson, killed the amendment.58 Koo's support for the racial
equality clause became a great controversy within the Chinese delega-
tion later in the month when China was denied a place on the Council of
Nine. Many of the Chinese delegates who agreed that it was necessary
for China "to disassociate herself from Japan" blamed Koo. Alfred Sze
and Eugene Chen claimed that Colonel House, Wilson's political advi-
sor, was counting on China's support in defeating the racial clause. In
return, the United States would back China's admission to the Council
of Nine, but Koo did not "keep faith with America." There is no evidence
that such a deal was made, and, as Morrison defended Koo in his diary,
"How could [Koo] an Asiatic have done otherwise?"59
When the Shandong Question finally returned to the fore, the pen-
dulum of support for China swung the other way. In the United States,
numerous critics, including Senate leaders, assailed Wilson's proposed
League of Nations. The allies, emboldened by Wilson's critics across the
Atlantic, threatened to kill the league unless granted territorial annex-
ations. The French and the Italians demanded the right to annex terri-
tory. When Wilson refused, the Italians walked out of the conference.
They eventually returned, but a black cloud hung over the proceedings.
Then it was Japan's turn. Japan needed to gain something from the confer-
ence, and since it had been denied the racial equality clause, Japan now
had leverage to demand retention of Germany's former leased territory.60
Despite these potential setbacks, hope remained. On March 24,
Wilson queried Koo as to Japan's real desire in Shandong. Koo replied
that Japan not only wanted Qingdao, but also the railway in order to
have a Japanese settlement in the area much like Britain's in Hong Kong.
"If Japan was to have the railway and exclusive settlement in the best
part of the leased territory," Koo went on, "it would mean the returning
of the shadow to China, while leaving the substance to Japan."" [I]n other
words," Wilson answered, "China would be getting back nearly the use-
less part of the leased area."61
Encouraged by Wilson's attitude toward the Shandong Question,
Koo went to work on a memorandum that laid out China's claim to
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Qingdao. Koo argued that the loss of Qingdao would "jeopardize her po-
litical independence, territorial integrity and economic welfare" (Wilson's
emphasis) because it was "the best harbor on the coast of China." For this
port and its railways to be controlled by a foreign power was "to place in
its hands the most powerful weapons for securing trade domination and
for jeopardizing the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce of
all nations." Wilson's Fourteen Points negated the validity of the 1915
Sino-Japanese agreement and the secret treaties between Japan and the
allies. Finally, direct restitution would have a "desirable effect" on Chi-
nese public opinion because the Chinese people looked to the United
States and the other powers for justice.62 Koo limited his arguments to
the 1915 treaty because he admitted to George Morrison that the Sep-
tember 1918 treaty, which he now possessed, was a "stumbling block."
When Koo handed the memorandum over to Wilson, the American presi-
dent, speaking "in a way that gave the Chinese face," again expressed his
sympathy and spoke of the "friendship of the United States," adding that
Lansing was working on a plan to solve the Shandong Question. The
Chinese left Wilson's presence "uplifted."63
When the powers met, the Japanese rejected Wilson's proposal to
make Qingdao a trusteeship of the League of Nations, and threatened to
not join the League of Nations if denied their claim. Prime Minister Lloyd
George of Britain tried to convince Japan to allow the former German
concession to be made into a league mandate but Japan refused. Lloyd
George sympathized with the Japanese position because the notion of
internationalization could be applied to Britain's economic concessions
in the Yangzi River valley. He also had little respect for China's war con-
tribution. Since Britain had a secret agreement with Japan, Lloyd George
intended to honor it, not wanting to undermine the Anglo-Japanese Al-
liance. The French followed Britain's lead and supported the Japanese
claim. Wilson had no choice but to accede to Japan's wishes. The most he
could achieve was Japan's promise to give political control to China while
retaining economic rights.64
Wilson summoned Koo to his residence where he dropped the
bombshell on China's hope to recover Qingdao. Wilson rejected China's
claim, since Beijing had been "pleased to agree" to the September 28,
1918 agreement with Japan and in light of Wilson's view that China's
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declaration of war did not cancel the 1915 agreement. Naturally disap-
pointed, Koo pleaded for reconsideration on the grounds that the 1915
treaty "had been imposed upon China by Japan." And with Japan al-
ready in Manchuria, the Japanese presence in Shandong meant that
Beijing "would be—as it were—in a pincers." Wilson and Lloyd George
gave the Chinese two options: allow Japan to inherit Germany's rights or
accept the 1915 treaty with Japan. Koo retorted that "both alternatives
were unacceptable," but he chose the latter while still preferring direct
restitution to China. Koo warned that although his government believed
in the justice of the West, there were people in China who "believed in
Asia for the Asiatics and wanted the closest co-operation with Japan." He
feared that China "might be driven into the arms of Japan" if it did not
get justice. Annoyed by the remark, Wilson defended his action saying
there was no injustice and that the "sacredness of treaties had been one
of the motives of the war." Wilson apparently forgot or ignored that his
government refused to recognize the 1915 agreement. He conveniently
forgot his admission in private at the conference that a nation at any
time could denounce a treaty it was bound to. Wilson may have real-
ized that to reject the 1915 agreement would allow the Chinese to de-
mand revision of the unequal treaties that likewise were signed under
duress.65
Koo departed Wilson's residence downhearted. His whole strategy
of using Wilsonianism for China's advantage was in shambles. Only less
than two weeks before, Koo told a reporter that, "Our main hope is
American love of justice." Publicly, he did not fault Wilson, whom he
described as a "defender of China," but George Morrison told a member
of the American delegation that Koo and his compatriots blamed Wil-
son, since it was Wilson who insisted time and again that he was on
China's side and could be relied upon. Indeed, it was believed that Koo
was behind an anonymous manifesto released to the press that declared:
"China has been stabbed to the heart in the house of its friends." Despite
his anger, Koo refused to break from the Americans. He believed that
Italy's brief withdrawal from the conference made Wilson cautious to-
ward Japan. And besides British and French support for Japan, a mem-
ber of the American delegation informed Koo that Britain threatened to
not join the league if Japan did not.66
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Koo knew that the decision, regardless of the causes behind it, was
a reneging on Wilson's own principles. In light of their secret treaties, he
understood why the British and French hesitated to support China, but
he thought that Wilson's Fourteen Points "at least in spirit nullified those
engagements." Koo acknowledged as well that the Europeans might not
be inclined to give deference to the Fourteen Points. He told Colonel
House if that was the case, "China's only hope lay with the United States."
And the Chinese diplomat believed that "if President Wilson was dis-
posed to insist on a just solution of this question, China would get her
satisfaction." He warned House that failure to achieve a pro-Chinese so-
lution on the Shandong Question would drive China to Japan. He added:
"Such a feeling, which could not be conducive to the interests of the
Occident in China, might require years to modify it when once rooted in
the minds of the Chinese people."67
In a similar vein, Koo remarked to E.T. Williams, another Ameri-
can delegate, that China had taken a strong stand on the Shandong Ques-
tion because it thought it could "rely on the firm support of the United
States." Koo continued, "If China should again be left in the cold at the
last moment," the episode "would serve to convince the Chinese people
in general of the unwisdom of the Chinese policy on this question from
the inception."68 Without admitting as much, Koo's reputation was on
the line. More than anyone else, he relied upon Wilson and the United
States to resolve the Shandong Question in a manner favorable to China.
And it was Koo who made statements to the press that gave people in
China the hope that the United States would come to China's rescue and
right the wrong done by Japan. If Wilson did not abide by the principles
he espoused and which inspired Koo, the latter would come out looking
the fool.
With those thoughts in mind, the Chinese reminded Wilson of the
conflict between the secret agreements reached between Japan and its
European allies and his Fourteen Points. The delegation suggested four
solutions: the surrender of Germany's rights in Shandong to the powers
who in turn would restore them to China; Japan's agreement to restore
those rights one year after signing the Versailles Peace Treaty; China's
compensation of Japan's military expenses incurred during its attack on
Qingdao; China making Jiaozhou Bay a free, commercial port. The Chi-
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nese delegation also called on the powers to abrogate the 1915 treaty.
Wilson refused to consider the options because he could not suffer Japan's
defection from the league.69
Wilson's refusal left the Chinese delegation so depressed that seri-
ous thought was given to withdrawing from the conference. Otherwise,
the delegates had only two choices: sign the treaty with reservations or
not sign at all. Complicating the matter was the May Fourth Movement
in China in which educated Chinese were, as Koo warned Wilson, vent-
ing their indignation against the powers' decision. Thousands of stu-
dents gathered at Tiananmen (Gate of Heavenly Peace) and Beijing
University, shouting "Return Qingdao." Soon, Chinese merchants and
workers joined in. Those government officials responsible for the 1918
agreement were physically attacked. Chinese students in Paris were so
outraged that members of the American delegation received death threats
and there was fear that Wilson's life might be in danger. Fearful himself,
Koo told Colonel House that if forced to sign the treaty by his govern-
ment, "I shall not have what you in New York call a Chinaman's chance.
. . . It would be my death sentence."70 Asking Beijing for a quick decision
to sign or not, Koo told the government that if China did not sign, he
feared the powers' wrath for undermining the alliance. If China signed
with reservations, there was no guarantee the reservations would be in-
cluded in the treaty. Koo viewed the moment as not propitious to China,
saying that Britain, Japan, and France all sought to expand their spheres
of influence in China.71
While the Beijing government mulled its options, Koo approached
Wilson with the idea that China be permitted to sign with reservations.
Koo explained that his people were disappointed and there was a con-
sensus that China should not sign the treaty. On the other hand, his gov-
ernment did not want to damage the alliance and preferred to sign with
reservations. The Chinese delegation would "make a protest in order to
satisfy public opinion in China" with a view toward revising the Shandong
articles later.72 Wilson opposed the reservations on the grounds that the
U.S. Senate would add its own reservations to the treaty before ratifica-
tion. Koo recalled later that probably Wilson felt that granting the Chi-
nese delegation the right to enclose a reservation in the treaty would
open a can of worms. Other delegations might be moved to do the same
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with respect to their grievances, such as the Italians who wanted and
were denied territory. The powers agreed that China could not sign with
reservations, and that China could protest only after the signing. Koo
rejected these terms, saying that China had no choice but to withdraw
from the conference and should not be held responsible for the conse-
quences.73
Although the Beijing government wanted the delegates to sign the
treaty, reservation or not, students, intellectuals, merchants, and urban
workers, who were angered by the government's attempt to quell anti-
government demonstrations, besieged the government. The warlords and
politicians agreed that China should not sign, and under pressure, the
government eventually ordered its delegates to abstain from signing the
treaty. Years later, Koo remembered walking through the deserted streets
of Paris thinking that day "must remain in the history of China as the
day of sorrow." For Koo, the conference was an almost complete failure.
In China, he was a national hero, but that was little comfort for a man
who had put his hope in Wilson.74
There was a significant difference between Koo's reaction to the
Versailles Treaty and that of other Chinese patriots. Koo was partly right
about the impact of the powers' decision on China. Many Chinese stu-
dents in America who had previously looked to the United States as
China's friend became disenchanted. Instead of looking to the West, the
Chinese were urged to solve their problems themselves and not rely on
others. People like Mao Zedong and Chen Duxiu, future founders of the
Chinese Communist Party, were thoroughly disillusioned with the West
and soon looked to Soviet Russia, which won praise from Chinese orga-
nizations for renouncing the unequal treaties. Sun Yat-sen wanted an-
other political revolution. Those leaning toward communism wanted a
social revolution.75
Koo rejected revolution in favor of cooperation with the powers.
Indeed, if the powers had agreed to allow the reservation, Koo would
have signed the treaty even though the people back home decried such
an action. Unfortunately, the powers brought about what Koo described
as a "turning point in China's history." Years later, Koo remarked that
Chinese history might have been different if Qingdao had been handed
back to China.76 Without saying so, he thought the revolutions that fol-
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lowed in Chinese history and the Sino-Japanese conflict of the 1930s
might have been forestalled. None of those events, however, were fore-
seeable in 1919. At the moment, Koo would not advocate revolution, or
what became known as Boxerism, in which the foreigners were kicked
out of China. Either would only worsen the situation by inviting more
imperialist intervention and maybe more unequal treaties. The only al-
ternative in Koo's mind was diplomacy and collaboration with the im-
perialists to eliminate the unequal treaties and secure Shandong, but this
approach increasingly grew untenable, as Koo now had to face Chinese
nationalism.
Chapter 3
CHINESE NATIONALISM
AND TREATY REVISION, 1921-1928
IN 1920, BEIJING APPOINTED KOO to be Chinese minister to Britain.
Koo found that "the contrast between London and Washington, the set-
up of the diplomatic corps and diplomatic procedure as well as social
customs and life in general, was quite noticeable." For their part, the British
really knew little about Koo. The British minister to Washington described
him as "well liked socially. . . . He is cultured, and has great charm of
manner." In February 1921, when Koo presented himself to the King of
England, Sir Miles Lampson wrote, "His views are distinctly progressive
and he is considered a typical representative of 'Young China.'" After
several months of giving speeches and getting involved in British social
circles, however, an American living in London observed that the British
were "inclined to look down their noses a little bit at him" especially
because of the "new Mrs. Koo." The year he went to Britain, Koo rr.arried
Oei Hui-Lan, recently divorced daughter of a rich "sugar-king" in Java,
and the gossip in England and the United States hurt Koo's image. The
British Foreign Office also did not like Koo's portrayal of China: "Since
his arrival in England he has done much 'window dressing,' and loses no
opportunity of misleading public opinion, in the interests of his coun-
try, as to the true state of affairs in China."1
The "true state of affairs" was that Koo represented a government
that did not possess complete control over China's provinces. Duan
Qirui's warlord clique only fully controlled eight provinces and half of
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V.K. Wellington Koo, 1921 (Photo courtesy of Library of Congress)
two others, including Zhili, wherein Beijing was located. After the Paris
Peace Conference, other warlords, infuriated by Duan's close relations with
Japan and China's failure at Paris, demanded not only the renewal of peace
talks between North and South but the reduction of Duan's military. When
Duan refused, war broke out in July 1920. Eventually, a warlord coalition
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defeated Duan and controlled all of northeast China and eight other
provinces. The rest of China's provinces were controlled by a mixed as-
sortment of warlords and Sun Yat-sen's Guangzhou government.2
Despite China's disunity, Koo and his government faced increas-
ing pressure back home to recover Chinese territory controlled by the
imperialists and to revise the unequal treaty system. Chinese hopes had
been raised before the conference only to be dashed. The Chinese people
wanted to see the perceived injustice done at Paris undone. They wanted
Qingdao recovered, but they adamantly opposed direct negotiations be-
tween their government and Japan. The September 1918 treaties, which
undermined Koo's efforts at Paris, left a bad taste for most Chinese who
refused to countenance more secret deals. Under such circumstances,
the League of Nations was one option. But the United States did not
ratify the Versailles Treaty and never joined the league. And since the
great powers dominated the league, Koo did not expect China to get a
fair hearing regarding Qingdao.
The other demand made on the government regarded the unequal
treaties. The unequal treaties were a great symbol of humiliation and
weakness for a proud people; they were likewise a great yoke that held
China down, preventing it from progressing and achieving the greatness
that it enjoyed less than two hundred years before. Japan emerged as a
great power, freed itself from the unequal treaties, and joined the "family
of nations." If only China could break the chains of bondage, it too could
follow the path pioneered by Japan. As much as any Chinese, Koo wanted
to make China a free and independent country, and tried to get the pow-
ers to agree to revise, not eliminate, the treaties. When Chinese proposals
were submitted to the Paris Peace Conference, they were ignored by the
powers that possessed neither the time nor the will to revise the imperi-
alist system. Nevertheless, China made some progress in treaty revision.
In May 1921, Germany repudiated "all its special rights, interests and
privileges," and forewent the Boxer Indemnity.3 Similar treaties were
signed with Hungary and Turkey.
With those gains came demands for more, and potentially there
was hope that another power would agree to revise its unequal treaties
with China.4 News of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the subse-
quent civil war reached China, but reports on the revolution and Lenin
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were sketchy if not confusing. Two announcements that came out of
Bolshevik Russia sparked Chinese interest. In the summer of 1919, see-
ing the Chinese anger toward Japan and the West and hoping to see revo-
lution go to China, the Bolsheviks issued the first Karakhan Manifesto.
In return for diplomatic relations, Bolshevik Russia promised the Chi-
nese everything they had sought at Paris: abolition of extraterritoriality,
the unequal treaties, and the Boxer Indemnity, as well as the return of
Russia's territorial concessions. The Bolsheviks also agreed to return the
CER, the stretch of the Trans-Siberian Railway that ran through Chinese
territory, to Beijing without compensation. When this manifesto was
officially communicated to Beijing in March 1920, it was well-received
by Chinese radicals who were thoroughly disillusioned with the West
after the Paris debacle.
The Beijing government, however, could not take full advantage of
the Bolshevik offer. China was constrained by its allies, which it had joined
in militarily intervening in Russia's civil war in 1918. Although Beijing
pulled its forces out in early 1920, it was still obligated to act in concert
with the allies, who showed no inclination to recognize the Bolshevik
government. This did not prevent Beijing from engaging in talks. In Au-
gust 1920, a Bolshevik mission went to Beijing seeking recognition of
the new government. Talks proceeded so well that the Bolsheviks issued
the Second Karakhan Manifesto in September. The Soviet government
reaffirmed its previous promises, though it retracted the promise to re-
turn the CER without compensation. The powers nixed any hope of an
agreement because they feared the collapse of the entire unequal treaty
system if the Bolsheviks surrendered extraterritoriality. Koo knew that
the United States did not want to lose the right of extraterritoriality. The
U.S. State Department expressed the opinion that eliminating Russia's
treaty rights would kill foreign loans and investment and might invite
the powers to take over and manage Russia's rights in China. Indeed, all
of the powers agreed that Russian interests should be placed under in-
ternational control. Despite the de facto elimination of Russian unequal
treaty rights, the powers did not intervene, though recognition of the
Bolshevik government was delayed several years. Meanwhile, Bolshevik
agents went to China to meet with Chinese radicals, and in 1921 the
CCP was formed.5
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These gains vis-a-vis Russia did not translate into a power nexus
that could assist Beijing in preventing more great power expansion. Koo
opposed alienating the powers by aligning with the Bolsheviks, and his
own conservative political nature showed no inclination in buying into
a communist revolution. Without any other viable option, Koo wanted
to somehow further drive a wedge between Japan and the United States,
if not Japan and Britain. While his government spoke with Soviet agents,
Koo suggested that Beijing persuade the United States to hold bilateral
discussions over how to eliminate extraterritoriality. Koo knew the United
States needed time to debate the impact such a step posed for American
businessmen, but the key was for China to guarantee that American busi-
nessmen would not suffer any losses. Koo's rhetoric reflected the think-
ing of some in the Chinese Foreign Ministry who were willing to make
political and economic concessions to the United States in order to get
an alliance that enabled Beijing to eliminate extraterritoriality and se-
cure tariff revision.6
In November 1920, the Republicans won the presidency, and with
British encouragement they considered holding a conference to discuss
naval disarmament. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes wanted to
prevent a naval arms race with Japan from becoming entangled in the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japanese imperialism in China, and the bal-
ance of power in Asia. He also believed that the United States would
never go to war to stop Japanese imperialism against China and opposed
giving China any military guarantees. The United States wanted to co-
operate with Japan and Britain in perpetuating the imperialist system,
though in a new guise.7 Washington may also have been interested in
finding some way to forestall a communist revolution in China that would
threaten the imperialist system. Whatever the case, the United States
agreed to hold a conference in Washington to discuss the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, naval arms limitation, and issues affecting China. When the
Chinese were informed of the impending conference, they immediately
made it clear that the Shandong Question and unequal treaty revision
had to be on the table. Japan opposed raising the Shandong Question,
preferring to settle the issue before the meeting commenced. The British
and Americans agreed.8
In August 1921, the United States invited the Beijing government,
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as well as other states, to send representatives to Washington in Novem-
ber. One power not invited was the Soviet Union. The Chinese were no
doubt aware of the general feeling of American ill will toward Britain
and Japan, and they sought to capitalize on the situation. Koo also be-
lieved that the new Republican administration would fulfill promises
made during the presidential campaign to render China justice.9
In early October, Beijing chose Koo, Alfred Sze, and Wang Chonghui,
a Western-educated international attorney who served on China's Su-
preme Court, to be China's chief delegates. In regard to the Shandong
Question, the government, backed or pressured by Chinese public opin-
ion of students, merchants, intellectuals, and workers, refused to either
compromise on Shandong or to negotiate directly with Japan. The pre-
vious summer, Washington tried and failed to bring the Chinese and
Japanese together to discuss the Shandong Question. Just before he left
London, the U.S. ambassador to Britain warned Koo to not raise Qingdao
at the conference. Otherwise, it would adversely affect the conference
atmosphere. In Beijing, Jacob Gould Schurman, the American minister
to China, told W.W. Yen, the foreign minister, that China and Japan should
settle the Shandong Question on their own, before the Washington Con-
ference commenced.10
The Chinese were not interested in negotiating, but the powers
pushed for China and Japan to resolve the Shandong Question outside
of the conference. Koo expressed dissatisfaction with this approach be-
cause of public opinion back home. Koo's arguments were rejected by
Britain's Lord Curzon with the retort that China "must give up the policy
of trying to play off one European Power against the other" and allow
that great power cooperation, not rivalry, was China's salvation. The Brit-
ish could see that the Chinese were trying to use the Anglo-Americans
against Japan. Curzon advised China to allow the surplus population of
Japan to expand into Manchuria, which he claimed was not Chinese ter-
ritory. Expansion there was far more preferable to Japanese expansion
into the heart of China via Qingdao. Koo disagreed, saying that Japan
did not want a population outlet but "complete control over the eco-
nomic and industrial resources of China, and reducing the latter to an
ultimate position of vassalage."11
Besides the Shandong Question, there were the unequal treaties.
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The Chinese delegation prepared a ten-point program that included
a call for tariff autonomy, abolition of extraterritoriality, and respect
for China's territorial integrity.12 Koo apparently decided to go for
broke at this conference believing that the United States was behind
him all the way. Public opinion in America certainly favored the Chi-
nese, but Koo did not fully appreciate the attitudes within the Harding
administration. The Republicans were more interested in naval dis-
armament, elimination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and coopera-
tion with the powers than in stealing thunder from the Bolsheviks
over the treaties.13
Arriving in Washington, Koo remained bent on pushing his patri-
otic agenda. Chinese students in the United States ensured that the del-
egation remained on that path by demonstrating outside the conference
building. Jiang Tingfu, a doctoral student at Columbia University, was in
Washington, and he remembered that the debate among the students
hinged on whether the abolition of the unequal treaties should be "gradual
or sudden."14 Student agitation, in some cases egged on by Sun Yat-sen's
separatist government, made for a highly charged atmosphere that put
the diplomats on notice to accomplish something.
On November 16, Alfred Sze presented China's ten-point agenda
to the conference in which China demanded full control of its internal
affairs. The enumeration of these ten points did not have nearly the ef-
fect that Koo's speech on Shandong had had nearly three years before.
Some of the powers might be willing to surrender their leaseholds in
China but nothing more. Britain, for example, was willing to negotiate
the surrender of Weihaiwei. Some of the powers found it difficult to take
Koo and company seriously considering the fact that Beijing in reality
only represented a small portion of the country. And even that govern-
ment was fighting to stay alive financially. Elihu Root, one of the Ameri-
can delegates, remarked that there was no desire on anyone's part to
"interfere with the validity of treaties," but if some action was taken, it
"should be confined to what all would recognise as 'China proper.'" Root's
proposal found favor with everyone except Koo, who declared that his
delegation could not recognize any definition of China that "did not ac-
cord to the Chinese constitution. It must include twenty-two provinces."
Root retorted that it was not in the realm of the conference to decide
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'what is China,' adding that he wanted "to avoid controversial topics and
do something useful."15
Although Koo won a resolution affirming his position, his stance
angered a lot of people. Koo remembered that Hughes was "sympathetic
to China," but he found Root to be "of a different type; he gave me the
impression that he understood Japan far more than China."16 One Brit-
ish diplomat remarked that Senator Henry Cabot Lodge "was intensely
annoyed by Mr. Koo's attitude and did not trouble to conceal this from
Koo." Robert Lansing, an adviser to the delegation, noted that Lodge
"spoke bitterly and contemptuously of [the] Chinese." Another partici-
pant commented to Lansing that Koo was "too clever, that he had changed
much." Koo struck William R. Castle, an American delegate, as "a slip-
pery man, without a trace of morals of any kind; agreeable enough to
talk to, but not at all a man to be trusted and not in the same class with
Sze." One journalist observed that while both Koo and Sze were West-
ernized, Koo "gave the impression of having been rather the more thor-
oughly Westernized, the more completely smartened up according to
modern American standards." Sze, on the other hand, "suggested a back-
ground, a residuum of the philosophy and point of view of his race, a
calm that rests upon the wisdom of centuries. For this quality, Dr. Sze
seemed a little more appealing."17 Apparently, Koo did not live up to the
Occidental expectation of how a Chinese should carry himself.
The British found little to like about Koo's remarks that China be
recognized as constituting twenty-two provinces. Such statements made
the British suspicious that Koo might demand that independent Tibet
be returned to China. London considered telling Beijing to rein in Koo.
Sir Beilby Alston, the British minister at Beijing, advised otherwise. Con-
fused newspaper reports gave Chinese readers the perception that the
conference was seriously taking up tariff autonomy and the elimination
of extraterritoriality. Worse, Koo's countrymen viewed him as a hero.
Others in Britain's Far Eastern Department doubted whether Beijing was
"able, or even willing, to prevent Mr. Koo from being petty and foolish."
Beijing was likewise under pressure to accomplish something positive at
the conference and reining in Koo would only anger Chinese students
and intellectuals.18
The real reasons why people were angry with Koo were two-fold.
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The powers wanted the conference to be a success, but Koo's insistence
on following through with his patriotic agenda muddied the waters. One
participant observed to Lansing that while "the sympathy of all was with
China to begin with . . . the course of Koo and Sze, particularly Koo, is
causing much discontent and weakening that sympathy."19 Then there
was Koo's refusal to be a pliant Chinese who followed the beck and call
of the powers.
On November 21, Root outlined the ideas later embodied in the
Nine Power Treaty in which the powers promised to protect China's ter-
ritorial integrity, assist China in maintaining "an effective and stable gov-
ernment," give China "unembarrassed opportunity" to establish "an
effective and stable government," safeguard the Open Door in China,
and cease taking advantage of China by seeking "special rights or privi-
leges." Two days later, Koo submitted more specific proposals before the
Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions: tariff autonomy; abo-
lition of extraterritoriality; removal of fortifications from the Leased Ter-
ritories; and elimination of foreign troops, foreign police, and the foreign
postal service. The powers only promised to create a Tariff Revision Con-
ference that would consider an increase of the tariff. Likewise, a commis-
sion would study whether or not to eliminate or modify extraterritoriality,
though no power was obligated to accept the commission's findings. Koo
also attacked the Leased Territories for being an 'imperium in imperio'
that not only undermined China's national defense but laid the basis for
conflict in Asia between the powers. Although willing to relinquish con-
trol over some Chinese territory, the powers generally were in no mood
to agree with full-scale retreat.20
While Koo and the powers argued over treaty revision, China and
Japan negotiated the Shandong Question. On December 1, the Chinese
delegation caved to American and British pressure to negotiate directly
outside the conference in the presence of observers from their delega-
tions.21 In response, the secretary general and other members of the
Chinese delegation resigned, and Wang Chonghui, either out of con-
viction or fear of Chinese public reaction or both, threatened to resign
unless Koo and Sze stopped compromising. Representatives of Sun Yat-
sen's government stirred up much hostility against the delegates, calling
them traitors. Chinese students delayed the first meeting between the
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Chinese and Japanese delegates by staging protests against direct nego-
tiations.22
Over the next two months, Koo and his compatriots negotiated for
Qingdao despite threats by students to assassinate members of the del-
egation. And in the process they further angered the Americans and Brit-
ish who grew impatient with the Chinese for squabbling over details, for
goading the Japanese, and for dragging out the negotiations. The ob-
stacle was the Jiaoji Railroad. The Japanese not only wanted the Chinese
to borrow $25 million from Japan for a railroad they never built, but
Tokyo wanted its people to hold important administrative positions over-
seeing the railroad. A deadlock ensued. Pressure from the other delega-
tions eventually forced Koo, Sze and Wang to agree to a formula of
compromise, but they could not sell it to their own people. GMD mem-
bers of the delegation came out against the compromise, and Chinese
students surrounded the house where the delegates were staying to pre-
vent them from meeting with the Japanese. Koo and the other delegates
were able to resume negotiations, but they also continued to balk be-
cause of, or in spite of, public pressure. Koo later remarked that "in di-
plomacy you must not aim at achieving 100% success." However, the
students, engaging in what Koo called "People's Diplomacy," did aim at
100% success. Such an approach could "never bring success, and only
spoils the negotiations."23
Thereafter, negotiations went nowhere until the United States and
Britain applied pressure. They wanted the Chinese delegates to accept
the Japanese loan and a Japanese manager for the Jiaoji Railroad. All the
above were anathema to Koo. In order to save face and at the Chinese
delegation's behest, Washington informed Beijing that China could not
get any better terms from Japan, and refusal to accept those terms would
be "intolerable."24 Such statements had their effect, and the Chinese and
Japanese delegations reached a settlement based on the compromise.
When the Washington Conference ended in February 1922, Japan
agreed to return Qingdao for a sum of money. The powers also handed
China a "Washington formula" in which the unequal treaties would be
revised once China proved itself capable of efficient self-government.
With the Nine Power Treaty, the Washington Conference created a sys-
tem to prevent a great power conflict in China, which benefited China
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by preventing war and further imperialist expansion. However, the pow-
ers maintained their hold on their imperialist rights in the midst of China's
changing realities, including the threat of communist revolution. The
powers were interested neither in following the lead of the Bolsheviks
who at least rhetorically renounced the unequal treaties nor in surren-
dering their rights in order to win back the Chinese who were disillu-
sioned by Paris. The so-called Washington formula was simply another
excuse to not sacrifice Western rights.25
Most Chinese formed an opinion of the conference based on ex-
pectations. If one expected sweeping revisions of the imperialist system,
then one's appraisals tended to be negative because the imperialist sys-
tem remained mostly intact. If one expected only gradual change, ap-
praisals tended to be more positive. In the words of Jiang Tingfu,
"Although China did not achieve much at the Conference in relation to
tariffs, concessions, or extraterritorial rights, the Washington Confer-
ence was, nevertheless, a very important stage in China's recovery of
rights."26
Koo returned to China in 1921 after being away for six years. He
faced the daunting task of establishing order and stability in China in
order to secure revision of the imperialist system. To say that China was
politically unstable was an understatement. From 1916 to 1928, there
were twenty-four Cabinets, eight presidents, and over twenty different
individuals who served as premier or provisional premier, in some cases
more than once. Another war was being waged between warlords Wu
Peifu and Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria. The war lasted only a few days,
but the number of troops involved and casualties inflicted were higher
than the previous war. Wu Peifu avoided defeat, but neither could he
decisively defeat his enemies. In 1922, Wu Peifu's warlord clique roughly
controlled eight of China's provinces as well as Beijing. There was little
room for optimism as one of Koo's subordinates explained to John Bassett
Moore: "What will befall the nation ultimately is a matter of uncertainty.
As China has a plethora of difficult problems, she is in urgent need of a
host of honest and energetic leaders."27
Upon his return, Koo found Chinese intellectuals and Western
friends of China speaking increasingly of the need for "good govern-
ment" in China. People like Wang Chonghui and Hu Shi drew up a mani-
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festo calling for "good government" and a "planned government." The
manifesto argued for political reform based on constitutional govern-
ment and publicity to influence public opinion and government plan-
ning. Moreover, good or "able men" were needed to implement this policy.
The manifesto's progressive program sought to end the North-South di-
vision, reduce the number of Chinese under arms, implement direct elec-
tion of officials, and create a national financial administration.28 Koo
approved of the manifesto, and blamed the "great confusion and strife"
on the "absence of a complete Constitution." China's poor financial situ-
ation was a matter of concern, but he believed the future "was brighter"
if one looked ahead two years to the day when there would be financial
reorganization. The latter was necessary because Koo foresaw the gov-
ernment collapsing in a matter of months due to "financial stringency."29
Throughout the summer of 1922, a series of "tea meetings" were
held at Koo's home in Beijing to discuss and debate a strategy that would
unify the country and open the way to revising the unequal treaties in
the context of the Washington agreements. Most of the participants, such
as Hu Shi, Wang Chonghui, and Lo Wen'gan, were Western educated,
but also in attendance were older intellectuals, such as Liang Qichao,
who presented their own views. After hearing different approaches, the
group focused on the notion of federalism. The idea was not a new one.
Before the 1911 Revolution, Liang Qichao, Sun Yat-sen, and others held
the conviction that "national strength [could be] based on local self-gov-
ernment."30 The idea revived in the 1920s. Some people pointed to the
overcentralization of power in the government's hands as the principal
reason for the breakdown of society and the rise of the warlords. Follow-
ing the American model, proponents hoped that every province would
have its own constitution and become self-governing. A central govern-
ment would remain in Beijing and it would maintain a national army
"in order to avoid the occupation of territory by war lords." Hu Shi faulted
"the attempt to unify China by force from above." Instead of using force,
good government had to exist in every province in order to establish a
stable civil authority. The sources of China's disunity were not imperial-
ism, warlordism, or capitalism, but rather the lack of strong local insti-
tutions. As he argued in his political journal, the Endeavor, "Internal
reform is a pre-condition for resistance to imperialism." Federalism and
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constitutionalism would help China break out of the shackles of the
unequal treaties and emerge as a free and independent country.31
Such ideas were more palatable to someone like Koo who not only
supported federalism but could not subscribe to the view of throwing
out the imperialists in order to save China. His outlook agreed to a cer-
tain extent with that of Hu Shi who, after the Washington Conference,
argued that China no longer had to fear imperialist aggression and that
the powers were willing to work with the government to create a stable
and peaceful China. Hu refused to call them imperialists, but instead saw
them as "investors." Koo opposed the imperialist system and foreign
meddling in China's internal affairs, but he welcomed the foreign pres-
ence and capital as long as Chinese sovereignty was not circumscribed.
And although Koo acknowledged later that his foreign policy was to elimi-
nate the unequal treaties, he preferred gradual change. His intention was
not "to adopt a policy of unilateral action with regard to the unequal
treaties." Koo wanted to eliminate the unequal treaties "by an orderly
method of negotiation, in the hope and expectation that the foreign pow-
ers concerned would be well disposed to cooperate with China." Koo
would unilaterally denounce the unequal treaties "only after the foreign
powers made it clear that they would not agree to a revision of the trea-
ties by negotiation or that they would obstruct the achievement of China's
national purpose in this direction."32
Such beliefs put men like Koo at odds with the fledgling CCP. After
the Paris Peace Conference, the liberal Western model of development
was in disrepute as was the emphasis on gradualism in political develop-
ment if not foreign affairs. Before the CCP was founded, Chinese radi-
cals blamed the warlords, corrupt government officials and politicians,
and the imperialist powers for making China backward. Once the CCP
was formed, it took on the issues of warlordism and imperialism. In May
1922, the CCP produced slogans that called for the overthrow of those
two isms. Two months later, participants in the second party congress
wrote a platform that condemned the powers, especially the United States,
for their exploitation of China, particularly during the Washington Con-
ference. And Chinese radicals rejected Hu Shi's conclusion that China
had nothing to fear from the imperialists. They condemned the collabo-
ration that took place between the powers and the warlords and the
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compradores such as Koo who were backed by Britain and the United
States. Over the next three years, the CCP railed against the British and
Americans and called for a revolution that would remove the warlords
and government collaborators who served as conduits for imperialism
and the disunity of China.33
For the moment, Koo and his compatriots were preoccupied with
making good government work and could ignore the CCP, which was a
minor political force. After Wu Peifu defeated the Manchurian warlord
Zhang Zuolin earlier in the year, Wu set out to establish a new govern-
ment in Beijing. Impressed by Wu, Koo gave his full support to the war-
lord because the latter's ideas were more in accord with Koo's political
convictions. Although antiforeign by nature, Wu leaned toward Britain
and the United States instead of Japan, making him more acceptable to
Koo, who admitted that he was distrustful of Japan. At the time, Wu
Peifu seemed progressive in the sense that he was supposedly honest,
supported rule by law, and stressed "peaceful constitutionality." He re-
stored the former parliament that had been dissolved in 1917 in a bid to
undermine Sun Yat-sen's government in Guangzhou and bring about
national unity. He also appointed Li Yuanhong to be president. Li served
as president after Yuan Shikai died until being forced from the presi-
dency in 1917. Before taking his post, Li insisted that the warlords re-
duce troop levels and reform the Beijing government.34
One other measure Li Yuanhong took in August 1922 was to bring
together bright and modern-minded Chinese to form a new cabinet com-
posed of Wang Chonghui (Ph.D. in International Law from Yale) as pre-
mier, Lo Wen'gan (Ph.D. in International Law from Oxford) as minister
of finance, and Koo as minister of foreign affairs. It became known as
the "Able Men" Cabinet. All were believers in the notion of government
by men of intellect and proven ability. In Koo's case, he was also very
popular in China. In October, The Weekly Review, an English-language
newspaper published by American owners, asked nearly 25,000 teachers
and students who they thought were the "twelve greatest living Chinese."
Koo ranked third with 1,211 votes, only 114 votes behind Sun Yat-sen,
who ranked first.35
The road to stability and order was not an easy one. Koo, who wore
the hats of foreign minister and chairman of the financial discussion
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commission, found the government stuck with the problem of inadequate
funding. Of the government's three main goals—writing a constitution,
unification and financial reorganization—the latter was of greatest con-
cern. Even before the Washington Conference commenced, the Beijing
government went bankrupt. Revising the unequal treaties would prove
worthless unless the government laid its hands on some hard cash. Oth-
erwise, Koo predicted the government might collapse in six months. Some
at the time, including Chinese newspapers that believed Koo's connec-
tions abroad would lead to suspension, if not cancellation, of the Boxer
Indemnity payments, were confident of Koo's abilities. People felt that if
he could avoid corruption in the government, there was hope yet for
China's financial situation.36
To alleviate Beijing's financial crisis, Koo attempted to obtain a con-
solidation loan from the Consortium. The powers were asked to sus-
pend the Boxer Indemnity payments and agree to loan China the money
necessary to reorganize the government and put it on a firm economic
basis. American and British government officials supported granting the
loan believing that Beijing's stability ensured access to the China market.
Japan disapproved, not wanting Wu Peifu to benefit by the money. Koo
requested an ¥18 million loan to be provided over the next several months,
but the Japanese again balked declaring that they refused to support any
particular Chinese party or faction. Neither would they nor American
and British bankers throw money down a sinkhole, in this case the sink-
hole being a Beijing government that already reneged on the payment of
previous loans.37
Another difficulty was making constitutional government work in
the midst of warlord intrigue. Factional politics led to the downfall of
the "Able Men" Cabinet in November. Koo remained out of the govern-
ment until April 1923 when he was appointed foreign minister once more.
The "Able Men" Cabinet became symbolic of future cabinets that rose
and fell in succession from 1922 to 1928, and the lack of stability in Beijing
became a source of embarrassment for many Chinese. The "Able Men"
were indeed bright but not adept at playing Beijing politics. Koo admit-
ted later that "it had always been my desire to bring about a revision of
China's unequal treaties and I had no taste for politics or political ri-
valry." Although he aspired to be a leader, he did not want to curry po-
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litical favor, and refused to join a political party, not doing so until 1942
when he became a member of the GMD.38
With the downfall of the "Able Men," the belief that constitutional
government was the road to China's salvation waned. Koo later argued
that without a tradition of representative government in China, war-
lords, politicians, and peasants did not possess an understanding of "what
democracy really was or should be even though they were living under
the Republic." Education was key to resolving the root cause of
constitutionalism's failure. He believed that representative government
had to be taught throughout the entire Chinese school system so that young
Chinese grew up understanding that "whether at a private gathering, a
public meeting, or in discussions in a council, freedom of speech and the
right of objection should be recognized and that where honest differences
of opinion exist, there is always a way of finding a workable compromise."
Koo's faith in education led him to support David Yui's "Citizenship Train-
ing" movement of the 1920s. China's partial failure at the Washington
Conference convinced Yui, a graduate of St. John's and Harvard and head
of the Chinese YMCA, that the Chinese people needed to be awakened
through a citizenship training movement. The movement promoted an
understanding of political theories as well as national and international
problems. Yet Koo was not overly idealistic. He recognized that it was all a
matter of time and training: "Democracy cannot be born overnight."39
The problem facing China was that the powers were not that pa-
tient. The spirit of cooperation that supposedly flowed out of the Wash-
ington Conference between the powers and the Chinese government
never materialized. A China divided by the warlords drove away poten-
tial investors. Foreign businessmen took their money to stable Japan.
Meanwhile, the powers stood by passively (except for selling arms) and
took no positive action to bring peace to China. The powers' agreement
to allow the Chinese to solve their own problems without interference
from outsiders became a legitimate reason to not implement the pro-
grams laid down at the Washington Conference. As a result of China's
internal political breakdown and the conservative nature of the powers,
Chinese officials, such as W.W Yen, grew pessimistic that the Washing-
ton Conference formula would be put into action.40
The Lincheng Incident convinced the powers that their refusal to
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revise the imperialist system was justified. In May 1923, twenty-five for-
eign subjects were kidnapped from a train by Chinese bandits.41 The
majority of the captives were Americans. Negotiations between foreign
consular officers, Chinese officials, and the bandits got underway but
made little progress until the bandits were threatened with foreign mili-
tary force. By June 12, all of the captives were released. The powers de-
manded not only compensation but indemnities as well. And there was
talk of stationing more troops in China in order to protect foreigners.
After several weeks of living in "retirement," Koo returned as for-
eign minister in July. In response to the powers' demands, Koo called for
patience. Even though the republican form of government was being
put to the test, Koo declared that China continued to pursue democracy
and the "ability to solve her own problems." In August, however, the pow-
ers pressed for compensation for the victims and the guarantee that the
railway police would be reorganized under foreign officers. The powers
took the position that the Lincheng Incident was similar to the Boxer
Uprising of 1900, but Koo believed that the powers' demands went "far
beyond what was justifiable in the circumstance." Before the powers could
place Chinese railways under foreign officers, the Chinese Foreign Min-
istry leaked the scheme to the Chinese public. Public outrage against the
reorganization plan led the foreign and Chinese press to denounce "the
project as an encroachment on China's sovereign rights."42
The British were furious with Koo, who not only refused to squelch
the torrent being unleashed against Britain but was believed to have ghost-
written some of the articles appearing in newspapers criticizing the Brit-
ish. The situation only worsened when Koo responded with his own note
declaring the Chinese government not liable for the Lincheng Incident.
Koo later recalled that he believed the Lincheng Incident to be an inter-
nal Chinese matter not subject to foreign interference and argued that
"nothing should be done which would infringe upon China's sovereignty
as an independent nation or would be contrary to or would go beyond
the principles and rules of international law in regard to the protection
of foreign nationals on the territory of China." The incident resulted,
not from an antiforeign movement such as the Boxer Uprising but from
a train robbery on a scale similar to what happened in the American
West. He admitted to Jacob Gould Schurman, the U.S. minister, that his
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note "would not entirely satisfy either Chinese or foreigners but he had
to take account of Chinese public opinion as [the] diplomatic body also
had probably been influenced by foreign opinion in making their de-
mands."43
In regard to the foreigners he was right. His note angered many in
the foreign community in China. The editor of the North-China Herald
accused Koo of trying "to treat the Lincheng outrage as if it were an
isolated event, a thing indeed to be regretted, but not worse than might
have happened anywhere, which the Chinese government could not have
expected and for which it cannot be blamed." The editor further ob-
served that the incident underscored the "widespread state of lawless-
ness" and "the disgraceful anarchy which made Lincheng possible."44 Koo's
note irritated the British intensely. They believed Koo was trying "to curry
favor with the Chinese Parliament and student classes and thus consoli-
date his somewhat insecure political position and . . . to score a diplo-
matic success at the expense of His Majesty's government." If true, Koo
was successful to an extent. He eventually compensated the victims while
ducking the railway reorganization scheme.45 If not responsible for leak-
ing the railway scheme, he probably condoned the act because he op-
posed further loss of sovereignty.
The Lincheng Incident embarrassed Koo and government person-
nel who were trying to convince the powers of China's stability. Koo played
down the incident because he knew that the powers would use it as an
excuse to not fulfill the promises made at the Washington Conference.
At one point in this episode, the powers threatened to drop recognition
of Beijing if the government did not accede to their demands. Secretary
of State Hughes warned Koo "that such outrages as that of Lincheng . . .
should not be encouraged and that when the Chinese talk of the integ-
rity and sovereignty of China they should maintain a Government ca-
pable of discharging its international obligations."46
The deleterious effects of Lincheng on Beijing's relations with the
foreign powers were felt almost immediately when Koo attempted to
put the Washington Conference principles into practice. In the spring of
1924, Koo sent out feelers to see if the powers were interested in holding
the Commission on Extraterritoriality in the fall. In particular, he called
on the United States to use its good offices, since it was the United States
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that had called the Washington Conference to order. Koo argued that
sending the Commission to China in the near future would "encourage
[the Chinese people] to get together to solve their political problems."47
By June, though, none of the powers could agree on a date. The Lincheng
Incident convinced the powers that China's disunity prevented the Beijing
government from maintaining law and order and from protecting for-
eign nationals, and they had no reason to take up revising the imperialist
system.48 Although not dead yet, the spirit of Washington was dying.
If Lincheng proved a serious setback for a man like Koo who sought
revision of the unequal treaties, it also had an important impact on the
Chinese people. The Lincheng Incident contributed to the general awak-
ening of the Chinese people in the 1920s. The Chinese were captivated
by the whole incident, and as John Fitzgerald has written, "This was a
tale of captivity with a difference: it was not China that was held against
its will but uninvited Westerners." The foreigners were more humiliated
than were the members of the Chinese government, and in their overre-
action, the foreign powers further stirred up nationalism in the Chinese
people who increasingly held the foreigners in contempt.49 On the one
hand, the incident rallied people to the government and Koo could use
this nationalism as a weapon against the foreign powers. On the other
hand, Koo found it more and more difficult to make compromises with
the imperialists and to maintain law and order in China in the face of
Chinese nationalism.
From 1923 on, the Beijing government found itself in increasing
ideological competition with Sun Yat-sen's GMD party and the fledgling
CCP. From 1918 to 1922, Sun appealed time and again to the powers,
especially Japan and the United States, for assistance. The United States,
which generally respected Sun in 1911, now viewed Sun as irresponsible,
if not imbalanced. Japan demanded that Sun accept the 1915 Twenty-
One Demands before recognizing his government, leaving Sun little
choice but to refuse. Then in 1923, the Soviet Union expressed a willing-
ness to help. The previous year, Adolph Joffe, a Soviet leader and diplo-
mat, and Foreign Minister Koo tried to reach an agreement to pave the
way to mutual diplomatic recognition. Although no communist, Koo
wanted a deal in order to ensure the security of the CER and promote
trade. The negotiations broke down because of a disagreement over the
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CER, so Joffe went south to meet with Sun. The two men negotiated the
Sun-Joffe Agreement that committed the Soviet Union to backing Sun
politically, economically, and militarily. The Soviets promptly sent ad-
visers to Guangzhou to help Sun reorganize the GMD, imbue it with a
more anti-imperialistic ideology, and provide military assistance. The
agreement also formed the first united front between the GMD and the
CCP in an effort to present solidarity against the imperialist powers.50
The marriage between Sun and the Soviets led him to modify his
previous views of the foreign powers. Earlier in his career, Sun cooper-
ated with the foreign powers to accomplish his revolutionary goals. Now
he called for throwing out the imperialists and the warlords who were
the enemies of the nation. Sun argued that the state had to mobilize the
people in order to free China from the grip of the foreign powers, and
not until the people served the state would China's semicolonization end.51
In the past, he frowned on the notion that foreign economic imperial-
ism was inherently dangerous to China and initially welcomed foreign
capital. After 1923, Sun revised publicly those earlier views and attacked
imperialism for its economic, political, and military oppression of the
Chinese people. In short, the imperialists became a target of Sun's revo-
lutionary propaganda. In January 1924, the GMD Party Congress issued
its own manifesto blaming the powers for China's instability and dis-
unity. The GMD's foreign policy platform called for abrogation of the
unequal treaties and offered most-favored-nation status to those coun-
tries that voluntarily gave up the treaties' unequal privileges.52
By 1924, Chinese students, intellectuals, merchants, and workers
influenced by Marxist-Leninism and Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of
the People, began denouncing imperialism and demanded treaty revi-
sions. And they allowed little room for compromise. This was clear in
1924 when Koo tried to recover Weihaiwei, the small port given to the
British during the 1898 "scramble for concessions." The twenty-five-year
lease expired in 1923. An Anglo-Chinese Commission met throughout
the fall of 1922 to discuss its return to China but ended when the Chi-
nese negotiator suggested that since the British agreed to turn over
Weihaiwei, China should allow the British to use a nearby island as a
summer resort for the British navy. When that concession became pub-
lic knowledge, the negotiator was accused of being a traitor and was forced
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to resign. When Koo tried to restart negotiations in 1924, he laid down
terms deemed unfavorable by the British. The British minister feared
not reentering into negotiations because there was sure to be "anti-Brit-
ish agitation" like that during the summer over the Lincheng Incident.
On the other hand, the diplomat recognized that Koo was under public
pressure to secure an agreement that was "tantamount to unconditional
surrender" on the part of the British. Otherwise, Koo and the govern-
ment would "be accused by their political opponents of sacrificing 'sov-
ereign rights.'" Eventually an agreement was reached that still permitted
British naval facilities, but before either side could sign it, a coup d'etat
forced Koo to take sanctuary, ironically, in Weihaiwei.53
Another foreign policy issue influenced by the vagaries of Chi-
nese nationalism involved normalization of relations with the Soviet
Union. The Soviet initiative with Sun Yat-sen naturally affected Beijing.
In 1923, Lev Karakhan, the Soviet Union's Deputy Commissar for For-
eign Affairs, arrived in China. Karakhan demanded recognition of his
government before negotiating a new agreement, but Beijing refused.
The impasse was broken in part when Britain recognized the Soviet
Union, but mostly because of agitation in Beijing. In February 1924,
forty-seven Beijing University professors urged Koo to recognize the
Soviet Union. The warlord Wu Peifu likewise called for resumption of
negotiations.54
Koo and other cabinet members wanted to accord recognition. By
March, Karakhan and C.T. Wang, Koo's nemesis from the Paris confer-
ence, had an agreement. In addition to reestablishing diplomatic rela-
tions, the Soviets gave up extraterritoriality, abrogated old treaties,
returned the Boxer Indemnity, and agreed to withdraw from Mongolia.
Yet Koo and others in the cabinet opposed the agreement for several
reasons. First, the Soviets made a series of pledges to discuss numerous
issues raised in the agreement at a future conference. Neither Koo nor
W.W. Yen trusted Soviet pledges of good faith. The Chinese cabinet felt
that the old treaties should be abolished immediately, and not at some
uncertain future date. Second, the Soviets refused to annul a 1921 treaty
with Outer Mongolia that recognized Mongolian independence. The
cabinet wanted Soviet recognition of Mongolia as Chinese territory. When
C.T. Wang initialed an agreement that did not contain a Soviet promise
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to cancel their treaty with Outer Mongolia, Koo, who rivaled Wang in
the pursuit of glory, rejected the agreement.55
Chinese students had their own interpretation. The general assump-
tion was that Koo opposed recognizing the Soviet Union because he was
pro-American. Since the United States was the only major power not to
recognize the Soviet Union, the students concluded that Koo wanted to
follow the lead of the United States. Students, led by a CCP founder,
went to the foreign ministry, carrying placards that accused Koo of be-
traying the country and demanded recognition of the Soviet Union.56
Chinese students tended to accept Karakhan's version that negotiations
failed because of foreign interference. Joining the students were the war-
lords who urged the government to continue negotiations.57
Along with moral pressure, an attempt was made on his life either
to frighten Koo into signing an agreement or simply to eliminate him.
On May 15, 1924, a package containing a bomb arrived at Koo's home.
Upon being opened, the bomb exploded, injuring several in the Koo
household, but not Koo himself. Who was responsible was never deter-
mined, though Koo claimed later that two Beijing University students
had planted the bomb. To place the blame on prorecognition individuals
is not far-fetched, and Koo himself suspected individuals with commu-
nist connections. The assassination attempt was a matter of concern for
some of the powers. Basil Newton, in Britain's Far Eastern Department of
the Foreign Office, expressed the fear that as a result of this attack, Beijing
would be "more than ever reluctant to come to decisions, e.g. in regard to
Weihaiwei, which can expose them to criticism however unreasonable."58
Eventually, Koo and Karakhan resumed negotiations, and the two
sides signed an agreement that was not significantly different from the
one reached earlier by C.T. Wang. Although Koo claimed he was "not
entirely satisfied with some of the provisions," he accepted the agree-
ment because "China with her vast interests in the re-establishment of
normal relations with Russia naturally could not defer the settlement of
this question longer than she could help it." At the time, recognition was
deemed a limited victory because normalization was one more blow to
the imperialist system that could be used as a tool against the other pow-
ers in revising the unequal treaties. Moscow, which had interests to be
served, gave Beijing recognition at a time when the Soviets were sup-
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porting Sun Yat-sen, potentially breaking Sun's monopoly on relations
with the Soviet Union. And normalization was an example of Beijing
asserting itself in its foreign relations in the face of opposition from
France, Japan, and the United States, which opposed the agreement. Since
Moscow in theory gave up extraterritoriality, Koo sent an open letter to
all the powers demanding they too surrender this unequal privilege.
Otherwise, recognition did Koo's government little good. The
agreement allowed the Soviets to open an embassy in Beijing with an
ambassador, not a minister as was the case with the other powers, from
where they could carry out propaganda work. And even though Koo
could potentially threaten closer Sino-Soviet cooperation, renewed re-
lations never translated into bargaining leverage when Koo met with
the other powers to renegotiate treaties. The Sino-Soviet conference
was never held, the Chinese never reasserted their influence over
Mongolia, joint Sino-Soviet management of the CER remained a sore
point, and the supposed gains that the treaty gave the Chinese were in
fact secured by Beijing since 1921 in one form or another. The treaty
was pro forma.59
The significance of both the aborted rendition of Weihaiwei and
recognition of the Soviet Union was the role of public opinion. To a
certain extent, the students cowed Koo. Years later, in criticizing the In-
dian people for demanding independence now, Koo remarked that, "It
seems Oriental people attach too much importance to . . . principles and
take too academic [a] view of great problems. Is it due to their political
immaturity in the face of the experienced European politicians and im-
perialists?" The Indian people of the 1940s reminded Koo of Chinese
students and intellectuals of the 1920s in being unrealistic in demanding
the impossible now. There was not always a straight path to "the attain-
ment of a cardinal object." Koo went on, "One should be realistic and
resourceful in seeking its attainment."60
In the months after the normalization of Sino-Russian relations,
Koo's stock declined. Hints of corruption impugned his character in-
cluding suggestions that the Soviets bribed Koo to sign the treaty. Then
there were reports that Koo's wife bribed members of parliament in or-
der to secure confirmation of Koo's appointment as foreign minister.61
For the rest of his career, Koo did not win the complete trust of either his
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compatriots or foreigners when involved in financial matters as a result
of these accusations.
Besides impugning his character, Chinese students increasingly at-
tacked Koo for being "too friendly to America."62 The CCP criticized the
United States for its imperialist policies and essentially accused Koo and
others like him of being puppets of the American capitalists.63 By the
mid-1920s, fellow travelers and noncommunists alike gradually focused
their critical eye on the American presence in China and America's un-
exceptional China policy.64 In 1925, a broadsheet portrayed Wu Peifu as
a dog being led on a leash by Uncle Sam: the caption read 'The truth
about imperialism and warlords.'65 Charges that Koo was a pawn of the
United States were unfounded. Koo admired American culture, but he
was no puppet. The real issue was not that Koo was a pro-American, but
that the growing support for using military force and revolution to over-
throw the unequal treaty system eclipsed his gradualist approach to solv-
ing China's problems.
Politically, the situation worsened for Koo after 1924. The October
1924 coup forced Koo into "retirement" for the next year and a half.
Meanwhile, antiforeign feelings among Chinese students, merchants, and
laborers increased, creating tension for all the powers in China. In May
1925, Japanese police attacked striking Chinese workers, killing one. On
May 30, hundreds of Chinese demonstrators marched on a British po-
lice station in Shanghai, leading British police to open fire, killing nine.
The result was a spontaneous outpouring of Chinese anger against the
foreign powers and the imperialist system. Nationwide strikes, boycotts,
and demonstrations followed. In Beijing, students, teachers, workers in-
cluding rickshaw pullers, merchants, and journalists were organized and
demonstrated with anti-British and anti-Japanese placards and banners.
The demonstrations were citywide. The outpouring of anger led the for-
eign powers to increase their military presence. Both the GMD and the
CCP experienced a surge in their membership rolls, and in Beijing, both
parties were able to organize because Feng Yuxiang, the Soviet-backed
warlord, provided protection. Koo joined Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, Jiang
Tingfu and others in condemning those striking and in the boycotting
of Boxerism. They called for law and order while imploring the powers
to sit down with Beijing to discuss how to handle the massacre.66
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In response to these events, the powers agreed to hold a Special
Tariff Conference in October. After the meeting convened, students held
anti-imperialist demonstrations over the next several months. On March
18, 1926, warlord troops opened fire on a CCP rally at Tiananmen, kill-
ing fifty and wounding two hundred, mostly students. Then in April, a
major warlord war pitting Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu against the So-
viet-backed Feng Yuxiang broke out, making the conference seem sur-
real. In May 1926, after the rise and fall of several cabinets, Koo became
minister of finance under the premiership of W.W. Yen. In the opinion
of John V.A. MacMurray, the U.S. minister, the new Cabinet possessed
"scarcely more than a color of legality." Beijing exercised little power over
provinces dominated by numerous warlords, and the GMD soon ex-
panded into the Yangzi River valley. Besides disunity, there was a lack of
cooperation among the powers meeting at the conference. The British,
Americans and Japanese agreed to grant tariff autonomy in 1929, but the
three powers could not agree on the tariff rate in the interim. Because of
the civil war, the tariff conference died for lack of interest by the powers. A
Commission on Extraterritoriality met the same fate in 1926.67
After Zhang Zuolin asserted his control over Beijing, Koo switched
allegiance from Wu Peifu to Zhang. Sir Miles Lampson, the British min-
ister at Beijing, described this period as "the low-water mark in the his-
tory of the Chinese Government." As far as Lampson could tell, Koo,
who was both premier and foreign minister, and the cabinet "seemed to
have little claim to represent anyone but themselves." There was a great
deal of truth in the statement. Zhang Zuolin only controlled China's
northeast provinces and two other provinces. China's remaining prov-
inces were divided among four major warlords, numerous minor war-
lords, and then the GMD-CCP United Front. In joining Zhang Zuolin,
Koo threw his lot in with one of the most conservative and least progres-
sive of the warlords. For example, Zhang performed Confucian rituals
and aspired to become an emperor.68
Koo apparently found the anticommunist Zhang more appealing
than the so-called Reds in the south. Early in 1925, Sun Yat-sen died of
cancer in Koo's Beijing palace home when Sun went there to make peace
between North and South. Chiang Kai-shek, a Japanese-educated mili-
tary man and Sun's protege, managed to wrest power and succeed Sun as
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leader of the GMD. His principal foreign policy goals were, in his words,
those pursued by Sun Yat-sen: "to remove the restrictions imposed on
China by other powers, and to attain international equality." The left-
wing of the GMD party espoused a "revolutionary foreign policy" in
which it would either negotiate or use pressure from the masses, such as
strikes and boycotts, to abrogate the unequal treaties. Chiang represented
the right-wing faction of the GMD, which took a more moderate ap-
proach to treaty revisions, but many foreigners and Chinese did not know
that such a distinction existed. The GMD's alliance with the CCP and
Soviet aid led some China observers to mistakenly refer to Chiang as the
"Red General" though he was in fact not a communist.69
Zhang Zuolin, on the other hand, had no Soviet connection. Since
1925, Zhang competed for British support to defeat Feng Yuxiang. Con-
servative foreigners in Beijing, particularly those with British interests,
preferred Zhang to Feng because the former provided order in the north-
ern capital and put down antiforeign protests in Shanghai. GMD and
CCP cadres were forced to operate in secret after Zhang arrested and
killed a number of party members. Moreover, Zhang Zuolin followed a
policy that was, according to Gaven McCormack, one of "gradualism in
foreign affairs, respect for the treaties, recognition of foreign loan obli-
gations, prohibition of anti-imperialist movements and of strike propa-
ganda."70 For Koo, Zhang's policy was more in line with his thinking.
Koo was not about to sign on to social revolution and communism.
On the basis of their anticommunism, Koo and Zhang sought for-
eign support in order to defeat the Soviet-backed GMD-CCP alliance.
The changes in China, however, led the powers to reconsider their poli-
cies. In 1926, Chiang Kai-shek launched the Northern Expedition, an
attempt to unify China by force. The success of the Northern Expedition
moved the British to lean toward recognizing the Guangzhou govern-
ment in order to protect British interests there that were being attacked
by boycotts. In April, Britain withdrew recognition of Beijing, though it
did not immediately recognize Guangzhou. Later in the year, the British
government announced a new policy in the famous December Memo-
randum, which declared that the powers had to accommodate them-
selves to the reality of the GMD movement in the south, that China should
be permitted tariff autonomy, and that the Chinese desire to revise the
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unequal treaties was a legitimate one. The British, however, wanted the
December Memorandum to be a joint statement made by all the powers.
When Lampson met with Koo, the Chinese foreign minister asked
Lampson for his credentials. The British diplomat thought Koo was act-
ing "a little stuffy in this," and made it clear that he would reveal his
credentials once London recognized a government in China. Waving the
Nine Power Treaty in Lampson's face, Koo declared that China had a
right to be consulted before London dispatched the December Memo-
randum. Koo obviously would have accepted revising the unequal treaty
system but not at the expense of surrendering power to the GMD.
Lampson felt that Koo might make trouble for him particularly since
Koo's attitude was rather cold: "Butter would not melt in his mouth."71
Trouble did come, but it was not entirely Koo's fault. When Zhang
Zuolin pressed for British political, military, and financial assistance in
dealing with what he called the Bolsheviks of the south, Lampson re-
fused. Zhang threatened to remove Sir Francis Aglen, the Inspector-Gen-
eral of China's Maritime Customs Administration, from his post. The
Beijing government derived a third of its income from these customs,
and they ensured a financial lifeline to whatever government controlled
them. The GMD independently collected the surtaxes established at the
Washington Conference, and Aglen went south in December 1926 to
discuss the issue with GMD officials. Infuriated, Zhang Zuolin believed
that Aglen was throwing in his lot with the GMD.72
In February 1927, Koo relieved Aglen on the pretext that the Briton
disobeyed instructions from Beijing, causing a great stir among the in-
ternational community. Koo later claimed that Aglen flirted with the
GMD.73 In fact, the GMD government warned Aglen that if he tried to
collect surtaxes in GMD-controlled territory, it "would consider it an
'act of war.'" Koo, who earlier admitted the impossibility of collecting
the surtaxes in the south, now demanded that Aglen carry out his duties.
The powers' diplomatic representatives presented Koo with a memoran-
dum advising him not to pursue Aglen's dismissal, warning that such an
act would lead to the collapse of the customs administration with dire
consequences for both Chinese and foreign interests. And they reminded
Koo that he and the rest of the Chinese delegation at the Washington
Conference declared that Beijing would take no actions that would prove
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to "disturb the present administration of the Chinese Maritime Cus-
toms." John V.A. MacMurray warned Koo that while Washington did not
want to interfere in China's internal affairs, he saw dangerous conse-
quences if Koo carried out his threat to relieve Aglen of his duties.74
Koo decided to take a middle ground approach. He fired Aglen,
but named another foreigner to head the Customs Administration.75 A
contingent of diplomats met with Koo to discuss his actions. To no avail,
Lampson "harangued [Koo] till I had exhausted my vocabulary."76 For
his part, the powers annoyed Koo by interfering in what he deemed to be
an internal Chinese matter. Koo later asserted that Chinese public opin-
ion looked upon his actions "as a legitimate assertion of China's sover-
eign right.. . [and] strengthened my conviction that, if China stood on
her legitimate rights, her action, no matter how striking or even shock-
ing it might appear in the Far East or Asia in general, would be fully
understood abroad." To a limited degree, Koo played a role in what Rob-
ert Bickers has described as the dismantling of Britain's informal empire
by laying the foundation of what would be the eventual Sinification of
the maritime customs that reflected imperium in imperio.77 More impor-
tantly, the issue revealed the competition between the GMD in the south
and the Beijing government for public support: a competition that ex-
tended to the unequal treaty system.
Although Koo refused to unilaterally overthrow the treaty system,
he recalled that "China's policy from the Paris Peace Conference on had
always been to regard the revision of the unequal treaties as a national
policy." In 1927 in a conversation with Lampson, Koo underscored that
his top foreign policy goals were still tariff autonomy and abolition of
extraterritoriality. Instead of a unilateral call for the end of the un-
equal treaties, Koo took a legal approach by relying on diplomacy and
international law. In particular, he intended to use the principle of re-
bus sic stantibus. Koo demanded revision of the unequal treaties be-
cause "the conditions prevailing at the time when those treaties were
made had changed, and the changed conditions made those treaties out
of date and called for their revision in accordance with current condi-
tions."78
In his competition with the GMD government for the prestige and
support of the Chinese people, Koo needed to take some positive steps
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toward destruction of the imperialist system. Using the principle of re-
bus sic stantibus, Koo implemented a policy of automatic termination of
treaties once they expired. In December 1926, Koo oversaw abrogation
of the Sino-Belgian Treaty by allowing the treaty to expire without nego-
tiating its renewal. Belgium resisted Koo's maneuvering but to no avail.
Koo later referred to it as "a landmark in Chinese diplomatic history
because it was the first time that an unequal treaty was declared com-
pletely abrogated in the face of the open and official opposition of the
other party in the treaty." Koo focused his attention on Belgium because
that country was incapable of flexing military or political muscle in or-
der to protect its imperial rights. This move upset many in China's for-
eign community because of the precedent that it set: "a precedent to
prove China's determination to act in order to bring an end to the re-
gime of unequal treaties from which China had suffered for a century,"
was how Koo put it. According to the New York Times, the Belgians lost
extraterritoriality "at a time when the shell of a Government is grasping
for anything that will enable it to seem alive and to catch popular atten-
tion by a gesture of nationalism."79
Koo's activities of the previous months to eliminate the unequal
treaties were indeed desperate measures to fulfill his patriotic goals while
at the same time trying to win enough public support for his actions to
undermine Chiang Kai-shek's revolution. His success with the Belgians
led him to revise China's treaty with Spain. Then Koo informed the Japa-
nese and the French of his intention to negotiate new treaties with those
countries. Like that of the tariff conference the treaty negotiations were
conducted in surreal conditions. Everyone knew that the Beijing gov-
ernment was more fiction than fact, and since the GMD army moved
ever closer to the northern capital, Beijing's days were numbered. Sir
Miles Lampson wrote that it was "this fiction of a Government, secure in
the knowledge that they could always count on the support and approval
of the country as a whole when it came to baiting the foreigner and play-
ing to the Nationalist gallery, which . . . abrogated the treaty rights of
Belgians, and notified Japan of China's intention to revise the Japanese
treaty within six months."80
Valid criticism aside, Koo defended his actions, telling foreign cor-
respondents that "China's lack of unity could not justify delay in the
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negotiation of new treaties." He added that "fears that a change in Gov-
ernment in China might lead to repudiation of such new treaties were
entirely groundless."81 However, success proved elusive. Negotiations with
Japan got underway in January 1927, but broke down because the North-
ern Expedition caused the collapse of the Beijing government. And the
days spent at the bargaining table made it clear that Japan would not
grant tariff autonomy. Japan's attitude was similar to that of Britain's. As
Lampson explained to Koo, the British government was not about to
make a wholesale abandonment of its vested rights in China. Koo simply
would not compromise on the issue of tariff autonomy. He viewed the
tariff revenues as essential for putting the Beijing government and ulti-
mately the entire country on a sound financial basis.82 As for the French,
negotiations also commenced, but protests from the GMD grew too loud
to be ignored and proved unfruitful.83
While engaged in these negotiations, Koo turned to Washington
for assistance in revising the imperialist system. In January 1927, the
United States, following the British lead of the previous month, expressed
willingness to revise the unequal treaties with "any Government... or
delegates who can represent or speak for China." Washington expected
most-favored-nation treatment and would relinquish extraterritoriality
if the Chinese could guarantee protection for American citizens in Chi-
nese courts. The next month, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
the Porter resolution, which called on the president to enter into nego-
tiations with "accredited agents of the Government of China, authorized
to speak for the entire people of China" with a view to revise existing
treaties between China and the United States. The U.S. State Department's
January announcement, however, did not clearly delineate with whom
Washington planned to negotiate the treaties: Koo or the GMD. Secre-
tary of State Frank Kellogg observed that neither side "could singly claim
to represent the whole of China." Washington's policy to wait and see who
would form a stable central government blindsided Koo. The American
insistence on only negotiating with a government that truly represented
China struck many Chinese as a convenient excuse for delaying talks.84
Chiang's Northern Expedition brought Koo's efforts to revise the
unequal treaties to a swift end in 1927. In June, Koo resigned and retired
to his villa in the Western Hills. He saw the handwriting on the wall.
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Beijing soon fell to Chiang Kai-shek, and Koo knew that whatever gov-
ernment came to power would not undo his work but would build on it.
Although an opportunist, Koo was a patriot who saw the abolition of the
unequal treaties as the basis for building a modern China regardless of
who was in control. In the meantime, Chiang Kai-shek turned against
the CCP and the Soviet Union, and either defeated the northern armies
or made political deals with some of the northern warlords. Zhang Zuolin
made a deal with Chiang that permitted him to return to Manchuria
while the GMD flag flew over Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek renamed the old
capital Beiping, or Northern Peace, and established the new capital at
Nanjing. For people like Chiang, Beijing carried a stigma, a foul odor
that stank of Yuan Shikai, Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, and Zhang Zuolin.85
In 1928, Koo received a rude jolt when the GMD government or-
dered his arrest, forcing him to flee to Great Britain's Tianjin Conces-
sion. Lampson declared that if GMD officials produced an arrest warrant,
the British would execute it. Lampson had no idea why the GMD wanted
to arrest Koo. He speculated that they sought revenge for the arrest of
GMD students in late 1926 by Zhang Zuolin. Frank Ashton-Gwatkin of
the Far Eastern Department believed the motives were more personal:
"Wellington Koo, I understand, is one of the most hated of the foreign-
educated 'Young China' group among his own compeers, because in his
own meteoric rise to fame he let down so many of his friends." With
regard to C.T. Wang, who was soon the new foreign minister, Koo was
"on particularly bad terms."86
Koo made it to Weihaiwei and checked into a local hotel under the
name of Mr. Wei. Once there, he asked for British protection. R.F.
lohnston, the local British Commissioner, observed, "Although Dr. Koo
is one of the Chinese statesmen who have advocated the abolition of the
'unequal treaties,' and foreign concessions, he has on several occasions
shown himself very ready to avail himself of the protection which those
treaties and concessions afforded to . . . embarrassed Chinese politicians
to find peace and protection here under the British flag." With the GMD
in control of China, Koo, not wanting to be arrested, left China and spent
most of 1929 in Europe. In the fall of 1930, he returned to China to work
with Zhang Xueliang, the son of Zhang Zuolin who was murdered by
the Japanese military outside of Mukden. The younger Zhang asked
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Chiang Kai-shek to rescind the arrest order, a move staunchly opposed
by Koo's old enemies in the Nanjing government.87
After Chiang came to power, C.T. Wang continued the work started
by Koo and other previous governments to revise the unequal treaties.
Seeking to improve relations with the United States and Britain, the new
government took a moderate approach to treaty revision in which Wang
negotiated separately with each power but in a manner designed to be
conciliatory toward the Western countries. The U.S. State Department
recognized Chiang's government in July 1928 because Nanjing was the
only government that promised stability for China, and the Americans
believed that it was incumbent upon them to contribute to improving
Sino-American relations. Along with recognition, the United States
granted the new government tariff autonomy in return for mutually
guaranteed most-favored-nation status. The United States, though, did
not surrender its extraterritorial rights nor did it withdraw its military
forces from China.
As for Britain, the new Chinese government toned down anti-Brit-
ish sentiment and took the initiative to win British recognition and de-
mand revision of existing Sino-British treaties. Britain reciprocated
because Chiang Kai-shek was preferable to the CCP and its Soviet friends,
and there was the lingering idea that British trade with China would
become immensely important in the future. The British officially granted
Nanjing tariff autonomy in December 1928, opening the door to recog-
nition. In 1930, the rendition of Weihaiwei, which was aborted in 1924
when Koo was in office, finally took place. Yet, Britain intended to carry
out imperial retreat with as much grace as possible and not be thrown
into a rout. The Empire still included Hong Kong and Kowloon, British
forces still protected British interests, and extraterritoriality still gave
British subjects an unequal position. In 1930, Japan caught up with Brit-
ain and the United States by granting China tariff autonomy, though it
too was not ready to forfeit extraterritoriality.88
Looking back at the 1920s, Koo's patriotism differed from that of
the Chinese students, merchants, teachers, and workers, many of whom
were influenced by Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles as well as Marxist-
Leninism. The antiforeign nationalism of the 1920s deemed the war-
lords to be China's domestic enemies.89 By being in bed with the enemies
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of the people—that is, the warlords and the imperialists—Koo was seen
as part of the problem. There was a growing belief that only a social
revolution could overthrow the warlords and the imperialist powers, such
as had taken place in the Soviet Union. And as these beliefs grew in in-
tensity, Koo's diplomatic approach grew less and less attractive. Hence,
Koo's approach only partially succeeded. The consummation of Koo's
lifework was performed by the Nanjing government, which relied on a
combination of popular support, military power, and diplomacy.
But just as World War I set the stage for the 1920s, the 1920s set the
stage for a renewed crisis with Japan. The Nanjing government's an-
nouncement of 1928 declaring past treaties to be invalid and the willing-
ness of Tokyo to grant Chiang's government tariff autonomy in 1930
brought about an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. It alienated,
however, civilian and military right-wing radicals in Japan who viewed
such policies as appeasement of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Worse,
Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods and Nanjing's control of Manchuria
threatened Japan's economic security in the middle of the Great Depres-
sion. Japanese militarists soon instigated a crisis that brought Koo back
into China's policymaking circles.
Chapter 4
CHINA, JAPANESE IMPERIALISM, AND
COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 1931-1937
IN 1929, KOO RETURNED TO CHINA to assist Zhang Xueliang, known
as the Young Marshal, who controlled Manchuria but gave his allegiance
to Chiang Kai-shek. At the time, Koo's career looked finished. On one or
more occasions, Koo tried to get a position in the Nanjing government
only to be rebuffed, particularly by his old nemesis, C.T. Wang. Koo had
little choice but to remain in Manchuria as a private individual. He had
purchased land in Manchuria years before and now purchased more in an
effort to establish a land development enterprise. "I wanted to leave the
political sphere," Koo asserted later, "and had the intention of giving up
my diplomatic and political life altogether. But things do not always turn
out as one would wish."1 The event that brought him out of the wilder-
ness and back into Chinese politics was the Manchurian Crisis of 1931.
For years, Manchuria was a sore spot in Sino-Japanese relations.
Both China and Japan viewed Manchuria as both a potential source for
raw materials and an outlet for growing populations. Japan in particular
viewed access to China's markets and resources as vital in providing Ja-
pan with the economic security necessary to wage total war. Japan per-
ceived Chiang Kai-shek's Northern Expedition to unify China as a threat
to those vital interests because Chiang was seen as a pawn of the Soviet
Union. Kwantung Army officers blew up Zhang Zuolin to create a pretext
for Japanese military intervention in Manchuria to prevent the GMD flag
from flying over Manchuria. The plot backfired, sparking anti-Japanese
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Chinese delegation to the League of Nations, 1930s. Koo is fourth from the left.
Sitting to his left is W.W. Yen. (Author's collection)
boycotts and resentment in Zhang Xueliang who used his authority in
Manchuria to undermine Japan's treaty rights. While Koo stood by the
Young Marshal's side, Japan returned to its previous policy of noninter-
ference while still claiming its special position in Manchuria.
Theoretically, Japan remained committed to internationalism by
virtue of its membership in the League of Nations, and of being a signa-
tory to disarmament agreements signed at the Washington Naval Con-
ference and the London Naval Conference of 1930, as well as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 that outlawed war. The navy and army, how-
ever, grew increasingly disgruntled with military cutbacks and coopera-
tion with the West that circumscribed rather than enhanced Japan's
position as a power in Asia. The Great Depression of 1929 reminded the
Japanese army of Manchuria's place in Japanese security. And although
Sino-Japanese relations were improved by Japan's granting of tariff au-
tonomy to Chiang's government in 1930, the move alienated civilian and
military right-wing radicals who viewed such policies as appeasement
of Chinese nationalism. Japanese officers of the Kwantung Army in Ko-
rea decided to take action. On September 18,1931, a section of the South
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Manchurian Railway on the outskirts of the Manchurian city of Mukden
exploded. The Kwantung Army immediately occupied Mukden and
moved its forces deeper into Manchuria, but Chiang Kai-shek ordered
Zhang Xueliang not to resist so that Chiang could focus on dealing with
his internal enemies.2
Japanese expansion could not have come at a worst time for Chiang
Kai-shek. He had only nominally unified China since the revolution of
1928 and believed that China could not deal with external threats until
the country was unified.3 There were a number of warlords who ruled
independently of Nanjing and feared Chiang's growing power. Besides
the warlord problem, there was the communist problem. The CCP, whom
Chiang turned against in 1927, remained a threat though it was splin-
tered ideologically and geographically. The CCP created a number of
rural Soviets that focused on using peasants and guerilla warfare to cre-
ate revolution while the urban CCP leaders continued to look for a revo-
lution in the cities along orthodox Marxist lines. By 1931, after a series of
failed uprisings, Mao Zedong was in charge of the largest CCP soviet
located in Jiangxi and Fujian Provinces.
More significant than the communist threat was the factionalism
within the GMD. In May 1931, a number of Chiang Kai-shek's rivals,
including various factions and militarists, formed a separate government
in Guangzhou. Koo backed this government, blaming Chiang Kai-shek's
"autocratic methods" for not allowing this motley group a wider par-
ticipation in his government.4 The disunity within China played right
into the Kwantung Army's hands. Although both Guangzhou and Nanjing
understood that the Kwantung Army could take advantage of China's
inability to speak and act with one voice, the Guangzhou government
pursued closer political ties with Tokyo and pushed its military forces
outward from Guangzhou into neighboring provinces. While Chiang Kai-
shek requested that Zhang Xueliang send some of his forces south to
assist in dealing with the Guangzhou government, Chiang also advised
the Young Marshal not to take any actions in Manchuria provocative of
Japan.5
Now that China faced a new crisis with Japan, Chiang created a
Special Foreign Policy Commission to determine what kind of policy to
pursue in regard to Japan. Koo was appointed to that Commission as
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Zhang Xueliang's representative to share his expertise on the League of
Nations and diplomacy in general. One important connection that Koo
had with the government was T.V. Soong, the Columbia- and Harvard-
educated minister of finance. Soong was a brother-in-law to Chiang Kai-
shek by virtue of the generalissimo's marriage in 1928 to his American-
educated sister, Soong Meiling. The marriage was viewed as a political
deal in which Chiang received needed financial banking in return for
giving T.V. Soong a position in the government. Soong, and another
brother-in-law, rich U.S.-educated businessman H.H. Kung, held nu-
merous ministerial positions till the end of World War II. Both Soong
and Kung also formed factions composed of Anglo-American educated
Chinese. Although rivals, they tried to give Chiang's regime a veneer of
democracy.6 Koo and his wife knew both men and their families well
since they all represented Shanghai's upper-class. Over the next seven-
teen years, Koo worked closely with T.V. Soong. The two men did not
always agree on foreign policy issues, but they found common ground
during the early 1930s when they found Chiang's policy toward Japan
unpalatable.
The question facing China was whether or not to rely on the League
of Nations. On September 21, Chiang Kai-shek informed the interna-
tional body that there was a dispute, but he did not request action at that
time. There were reasons to not expect much from the league. In 1929,
Chiang nearly quit the international organization for good after the league
responded weakly to tensions between Zhang Xueliang and the Soviet
Union. The next year, when China tried to become a nonpermanent
member of the League Council, there was opposition because of China's
disunity and its inability, if not refusal, to pay its dues. Still, some in the
government, such as T.V. Soong, wanted to rely entirely on the league.
Yet, when Koo met with Chiang and the Special Foreign Policy Commis-
sion, he doubted the body's efficacy. Instead of looking to the League of
Nations, he argued for direct negotiations with the Japanese, believing
that refusal to negotiate played "into the hands of the Japanese strategy
of facing up to the League of Nations." Although the League Council
asked Japan to withdraw its forces, the League Covenant, in Koo's opin-
ion, provided the group with "no power to enforce its decision." Recog-
nizing the limits of its power and with Japanese opposition to the League
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Council's proposal, Koo believed direct negotiations to be essential. How-
ever, he wanted Sino-Japanese negotiations to be carried out on a basis
like that which took place at the Washington Conference in which a third
of the power or league observers were on hand.7
Chiang agreed, but he wanted Japan to withdraw and accept the
dispatch of neutral civil officials to the area. In a matter of days, though,
Japan's answer was clear. It would neither withdraw nor allow a third
party to participate in negotiations. And on October 26, Japan put be-
fore the League Council its own proposals for negotiations, including
the demand for Chinese recognition of Japan's treaty rights in Manchu-
ria. The League Council sided with China by voting against Japan's pro-
posals and in favor of China's recommendation to negotiate after a
Japanese troop withdrawal. This action reassured Koo, but he remained
skeptical of the league's ability to handle the crisis. In November, the
League Council proposed sending a commission to Manchuria to assess
the situation. While the League Council engaged in bitter debate, the
Kwantung Army expanded further in Manchuria in defiance of its own
government and world opinion. Initially, Koo rejected the proposed com-
mission "as being too vague and not providing for evacuation" of Japa-
nese troops despite warnings from the British and American ministers
that rejection could put China "at serious tactical disadvantage." A coun-
terproposal was prepared, but Sir Miles Lampson, the British minister,
cautioned Koo that China could "find herself accused of turning down
compromise sponsored by the Council and see world opinion turn against
her." Koo did not reject the commission out of hand. He simply thought
that to not impose a deadline for Japanese evacuation was to condone
"the act of wanton aggression on the part of Japan." It also gave the im-
pression that "instead of dealing frankly with this issue," the League Coun-
cil put forth the commission idea "with a view to providing the Council
with a means of exit from its difficulty." Despite his qualms, Japan and
China reluctantly accepted the League Commission on December 10.8
The powers' unwillingness to confront Japan over its expansion
into China weakened the League of Nations. European newspapers gen-
erally argued against the involvement of their respective countries in the
affair. Some condemned Japan, and some thought Japan was justified in
its acts, considering past Chinese recalcitrance over the treaties. The Brit-
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ish tended to sympathize with Japan, blaming the Chinese for trying to
undermine Japan's position, which was based on treaties, and denounced
Chinese talk of going to war as foolish. France's government likewise did
not view Japan's actions with any sense of opprobrium and did not want
the League of Nations to become wrecked on an issue that was not an act
of war on Japan's part. More importantly, French officials worried about
Germany, where right-wing conservatives controlled the Weimar Repub-
lic. For the moment, a European crisis was not imminent, but the French
did not want to be preoccupied with the Sino-Japanese dispute should a
crisis break out closer to home. Besides, confronting Japan could ulti-
mately threaten French Indochina, and given French hostility toward
communism and Comintern activities, France did not want to discour-
age the Japanese from pushing northward.9
If the British and French did nothing, then there were the two
nonleague members, the Soviet Union or the United States. As the United
States reeled from the Great Depression, Washington could not entirely
sympathize with Japan's economic and demographic problems that jus-
tified Japan's expansion into Manchuria, but it hesitated to brand Japan
an aggressor. Neither President Herbert Hoover nor Secretary of State
Henry Stimson wanted the United States dragged into war. Japan's ac-
tions were immoral but understandable, since it needed to preserve or-
der on the continent to protect its vital security interests against
Bolshevism. Since Japanese expansion into Manchuria posed no secu-
rity threat to the United States, Hoover rejected economic sanctions or
military actions against Japan. As for the Soviet Union, relations between
Nanjing and Moscow had not been restored, but the Soviets worried
about the creation of a Japanese colony on its border and the potential
for Japanese expansion into Mongolia. Moscow wanted to take action
against Japan especially now that the Kwantung Army controlled the CER.
But Joseph Stalin could see that no other power wanted to restrain Japan
and he did not believe the Soviet Union was strong enough militarily to
deter further Japanese expansion. To avoid conflict, Moscow offered to
sell the CER to Manchuria's puppet government and signed a nonag-
gression pact with Japan.10
The international situation left Chiang with few options. With war
against the militarily superior Japan impossible and the likelihood of
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outside help just as impossible, Chiang preferred to negotiate. "The Gen-
eralissimo was a realistic statesman," Koo observed later. "He felt it was
necessary to negotiate with Japan. On the other hand, as a shrewd politi-
cian, he did not wish to profess openly a policy of direct negotiation."
Chinese students, however, rejected that option. Displeased with the
government's handling of the Manchurian crisis, they entered the for-
eign ministry in September, attacking and nearly killing Foreign Minis-
ter C.T. Wang, who promptly resigned. Nearly a month later, Koo accepted
the appointment as Wang's replacement. Lampson believed Koo's deci-
sion to accept the post showed "considerable courage."11 Indeed, stu-
dents attempted to intimidate and bully Koo much as they had Wang
because Koo favored direct negotiations. Koo's tenure as foreign minis-
ter lasted only ten stormy days. Angered with the government's policy of
direct negotiations and demanding that China walk out of the League of
Nations, students surrounded the foreign ministry and threatened to
beat Koo, who sought protection in Chiang's Nanjing residence. Over-
seas, Chinese confronted and attacked Alfred Sze, forcing his resignation
as China's delegate to the international body. The atmosphere was of
such anger and excitement that Koo feared that peaceful resolution of
the crisis might prove impossible. In the face of demands for war, Koo
sought a nonmilitary solution to the crisis. He suggested creating a neu-
tral zone in Manchuria, only to backtrack in order to avoid public disap-
probation.12 Although supported by intellectuals like Hu Shi and Jiang
Tingfu, Chinese students were, in Koo's words, "hostile and inflamed
against any suggestion that China and Japan negotiate directly respect-
ing a neutral zone" in Manchuria. On December 15, thousands of Chi-
nese high school and university students attacked the Chinese Foreign
Ministry. Chiang Kai-shek announced his retirement, and Koo resigned
as foreign minister.13
The same month that Chiang Kai-shek "retired," the Kwantung
Army expanded into Manchuria, taking advantage of the disunity that
remained in Nanjing and the weak response from the powers. Although
ordered to resist to the last man, Zhang Xueliang put up only token re-
sistance and then pulled out, removing all army forces from Manchuria.
Meanwhile, the coalition government that replaced Chiang Kai-shek col-
lapsed. In late January, Wang Jingwei, a longtime GMD politician, took
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the reins of civilian power with Chiang Kai-shek being in charge of the
military. T.V. Soong took up the post of finance minister, and Lo Wen'gan,
the Oxford Ph.D. who served in various cabinets with Koo in the 1920s,
was made foreign minister.14
No sooner did this new government come to power than it was
faced with another crisis. The Sino-Japanese conflict expanded to Shang-
hai where the Japanese military instigated an incident, creating a pretext
to militarily intervene in Shanghai to punish China for its anti-Japanese
boycotts. Following other instigated incidents of fighting between the
Japanese and Chinese, local Japanese naval forces demanded the cessa-
tion of such boycotts, an apology, restitution, and removal of Chinese
army forces from Shanghai. When Shanghai's mayor did not answer the
ultimatum to the navy's satisfaction, Japanese marines engaged in street
fighting with Chinese forces that turned into pitched battles complete
with naval and aerial bombardment. By late February, both sides raised
the stakes with reinforcements that risked blowing the situation up into
full-scale war ultimately involving the other powers.15
In the midst of this crisis, Koo explained to his foreign counter-
parts that the Sino-Japanese conflict was not a local one but rather an
international question to be solved by a conference of all the powers
concerned. If Japan got away with this kind of expansion, not only did it
undermine the treaties, but it would "so upset the balance of power and
the relative positions between Pacific Powers that the consequences and
effect would be far-reaching." Koo wanted a conference of those nations
who had signed the Nine Power Treaty and were committed to protect-
ing the territorial integrity of China and guaranteeing the Open Door.
As the Shanghai conflict continued, replies to Koo's queries as to the
possibility of the United States cooperating with the League of Nations
in imposing sanctions against Japan were in the negative.16
The powers took interest in events in China, but they did not re-
spond in a manner satisfying to China. In January 1932, Secretary of
State Henry Stimson announced what became known as the Hoover-
Stimson Doctrine in which the United States refused to "recognize any
situation, treaty or agreement entered into between" China and Japan
that impaired U.S. treaty rights in China including the Nine Power Treaty,
which upheld the Open Door. Japan and the other powers that were
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party to the Nine Power Treaty ignored Stimson's declaration until the
flare-up in Shanghai. After fighting broke out in Shanghai, the British,
not wanting to face Japan alone, submitted an appeal to the League of
Nations that included much of the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine. The ap-
peal, though, did not condemn Japan. Although appalled by events in
Shanghai, French foreign policymakers reflected the same caution and
were not very receptive to Stimson's proposal. Like the British, they did
not want to give the impression of abandoning the League of Nations
and lent their support to the British proposal.17
In March 1932, a ceasefire was finally arranged between the two
contestants in Shanghai. On March 15, the League Commission of En-
quiry, led by Lord Lytton, arrived in China. Koo reluctantly agreed to be
the Chinese representative accompanying the various commissioners to
Manchuria, soon to be renamed Manchukuo by the Japanese. This as-
signment involved a great deal of risk. Along with an assassination plot
against Koo's life in order to embarrass Chiang's government, there were
threats by the Manchurian authorities to have Koo arrested because of
his former connection with Zhang Xueliang. Under this pretext, the
Kwantung Army in theory provided Koo with protection, but in reality
they spied on him and restricted his movements.18
In April and May, the commission traveled throughout Manchuria
under strict surveillance by the Japanese. Policemen and secret agents
watched their every move. Packages and clothing were searched. The in-
tense surveillance led Koo to term the atmosphere "oppressive and heavy."
After the commission reached Mukden, a parade was held in a square
outside of the place where Koo was staying. There with the aid of bin-
oculars, Koo watched several thousand Chinese and Japanese boys and
girls preparing to receive Japanese troops with Manchukuo's national
anthem playing in the background. The scene left Koo feeling "sorrow-
stricken." The Japanese were doing most of the singing and flag-waving
while the Chinese "remained silent and immobile." The Japanese also
brought in heavy equipment to mine for coal. As he stood amidst the
equipment, surveying the work, Koo "was depressed to think that such
[a] rich treasure storehouse was taken away from China to be utilized by
others. There are probably many more elsewhere, but Chfina] has not
tried to utilize them. What has she been doing all these years?"19
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After Koo returned from his trip, he told Chinese journalists that
China had to solve its own problems. China could not prevent further
Japanese expansion merely by depending on others. As he explained to
an Italian diplomat, "The responsibility of checking and forcing Japan to
withdraw from Manchuria belongs primarily to China." Along with the
fact that the powers provided little real assistance, his visit to Manchuria
"renewed feelings of indignation at those responsible" for its loss. Koo
believed in the right of self-defense, a right not exercised in 1931. Self-
defense had been exercised, though, at Shanghai with Chinese forces
holding off the Japanese until a truce was reached. That valiant stand by
Chinese forces in Shanghai may have strengthened Koo's conviction that
Manchuria could have been defended. Later in the summer, he told his
government that it had to resist Japanese aggression.20
The problem for Koo was that his government was not listening.
During the entire Shanghai Crisis, Wang Jingwei, the premier, followed a
policy of "resisting while negotiating." By resistance, Wang did not mean
war, and by negotiating, he did not intend to sign a treaty with the Japa-
nese that represented a complete sellout. After the failure of the League
of Nations to do anything substantive to punish Japan, Wang argued for
direct negotiations with the Japanese in which conflicts between both
sides would be settled on a case-by-case basis. But since China's military
was too weak to take on modernized Japan, the Chinese military had to
settle for passive resistance while surrendering more territory to Japan.
It was this policy that moved Wang to sign the Shanghai Truce Agree-
ment with Japan in May that led to the withdrawal of Japanese forces
from the city. Many Chinese, including government officials, condemned
the agreement, but an effort to impeach Wang Jingwei failed because of
Chiang Kai-shek's intervention.
In June 1932, Chiang, Wang, and other high-level GMD leaders
met at a conference in Lushan where Chiang laid down his policy of
"first internal pacification, then external resistance." Earlier in the year,
Chiang used his armies against the CCP in Jiangxi Province. Chiang
wanted to destroy the CCP before taking on the Japanese even though
his policy was unpopular with those Chinese who viewed Japan, not the
CCP, as the real danger. He pulled out troops from Shanghai during the
crisis so that he could mass 500,000 men around the Jiangxi Soviet, and
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there Chiang remained throughout this period. For months to come,
Chiang gave speeches trying to convince his own military of the sound-
ness of his policy. But opposition to his policy was mounted by the
Guangzhou politicians and by Wang Jingwei, who believed Chiang's
policy undermined his "resistance while negotiating" policy. The key to
success was having the military around to provide leverage when negoti-
ating with the Japanese, but Chiang insisted on using his best troops to
fight the CCP, leaving the responsibility of resisting Japan to local forces.21
Koo likewise opposed Chiang Kai-shek's policy. If China put up
armed resistance and the Western powers applied diplomatic pressure,
Japan would back down. Sources from Japan convinced him there was
opposition to the Kwantung Army's expansion into Manchuria and that
Japan was on the verge of "an internal revolution or an external war."
Koo wanted his government to take the fight to the Japanese so as to
place such economic strains on Japan that it would quit the fight. Koo
admitted that the "main difficulty with the [GMD] was that it was di-
vided among itself." Yet, he was confident that China would finally unite
in the face of the Japanese threat. And although he acknowledged that
the Japanese militarists "prevented the more sober-minded statesmen
and industrialists in Japan from voicing their true opinion," he told Nelson
T. Johnson, the American minister to China, that if "China and [the]
Powers worked together, there would be a settlement."22 In fact, Koo's
analysis was rather flawed. In May, Japanese officers assassinated the prime
minister, bringing party rule and the hope of a moderate civilian solu-
tion to an end. And as time revealed, the powers were incapable of coop-
erating to stop Japanese expansion.
In August, Nanjing appointed Koo to be the Chinese minister to
France as well as a League of Nations delegate at Geneva. That same
month, Japan recognized the state of Manchukuo. Soon after his arrival
in France, Koo joined the Chinese delegation to the League of Nations.
Koo had not attended league sessions for over ten years, but having helped
draft the League Covenant, "I was no stranger to the workings of the
League or to many of the members of its delegations." China placed the
Manchurian question entirely in the hands of the Geneva-based group.
The previous year, China invoked the League Covenant in requiring the
League Council to bring about settlement of a dispute. If a settlement
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could not be reached, then the League Council had to draw up a report
that assessed blame and recommended avenues of resolution. A League
Committee, called the Committee of Nineteen, was created to examine
the Lytton Report and issue its recommendations. Koo believed the re-
port would decide whether China's policy had been a good one or not.23
In October 1932, the much anticipated Lytton Report was pub-
lished. Softening the language to avoid a breach with Japan, the report
did not condemn the Japanese. However, it stated that Japan's use of
force was unjustified and that the people living in Manchukuo did not
support the government. It concluded that the Manchukuo government
was Japan's puppet. On the other hand, the report was critical of Zhang
Xueliang's oppressive rule and commented that instability in China was
"an obstacle to friendship with Japan." The report recommended that
Manchuria be placed under Chinese control but that Japanese economic
interests be protected. Despite the report's attempt to be balanced and
fair, the Japanese viewed it as hostile and asked for a six-month delay to
examine its contents.24
There were aspects to the report that troubled Koo. He believed
that the Lytton Commission had "misinterpreted Chinese nationalism"
to be the cause of "many international disputes." He was disappointed
that the commission did not see Japan's "internal political disputes" as a
"real menace to international peace." And Koo was deeply disturbed by
the report's criticism of the Chinese use of boycotts. In vain, he tried to
convince Lytton that if Japanese forces withdrew from China, his gov-
ernment "would be willing to do her best to stop not only the boycott
but the anti-Japanese movement" even though he really could not guar-
antee such an eventuality. As long as the Japanese remained, Koo de-
fended his country's use of the boycott as a "legitimate defense against
Japanese aggression." He explained to an Irish delegate at Geneva that
the boycott should not be condemned because it was a "peaceful instru-
ment of resistance and defence in the possession of militarily weak coun-
tries." Besides, "economic retaliation," such as quotas and tariffs, was
widely practiced around the world without provocation. The boycott,
on the other hand, was a legitimate act as described in the League Cov-
enant.25
On November 21, the League Council met to discuss the Lytton
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Report. Koo called on the Council to take "prompt and effective action"
on China's behalf, but the Japanese, who opposed the report, openly
questioned whom Koo actually represented: Chiang Kai-shek or Zhang
Xueliang. Koo tried to counter arguments that China was disunited and
unstable but he faced a hard sell. A number of league members were
aware of the fact that Wang Jingwei now resided in Europe after a dis-
agreement with Chiang, refusing to return to China. Meanwhile, Chiang
Kai-shek remained vigilant in his efforts to destroy the CCP. The Japa-
nese proved antagonistic by refusing to allow members of the Lytton
Commission to express their views of the report and the situation in
Manchuria. The commissioners were discharged from their duties. From
this point on, the league, in Koo's words, betrayed a tendency to post-
pone the "issue on pretext [of] trying conciliation first." The council met
six more times, but accomplished nothing of substance. The report was
passed to the League Assembly for consideration.26
On December 6, the Special Assembly convened. The Japanese del-
egate argued that Japan had done the people of Manchuria a favor by
saving them from the clutches of dictators. The small powers demanded
that the League of Nations implement the report's recommendation that
Manchuria be turned into an autonomous region with foreign advisers.
Some even favored Japan's expulsion from the league. Much to their dis-
appointment, the great powers threw cold water on the whole proceed-
ings. The delegates from France, Great Britain, and Italy advocated realism
and conciliation and rejected taking action against Japan. The attitude
of the British and French generally was that there was no reason to con-
demn Japan. Sir John Simon, Britain's foreign minister, was, in Koo's
words, "unfriendly to China," as Simon proceeded to quote at length the
parts of the Lytton Report that were unfavorable to China. On Decem-
ber 9, a resolution condemning Japan for recognizing Manchukuo and
rejecting Japan's self-defense argument was defeated in the League As-
sembly; instead, the Lytton Report and Japan's Observations on the Re-
port were referred back to the Committee of Nineteen.27
When the assembly passed the buck back to the Committee of Nine-
teen, Simon hoped that the United States and the Soviet Union could
participate in forming proposals to reach conciliation. U.S. and Soviet
officials were in Geneva representing their respective countries at the
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World Disarmament Conference. Although neither were members of the
League of Nations, the British wanted to make the United States par-
tially responsible for whatever solution was agreed to while seeing the
Soviet Union as having a natural right to participate, given its proximity
to Japan. The idea never got off the ground. Japan opposed those coun-
tries' participation on the grounds that they could not share responsibil-
ity in the league by virtue of not being members of the club. The
Committee accomplished nothing and recessed for the holidays.28
While the league dallied, events in China took a turn for the worse.
On January 3,1933, the Kwantung Army occupied Shanhaiguan, the gate-
way to Rehe, a northeastern province bordering Manchuria. The army
had wanted to occupy the area for some time but held off to avoid fur-
ther damaging Japan's position at the League of Nations. The league's
growing opposition gave the military the green light for expansion. Lo-
cal Chinese forces put up resistance but were forced to retreat. The fact
that the Manchus used Shanhaiguan to conquer ultimately all of China
was not lost on the Chinese. While protests were made to the league,
Chiang Kai-shek came under intense pressure from the Guangzhou gov-
ernment and the Chinese delegation at the League of Nations to break
off his communist extermination campaign in Jiangxi and send troops
to Rehe. Chiang refused. In February, the Chinese suffered humiliation
as many of Zhang Xueliang's forces beat a fast retreat, forcing an embar-
rassed Young Marshal to resign. As Zhang took early retirement in Eu-
rope, Wang Jingwei returned to China where he became president of the
Executive Yuan.29
The loss of Rehe humiliated the Chinese delegates at Geneva be-
cause they assured the league that China would defend Rehe, only to see
Chinese troops withdraw without a fight. Chinese military withdrawal
undermined the diplomats' efforts to convince the powers that China
was serious about resisting the Japanese. As Japanese forces occupied
Chinese territory, Koo grew frustrated with the League of Nations. He
saw the Sino-Japanese dispute as a litmus test of "the efficacy of the League
of Nations." In failing to condemn Japan, the league set a bad example
for the smaller powers, which struck Koo as "seeing the Sino-Japanese
dispute from the right point of view, whereas the so-called great Powers
appeared to be rather short-sighted." By being short-sighted, Koo meant
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that the powers were destroying the league's credibility by refusing to
brand Japan an aggressor and to impose sanctions. And now that Japan
expanded further into China, the hope of conciliation was dead. Japan's
renewed aggression "brought the nations of the world to a point where
the question to consider was how to save the League of Nations from
destruction." To prevent its demise, the powers needed to maintain a
united front. Koo wanted "a very definite statement by the League that
they stood behind the Lytton Report." He expected "the League of Na-
tions to pronounce a moral judgement on Japan." Doing nothing did
not encourage the Soviet Union and the United States to collaborate
with the league.30
Koo was right that conciliation was dead. Although the Committee
of Nineteen did not reassemble until January 16,1933, conciliation with
Japan proved impossible because some of the small powers demanded
Japan's expulsion. The great powers balked at such a step. Although the
Western powers (including the United States) were not united in what
action to take toward Japan, they were united in what they would not do.
The Western democracies would neither accord recognition to
Manchukuo nor seek the expulsion of Japan from the League of Nations
or impose sanctions. The Committee of Nineteen was divided between
those powers still seeking conciliation and a group of small powers tak-
ing a strong anti-Japanese line. With conciliation impossible, the Com-
mittee of Nineteen passed onto the assembly its report, which reiterated
the Lytton Report's recommendations to not recognize Manchukuo but
also to not impose sanctions or condemn Japan. While the League of
Nations debated, Japan issued an ultimatum to Nanjing to remove Chi-
nese forces from Rehe. On February 24, forty-two of the forty-four na-
tions in the League Assembly voted in favor of the report with Japan
voting against and Siam abstaining. Afterwards, Japan walked out of the
proceedings, and a month later quit the League of Nations.31
In the meantime, the League Assembly created and charged the
Advisory Committee, composed of the Committee of Nineteen and two
nonleague members, Canada and the Netherlands, with the task of set-
tling the dispute between Japan and China. Invitations were also sent to
the United States and the Soviet Union. President-elect Franklin Delano
Roosevelt informed the league that he supported Stimson's nonrecogni-
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tion policy and agreed to work with the league in resolving the crisis. In
the Soviet Union, however, those opposed to cooperation with the league
argued that the other countries would push Japan and the Soviet Union
into war. Hence, the Soviet Union rejected the league invitation, though
in moderate terms.32
With the creation of the Advisory Committee, the league members
were to work in concert and not unilaterally. Koo pressed for action,
especially sanctions. By isolating Japan with moral and economic pres-
sure, Japan would capitulate. He told Lord Cecil, Britain's representative,
that the younger Japanese officers would stay in power until Japan was
isolated and on the verge of losing its standing among the great powers.
Then, "the older people would insist on a change of policy." As far as Koo
was concerned, the key "was . . . to show to Japan that the Powers" were
prepared "to back up the Report with concrete measures."33
The big obstacle facing the Chinese delegation now was convinc-
ing the League of Nations that a state of war existed in China. League
representatives time and again questioned why China had yet to break
diplomatic relations with Japan. The small powers especially could not
fathom China's refusal to even recall the Chinese minister to Tokyo. To-
kyo could claim that no state of war existed. Koo and his compatriots at
the league advised Nanjing to implement economic, financial, and dip-
lomatic measures against Japan in order to maintain an international
front. They suggested that the government implement a plan of national
reconstruction "as a means of improving the China market for western
goods and of enabling China to resist Japan successfully." Western trade
would achieve gains in the China market if there was a boycott of Japa-
nese goods. And the government could strengthen resistance to Japan
and enlarge the opportunities for Western trade in the China market by
giving the Westerners a favorable tariff.34
Nanjing rejected sanctions as impractical, and since the powers re-
fused to fulfill their obligations to impose sanctions, China's diplomats
were told to stop pursuing sanctions. In this respect, the government
was probably right. The Western democracies, especially France, were in
no mood for sanctions. Most Frenchmen cared little about events in Asia.
There were developments closer to home to attract their attention. By
now, the Great Depression touched France, and with rising unemploy-
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ment, the coalition governments formed in these years were preoccu-
pied with improving the economy. Moreover, Adolf Hitler was now chan-
cellor of Germany, and after outlawing the communist party, Hitler
secured passage of the Enabling Act, which made him dictator. The rise
of Hitler on France's doorstep naturally pushed Japanese expansion into
the recesses of most French minds.35
The advice of Koo and his colleagues also did not find favor back
home because Chiang Kai-shek still sought an "accommodation" with
Japan. Despite having many critics, Chiang's policy remained that of "first
pacification, then resistance." Later in the year, Chiang told his soldiers
that while Japan was a disease of the skin, the communists were a disease
of the heart. Backing Chiang's policy was Wang Jingwei who became
disillusioned with the League of Nations for its refusal to invoke sanc-
tions against Japan. He concluded that China could only help itself. Wang
now began to tout Li Hongzhang, negotiator of a peace treaty ending the
Sino-Japanese War of 1895, as the model of compromise in dealing with
Japan.
In May 1933, the Kwantung Army struck south of Shanhaiguan
and was poised to attack Beijing and Tianjin. Chinese forces retreated
after taking heavy casualties. Chiang feared that the fall of Beijing and
Tianjin would force him to sacrifice his policy of killing communists, so
he sought a truce to reduce the costs of resistance and to salvage his anti-
communist strategy. On May 31, 1933, Chiang's emissary and the
Kwantung Army signed the Tanggu Truce, which declared most of Hebei
Province a demilitarized zone cleared of Chinese forces, and gave Japan
the right to fly spotter planes over the area to ensure Chinese compliance
with the truce's conditions. The Tanggu Truce saved Chiang from mili-
tary disaster in the north and permitted the continuance of the "first
pacification, then resistance" policy. Wang Jingwei again openly supported
Chiang Kai-shek because he had no faith in China's armies and defended
the truce in the face of charges that he and Chiang were traitors.36
News of the Tanggu Truce disappointed Koo. Years later, he held
the Tanggu Truce partially responsible for undermining the work of the
League of Nations in creating an arms embargo as well as determining
the extent of nonrecognition of Manchukuo. Koo and his colleagues told
Nanjing that the Tanggu Truce was inopportune in its effect on interna-
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tional public opinion. "It was felt," the men continued, "that a concrete,
definite policy on the Manchurian question was necessary." No power
would assist China if it "wished to pursue a passive policy and do noth-
ing to hasten a solution of her serious question with Japan." In their
opinion, such a passive policy was dangerous because it "might in fact
lead to [China's] dismemberment." Possibly aware of Wang Jingwei's views
of Li Hongzhang, Koo and his compatriots argued that the Sino-Japa-
nese War opened the way for the "scramble for concessions" of 1898
because China's "willing surrender" was "interpreted by the more ambi-
tious nations as proof of China's utter inability to maintain herself as a
self-respecting, independent State." And now with increasing tensions
between France and Nazi Germany, Japan would take advantage of
Europe's distresses to "pounce upon China once again," as it did in 1915,
and eventually go to war with the United States and the Soviet Union.
Thus, China had to be prepared for world war. The memorandum went
on to suggest that China join with Britain, the United States, and the
Soviet Union in presenting an economic front. Internally, they advocated
the creation of a united front and reconstruction.37 China had to help
itself before it could expect help from others.
There were indeed serious threats to peace in Europe. In October,
Adolf Hitler, who hated the Versailles Peace Treaty, led Nazi Germany
out of both the League of Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Con-
ference. Europe's distresses gave Japan a free hand in China because it
denied China outside help in the face of Japanese aggression. Wang
Jingwei refused to place his hope in the West and would even declare
neutrality should war break out between Japan and the West. He wanted
to buy time to strengthen China internally. Chiang and Wang agreed,
though, that their policy "first pacification, then resistance" should con-
tinue. Nazi Germany viewed the China market as a source of raw mate-
rials needed to build up Germany's military strength. Sino-German trade
expanded after 1933, and Germany provided both military hardware and
advisers were put to use by Chiang primarily against the CCP. Mean-
while, Chiang and Wang took steps to ensure they had control of their
Japan policy. Government officials who represented the hard-line, anti-
Japanese view within the Nanjing government were removed. From 1934
onward, anti-Japanese activities were suppressed and censorship was
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imposed on the media. Japanese-educated Chinese who supported
Chiang's and Wang's policy generally replaced Western-educated offi-
cials in the government.38
Their efforts at some rapprochement with Japan were complicated
by Tokyo itself. In April 1934, a Japanese foreign ministry spokesman,
Eiji Amau, announced Japan's Monroe Doctrine for China in which he
claimed that East Asia was Japan's special sphere and that Japan was re-
sponsible for peace in East Asia. Japan did not welcome foreign inter-
vention into China, nor did it approve of China's efforts to seek foreign
assistance. Japan was displeased with the League of Nations, Germany,
France, and the United States, all of which provided loans and/or mili-
tary advisers. Japan directly challenged the Open Door and the Nine
Power Treaty. Koo denounced the Amau Doctrine, but his own foreign
ministry issued only a mild protest. Chiang Kai-shek killed the League
of Nations' financial assistance program, and Japan's opposition made it
difficult for Nanjing to secure other foreign loans. Chiang and Wang's
policy of "first pacification" worked to prevent a crisis from breaking
out between China and Japan, but it did so at a political cost for the
government.39
Watching these events from afar, Koo was disappointed that his
advice was being ignored. "Although there has been no announcement
of any change in policy," Koo wrote to a friend, "signs of the times seem
to indicate that there has been a disinclination to pursue a policy of ef-
fective resistance—at any rate for the present." Koo continued: "I believe
that, if this is true, it will be a costly mistake in the end; and I am con-
tinuing my efforts to make them see my point. But . . . a number of
prominent Chinese in close touch with Japan have been lifting their heads
and advocating a change of policy. It seems their influence is being felt
more and more as time passes." Yet, Koo was not entirely despondent.
He could see light at the end of the long tunnel: "That they will not
succeed in the end so far as the best interests of China are concerned, I
am certain." While Chiang Kai-shek's policy remained unchanged for
the next year, Koo returned to China in July 1934. It was rumored that
Koo might resign in protest of Nanking's policy. He did not resign, but he
was embittered with Chiang and Wang for ignoring him. Koo remained
in China for another eighteen months awaiting reappointment as am-
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bassador to France and making occasional trips to Nanjing, but he was
clearly on the periphery of foreign policy making.40
While Koo sat in China, he realized that China desperately needed
an alliance to survive. The Great Depression, the rise of Hitler, Imperial
decline and defeatism prevented the powers from making the League of
Nations a viable deterrent both in Europe and Asia. Those factors and
isolationism in the United States made the Nine Power Treaty null and
void. Months before the Sino-Japanese conflict revealed the hollowness
of those international covenants, Koo pushed for a broad anti-Japanese
alliance. In 1936, Koo warned the British of the inevitability of war. He
claimed to have seen Japanese military plans some years back that called
for the "complete domination of the Asiatic continent," including Man-
churia and Hong Kong. Japan also allegedly wanted to conquer Australia
and obtain "naval parity with America." Only a Far Eastern pact could
potentially restrain Japan. The British treated Koo's idea as simply an-
other Chinese attempt to play one power against another.41 Neville Cham-
berlain, Britain's prime minister, argued that friendship with Japan was
more important than that with the United States or China. Chamberlain
believed that conciliation of Japan permitted Britain to concentrate on
Germany, and others in the British government supported signing a non-
aggression pact with Japan.42 Yet events in Japan suggested that Japan
was out of control now that the military dominated the country's politi-
cal institutions.
One glimmer of hope arrived from the United States in 1936. Chi-
nese officials in Washington reported to Koo that Roosevelt wanted to
"establish [a] regional organization for peace and hoped China might be
included, but not Japan." FDR's concept fit with Koo's idea of a Far East-
ern pact. Unfortunately, Roosevelt made similar statements to Maxim
Litvinov, the Soviet foreign minister, in 1933 only to back off such talk,
making the Soviets distrustful. Chamberlain, likewise, distrusted FDR
after several similar incidents.43
In March 1936, Koo returned to a Europe far different from the
one he left in 1934. Hitler rearmed Germany in defiance of the Versailles
Treaty. In April 1935, the Stresa Front was created between Britain, France,
and Italy in which the three powers condemned German rearmament
and agreed to defend the independence of Austria, Hungary, and other
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states in Germany's path.44 A few months later, Benito Mussolini, Italy's
Fascist dictator, stabbed France and Britain in the back when he attacked
Ethiopia. The League of Nations condemned Italy's aggression. Needing
Mussolini's support against Germany, the British and French opposed
the use of sanctions. Public opinion in both countries expressed outrage
at their governments' willingness to turn their backs on Italy's aggres-
sion. Limited sanctions were imposed but failed. By 1936, Italy conquered
Ethiopia, discrediting both the West and the League of Nations. Koo,
who was in Geneva, noted that there was a general "sickening atmo-
sphere at [the] impotence and cowardice of [the] League in [the] face of
[the] murder of a League member by another. Everybody felt injustice
and yet no one would say it."45
Meanwhile, Japan sought elimination of the treaty remnants of the
Washington Naval Conference. In 1936 at the London Naval Confer-
ence, Japan demanded naval parity with Britain and the United States
and walked out of the conference when the answer was no. Japan's over-
all policy was to maintain its position on the Asian continent, resist So-
viet expansion, and expand its power into Asia. The army made
preparations for future war with the Soviet Union, and in November
1936 Tokyo signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in which
both sides agreed that if either were attacked by the Soviet Union, the
other would do nothing to help Moscow.46
With the situation worsening in Europe and Asia, Britain and France
continued their policy of not confronting Japan. Militarily, the British
were incapable of defending the home islands and protecting the empire
simultaneously. In 1937, Italy's signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact left
the British the task of preventing those nations from allying with Japan.
As for the French, the rise of Nazi Germany, Japanese expansion in Asia,
and the effects of the Great Depression bolstered by movies and books
that spoke of the horrors of the next war that would far exceed those of
the last one instilled much fear in the hearts of Frenchmen. By 1937, the
French believed that Germany's armed forces were superior to France's,
and unsurprisingly, France sought to conciliate Germany. With Britain
as a weak partner, France could do nothing for Czechoslovakia and Po-
land should Hitler drive east.47
For Chiang Kai-shek, the only encouraging news emanated from
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the Soviet Union. In August 1935, the Comintern called for a united front
against Japan. The next year, Litvinov suggested to Koo that the Soviets
and Chinese discuss cooperation. Chiang leaned toward a united front
because he wanted Soviet military aid and a mutual assistance pact. The
Soviets, however, declined the mutual assistance pact and wanted in-
stead a commercial treaty. With the rise of Hitler, Stalin did not want to
be dragged into war with Japan. The Soviets would provide military aid
but that was the limit of their intervention.48
In December 1936, Chiang's efforts to build a coalition were nearly
destroyed by the CCP. Chiang Kai-shek flew to Xi'an to push Zhang
Xueliang to attack the CCP. On December 12, Zhang kidnapped Chiang
and held him prisoner, permitting the CCP leadership to meet with the
generalissimo. The kidnapping shocked many inside and outside of
China, including Koo. It came days after Germany and Japan signed the
Anti-Comintern Pact. In Koo's mind, this agreement and other develop-
ments around the world proved the futility of Chiang's policy, which left
China isolated. In Paris, Koo met with Wang Jingwei, who was recuper-
ating there after an assassination attempt in China. Koo argued for co-
operation with Britain, France, and the Soviet Union byway of "two sets
of agreements" in order to "internationalize the Sino-Jap[anese] ques-
tion." Koo recognized the antipathy that existed between Britain, France,
and the Soviet Union, and separate agreements was his way of bridging
the gap. He reasoned that Nanjing could not deal with both internal and
external threats at the same time, so a united front was preferable to the
suggestion that Nanjing divide its forces to deal with both. In Koo's opin-
ion, "the Jfapanese] peril was far greater" than the communist one. On
December 25, the Xi'an Incident came to a close with Chiang Kai-shek's
release and the creation of a Second United Front between Chiang and
the CCP.49
Over the next several months, Koo persisted in his search for coop-
eration among the powers. The signing of a nonaggression pact between
Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union would be the
first step toward the long-term goal of establishing an alliance. An alli-
ance guaranteed peace in the Far East, because Japan would not go to
war with several nations at once.50 Koo knew though that a Pacific Pact
was problematic. The French informed Koo time and again that the only
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"stumbling block" was Great Britain.51 There was truth to that statement.
The British Foreign Office rejected proposals that would have led to Pa-
cific agreements, preferring to reach some kind of mutual understand-
ing with Japan that permitted British trade with China. However, the
French wanted a Pacific Pact no more than the British, because France's
military weakness made it incapable of resisting Japanese expansion. And
while the Soviet Union renewed a pledge to send military aid to Chiang
Kai-shek, Soviet policy, like that of the other powers, was otherwise ex-
tremely cautious. The Soviets recognized there was little hope for collec-
tive security in Asia given the attitudes of the Western democracies.
Moreover, Stalin purged his officer corps, weakening the Soviet Red Army
at a critical moment.52
In the meantime, while Koo mulled over his country's fate, he main-
tained his weekly routine of attending meetings and exhorting the em-
bassy staff to "develop esprit de corps." He also daily engaged in what he
described as cultivating relations in that he tried to learn as much as
possible of French society. Koo made it a point to meet politicians, jour-
nalists, academics, and bankers. He was present at social gatherings when-
ever possible, though some of the guests proved rather annoying. On
one occasion, he was asked to lunch by a woman who remarked, "Japan
is a big power, becoming more powerful every day. You will surely be
able to swallow up China." The Madame had mistaken Koo for the Japa-
nese ambassador.53 Other days were far more pleasant, such as when he
could take in eighteen holes of golf, a game of bridge, or a movie. It was
fortunate that he did seek some leisure time, because he would have few
opportunities to relax for the next eight years.
Chapter 5
SINOJAPANESE WAR AND THE
SPECTER OF SELLOUT, 1937-1941
ON JULY 7,1937, JAPANESE AND CHINESE forces clashed at the Marco
Polo Bridge near Beijing. When the Japanese Army presented demands,
including Chinese withdrawal from the area and an apology for the inci-
dent, Chiang Kai-shek refused. In coming days, the Japanese government
sent five divisions to China and demanded control of North China.
Chiang Kai-shek agreed to be more vigilant in suppressing the activities
of the communists and other anti-Japanese bodies in order to assuage
the Japanese, but the Japanese demanded concessions that Chiang was
not prepared to make. The generalissimo decided that he could no longer
appease the Japanese by trading territory for time.1
News of Japanese divisions bound for China kept Koo awake all
night as he sought some solution to the crisis. As both sides rushed rein-
forcements toward Shanghai, Koo saw that unless there was outside me-
diation, major war in China was certain. News from China was
"depressing." Chinese forces withdrew from Beijing without a fight after
the local commander defiantly declared his refusal to give up even an
inch of Chinese territory. "I felt no face to see anybody," Koo wrote in his
diary, "China became a joke." Although there were credible rumors that
Japan was interested in reaching a settlement, Koo insisted on fighting
unless Japanese forces withdrew from Beiping. The fall of Tianjin was
likewise "most depressing and sickening news." When Koo learned of
the bombing of civilians in Tianjin, it made his "hair stand up." On the
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day that Beijing fell, Chiang Kai-shek announced that another truce to
settle differences was impossible.2
With the outbreak of undeclared war, Koo and other compatriots
urged Chiang Kai-shek to approach Moscow to promote Sino-Soviet
military cooperation with "Anglo-American-French material coopera-
tion as background." Koo assumed incorrectly that the peace in Europe
resulted from a equilibrium of forces. France and Britain, with the "moral
sympathy and support" of the United States and with a treaty between
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France and the Soviet Union in the background, gave Europe a stability
that prevented aggression. Asia needed such a balance of power, and
the lack of it explained why "Japan could run amuck." Since Britain,
France, and the United States were anxious to avoid war at almost any
cost, China and Soviet Russia could do all the fighting while the other
three powers supplied material and financial aid.3 Koo and his col-
leagues in Europe were not hopeful that such equilibrium of power
could be formed. The Soviet Union would only act if backed by the
Western democracies. The British struck Koo as not taking events in
China seriously and he acknowledged that France was "impotent in
the Far East."4
Unexpectedly, the Soviet Union did do something. In August 1937,
Nanjing and Moscow signed a Treaty of Nonaggression in which both
sides agreed that neither would make separate deals with Japan and the
Soviets promised Chiang Kai-shek military aid. Chiang preferred an al-
liance that obliged the Soviets to commit their forces against the Japa-
nese, but Moscow was unprepared for war with Japan. Over the next
four years, Soviet aid in the form of advisors, aircraft and other military
equipment poured into China. Depending on the type of weapon, So-
viet assistance represented 80 to 100 percent of the total foreign aid given
to China between 1937 and 1939. By concluding this agreement, the So-
viet Union hoped to indirectly confront Japan while halting appease-
ment of Japan by using Chiang to pin the Japanese down in China.
Unfortunately for Koo, the Soviets turned his scheme on its head. Mos-
cow provided the military support as background, leaving China the
tough task of forging an alliance with the Western democracies who al-
ready rejected a broad anti-Japanese front especially one that incorpo-
rated the Soviet Union even as background.5
Meanwhile, China took its complaint before the league. Although
there is no evidence that either Chiang Kai-shek or Koo expected con-
crete actions from the League of Nations, Chiang's government demanded
that the league impose military and economic sanctions against Japan.
The government may have sought to win international public opinion
to its side as a stratagem to lay a foundation for an anti-Japanese alli-
ance. Although the French "advised delay," Koo believed that the league
had to act to save itself. "The aggression of Japan on China was flagrant,"
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Koo remarked to Yvon Delbos, the French foreign minister, "and if the
League should refuse to take cognizance of it, the League would become
a complete farce." The least the league could do was to brand Japan the
aggressor and deal with the issue of sanctions later. In early September,
Koo told league members that Japan, which was bent on domination of
Asia and not expanding simply out of the need for seeking population
outlets or raw materials, had to be punished.6
From conversations with various individuals in Geneva, Koo rec-
ognized that he was making a hard sell when calling for sanctions, be-
cause it was clear that the "League could not do much" and that the "matter
hinged on Britain and France." The Soviet Union, which by now was a
league member, did not fit into the equation. Although the Soviets would
not take the lead to avoid worsening relations with Japan, Stalin was
prepared to support the branding of Japan as an aggressor and to im-
pose sanctions if the democracies stood unified on the issue. The de-
mocracies however believed that sanctions might provoke Japan to
attack British and French interests in Asia. The British tolerated hu-
miliation of the league should it fail to act. The French were convinced
that any attempts by the league to impose sanctions would merely re-
veal the league's impotence, having negative repercussions for Europe
where France's foreign policy was focused. Delbos told Koo point blank,
"You might as well call on the moon for help as on the League of Na-
tions." The British and French agreed that sanctions were ineffective as
long as Washington was not a part of it. And if the Chinese pushed for
sanctions, the United States would be forced to implement its Neutrality
Acts.7
Although Koo agreed with his counterparts that U.S. "collabora-
tion" was essential and that calling for sanctions was a mistake, the for-
eign ministry insisted that Koo push the league to impose sanctions.8
The powers warned that American neutrality would negate whatever
actions the league sought to implement, and advised Koo to take his case
before the league's Far Eastern Advisory Committee, not the Assembly.
The Chinese diplomat accepted this advice because he too wanted Ameri-
can cooperation and he thought it "useless to force things if [the] Powers
were unwilling." It made sense to "work with them [rather] than against
them."9 His government insisted otherwise. On September 16, Koo asked
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that Japan be condemned as an aggressor and punished with an em-
bargo of certain raw materials. At the same time, he asked the powers to
provide China with the financial assistance necessary to begin an arms
buildup. The powers refused.10
From Koo's point of view, France and Britain feared being in the
position of having to apply sanctions once they did brand Japan an ag-
gressor, and were "trying to 'pass the buck' from themselves to another."
When asked to present resolutions of a general character, Koo retorted
that thousands of Chinese noncombatants were being killed everyday.
"Public opinion everywhere in the world was indignant," Koo argued,
"and expected the League to do something." When he went before the
League Advisory Committee that day, he did convince the powers to con-
demn Japan's bombing raids on civilians, but later when he called for
creation of a sub-committee that would ask league members to do all in
their power to help China, there was virtual silence. The British told Koo
that creation of such a committee would delude the Chinese people into
thinking that the "League intended to take stronger action than was in
fact possible." Koo became even more indignant when the Advisory Com-
mittee meeting was not only postponed but Koo was asked to withdraw
his resolutions."
On October 1, the Advisory Committee did meet and the British
representative proposed that the most effective act that the league
could initiate at the moment was to call for a Nine Power Treaty con-
ference. For Koo, the "proposal fell like a bomb, deafening all senses."
On October 5, the Advisory Committee submitted to the Assembly a
heavily diluted version of Koo's resolution that refused to brand Ja-
pan an aggressor and merely asked league members to do nothing
that would weaken China's ability to resist. Despite Roosevelt's "Quar-
antine Speech" in Chicago in which FDR asserted that "The epidemic
of world lawlessness" had to be quarantined, Britain and France feared
that a strong resolution only invited Japanese retaliation. The League
Assembly passed the resolution, an act that received Washington's
blessings.12
The powers' decision to shift responsibility from the league to the
Nine Power Treaty left Koo dissatisfied. He reminded the Advisory Com-
mittee that the "Washington Treaty cannot relieve League members of
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their obligations under the Covenant." The majority of the committee
members, however, agreed that while they would do nothing to weaken
China and did find Japan guilty of breaking treaty obligations, they could
do nothing against Japan. In the words of one member, "The League was
'absolutely powerless.'"13
As Koo prepared to travel to Brussels where he would lead the Chi-
nese delegation, he still sought a balance of power in Asia. To achieve
such a balance, Koo knew that the Americans were essential, and he com-
mended Roosevelt for the Quarantine Speech. He also recognized that
the United States did not want to be pulled into a situation from which it
could not withdraw and detected a strong pessimism among the French
who felt that America would not do very much on China's behalf. And
going into the conference, Koo could see that China and the powers
pursued different goals. China wanted Japan declared an aggressor and
material support including arms and military demonstrations by the
powers. The powers preferred to simply mediate the dispute possibly
with Japan in attendance. If Japan showed up, Koo feared that China
would have to make concessions. If not, he feared the powers would
take little action.14
Likewise, the Chinese Foreign Ministry seemed skeptical of success
at the Brussels Conference. Whether the conference was a failure or not,
the Chinese delegation was to work with the powers, get them to restrain
Japan, and persuade France, Britain, and the United States to encourage
Soviet Russia to use its military against Japan.15 Although uncertain as to
the American position, Koo went into the conference convinced that the
"United States . . . did not like to see the Conference fail and admit de-
feat."16 He could not have been more wrong.
Before the conference even began, the Americans refused to play a
leadership role and later warned Koo not to make any statements that
implied the United States was taking the lead. The American delegation
suggested that China withdraw from the conference so that the powers
could have "full liberty of discussion." China had a right to participate,
but those nations who supported China entirely would be reticent in the
presence of the Chinese. China was not a contractual party to the Nine
Power Treaty, and Japan's actions were aggression against the powers'
interests in China. There was, however, no way for China to accept such
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a suggestion. Koo said that the Chinese were united in their resistance of
Japan and that for China to withdraw from the conference would under-
mine that resistance.17
On October 31, Koo left Paris for Brussels. His journey took him
through World War I battlefields, which "led me to reflect that although
the youthfulness of the trees and the relative newness of the buildings
still told the story of . . . the war, the world had learned little from it. A
new war was in the atmosphere everywhere." Upon arriving in Brussels,
he quickly became discouraged. A couple of American journalists in-
formed Koo of the pessimism that permeated the U.S. delegation. One
delegate asked Koo what China would be willing to sacrifice in order to
reach a settlement, but as Koo explained to Delbos, "China would not
want peace at any price, but only peace with justice." Koo readily felt the
difficult position his country was in. At a time when war was raging in
China and the country was in desperate need of help, the powers' were
in no mood to confront Japan. The delegations to Britain, France, and
the United States repeatedly warned Koo "to pursue a policy of modera-
tion so as not to slam the door" on the prospect of Japan's participation
in one form or another.18
On November 3, the day the conference opened, Koo presented
China's case and the facts of Japan's aggression. Although Japan rejected
the conference, the powers sent a note asking Japan to accept media-
tion.19 While waiting for Japan's reply, the conference utterly failed to
accomplish anything. With instructions from FDR, Norman Davis told
the British and French that the United States did not intend to take the
lead, especially since U.S. interests in East Asia were minute. As for the
French, they wanted the Americans to take the lead because they wanted
to use cooperation in the Far East as a way of committing the United
States to the defense of Europe. The French, like the Americans, opposed
the use of sanctions and were skeptical of the viability of applying moral
pressure on Japan.20 Britain likewise wanted to secure American coop-
eration and not suggest any steps, such as sanctions, that would push the
United States further into isolation. The overall attitude of Britain's for-
eign office was that British action in Asia depended upon the attitude of
the United States.21
On November 12, Japan flatly refused to accept mediation, stating
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that its actions in China were a matter of self-defense. Meanwhile, the
military situation in China worsened, with Japanese troops breaking
through Chinese lines around Shanghai. At the same time, Germany
offered to mediate direct Sino-Japanese talks. Koo continued calls for
military assistance to China, but the American people would not sup-
port sanctions until they were ready to risk war or felt that such mea-
sures entailed no risks.22 Koo did not want the conference to end "where
it had begun or even before it had begun." He thought the whole con-
ference to have been "over conciliatory toward Japan."23 Only the So-
viet Union (although not a Nine Power signatory, it was invited
nevertheless) backed the Chinese at Brussels in calling for collective
security in Europe and Asia.24
The conference ended on a sour note of failure. Meeting with the
British and American delegates, Koo expressed disappointment that the
powers could not provide China with more concrete assistance. Koo
wanted the powers to ship arms to China and to guarantee the French
protection of Indochina from Japanese attack. Such measures met with
disfavor in the United States. Koo told the delegates that "Just as domes-
tic order requires more than laws on the statute books, mere words are
insufficient to restore peace and order in the face of international vio-
lence." He also told journalists that Britain acted like a friend, whereas
the United States had not. An infuriated American delegate expressed
displeasure with Koo's remarks, but in the same breath admitted that the
United States could not provide any material assistance due to isolation-
ism. The conference's last resolution stated that its sessions had been
temporarily suspended and would meet again when it could be "advan-
tageously resumed."25
The Chinese diplomat remained convinced, though, "that the
United States could save the situation if it would act quickly and ener-
getically." Otherwise, China's only alternatives were guerrilla warfare or
German-Italian mediation, neither of which were, in Koo's opinion, in
"the best interests of China or a constructive solution." Oversimplifying
the situation, Koo blamed the failure of the Brussels Conference on the
fact that the major powers that could help China were democracies. In
reflecting on the attitude of the Western powers, Chen Kongbo, the Chi-
nese ambassador to Italy, remarked that "Mussolini had told him that
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authoritarian States always favored positive action, whereas democratic
countries always pursued a negative policy." Koo concurred with that
opinion: "Democratic countries always moved slowly whereas the oth-
ers could move rapidly."26
While the delegates at Brussels were busy burying the dead confer-
ence, the military situation proved grave. Japanese troops were driving
toward Nanjing. For Chiang, the Brussels Conference was such a disap-
pointment that he informed Nazi Germany, who previously offered its
mediation services, that he was willing to meet with the Japanese mili-
tary. The failure at Brussels meant no Soviet intervention, since Stalin
made it clear that he would intervene only if the powers put up a united
front. With the Japanese Army poised to capture Nanjing and since the
powers were unwilling to take on Japan, Chiang pursued German me-
diation to buy time and as a tactic to frighten the powers into support-
ing his regime. Germany played the role of "honest broker" because it
was concerned about its economic interests in China. Nazi Germany was
now China's third largest trading partner, and its interests were threat-
ened by the war. The Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact also worried pro-
Japanese elements in Berlin who wanted the war to end so that Japan
would be a viable deterrent to Soviet expansion. The powers, as Chiang
foresaw, were rather appalled that Germany might mediate cessation
of the conflict, diminishing French and British prestige in East Asia.
The Soviet Union increased aid to Chiang, but the United States still
refused to provide any support. Koo told the Americans that German
mediation was not in China's best interest. He preferred either to rely
on the United States alone or to make Germany a part of a j oint media-
tion effort as last resort.27
Despite the powers' concerns, nothing came of Germany's media-
tion efforts. Japan rejected Chiang's precondition of a truce. Then in
early December, Japanese forces entered Nanjing and commenced their
"rape" of the Chinese capital. Victory there led Japan to demand
Chiang's recognition of Manchukuo, his cooperation in fighting com-
munism, his acceptance of demilitarized zones, and war reparations.
Although a number of the GMD government's top military and politi-
cal leaders favored accepting Japan's terms, Chiang Kai-shek rejected
them on the grounds that they would make China a Japanese colony. The
Sino-Japanese War and the Specter of Sellout 127
next month, Japan announced its policy of seeking to annihilate Chiang's
government.28
At the end of 1937, Koo recognized the powers' domestic and stra-
tegic difficulties, but, as he stated in his closing speech at Brussels, he still
believed that the powers overlooked the possibility that the "violence
and disorder raging in the Far East" would eventually become impos-
sible to contain until there was another world war. In fact, Koo was sur-
prised that the Sino-Japanese conflict had not become a wider war by
now. Japanese aircraft attacked the U.S. gunboat Panay anchored near
Nanjing, sinking it and killing several Americans. Britain, thinking that
Washington was now willing to move beyond words to action against
Japan, was prepared to send several battleships, the bulk of the Royal
Navy, to China to prevent such outrages. Tokyo quickly apologized and
paid indemnities, defusing the crisis. In Koo's mind, the Panay incident
could have sparked a world war, "but the dark clouds blew over without
breaking out into a storm."29
The situation for China internationally was bleak in 1938, though
there were glimmers of hope. The Soviet Union pressed the CCP to give
its full support to Chiang Kai-shek, who received more Soviet aid than
Mao Zedong. The British provided military assistance, though they re-
fused to loan Chiang money, fearing Japanese reprisal against vulnerable
Hong Kong and potential attack by Nazi Germany in Europe or the Medi-
terranean. In lieu of a loan, the British built the Burma Road in order to
take supplies into China. France contributed by keeping the railroad,
which ran from Vietnam into China, open even though French authori-
ties were concerned that the flow of military supplies could possibly lead
France into direct conflict with Japan. The vital lifeline for Chiang Kai-
shek remained open despite French threats to close it. Much of the So-
viet aid passed over that railway. The French decision to keep the railway
open proved crucial in coming months when Japan closed off the Hong
Kong-Guangzhou-Hangzhou routes that filtered 75 percent of foreign
aid into China. However, the French populace grew weary of China's
attempts to involve the West deeper in the war. In January, the French
press began criticizing the Chinese for trying to drag the United States
and France into war with Japan.30
The Chinese expected more of the powers, though. Koo demanded
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that the league implement sanctions in order to show the world that the
league had vitality. Koo also wanted the league to be an example to the
United States in order to break the "vicious circle" in which the U.S. ex-
pected the league to take the lead whereas the League expected Washing-
ton to take the lead.31 The league passed a watered-down resolution that
simply stated that league members "for whom the situation is of special
interest" should consult "other similarly interested powers" on what steps
to take to bring about a "just settlement of the conflict in the Far East."
Chiang rejected the resolution as "unacceptable," and Koo himself thought
"it would be better to have no resolution at all if this was the best that
could be obtained." He blamed the French for preventing the British from
taking strong action "saying in effect that if the British were involved in
the Far East what would happen to poor France all by herself in the Medi-
terranean?" At the next league meeting, Koo "spoke and dwelt upon the
need of living up to obligations of membership and thereby strengthen-
ing the League." He told the league representatives that they had to pre-
serve the "principle of collective security." Aggression unchecked in China
could harm the peace in Europe.32
Unfortunately for Koo, Adolf Hitler peacefully annexed Austria in
March. Then he turned his eye toward the Sudetanland, the German-
dominated areas of Czechoslovakia. In May 1938, while Hitler ordered
his generals to prepare for war against Czechoslovakia scheduled for
October, he announced that Germany was withdrawing its advisers from
China, cutting off aid to Chiang's government, and giving diplomatic
recognition to Manchukuo. Hitler hoped the Japanese could tie down
the powers in the Pacific while he expanded into Czechoslovakia. Japan
had already established a pro-Japanese Reformed Government in Nanjing
to oversee central China, now that Chiang made Chongqing his wartime
capital. Hitler believed that Japan would ultimately win in China and
expand further into Asia, and decided that leaning entirely toward Japan
paid greater dividends over the long term.33
Chiang Kai-shek tried to lift up the morale of his people by assur-
ing them that Japan did not have the resources to conquer China, and
that eventually the United States and the European powers would enter
into the Sino-Japanese conflict. But on top of China's huge battlefield
casualties and the loss of major cities came bad news from Europe. In
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September, a conference was held in Munich between Neville Chamber-
lain; Edouard Daladier, the French prime minister; Benito Mussolini;
and Hitler, and it was there that Hitler got what he wanted: The
Sudetanland would go to Germany on October 1, and a four-power agree-
ment neutralized Czechoslovakia, canceling its alliances with France and
the Soviet Union. Munich demoralized many within the Chinese gov-
ernment including Wang Jingwei who did not believe the Western pow-
ers would intervene on China's behalf. The Western democracies seemed
on the verge of defeat in Europe while standing aside as Japan gobbled
up China. Only the Soviet Union aided China and Wang saw this as a
plot to drive China to communism. Wang wanted Chiang Kai-shek to
reopen peace talks with the Japanese and sacrifice whatever was neces-
sary to achieve peace.34
Back in Europe, Neville Chamberlain pronounced Munich a suc-
cess and believed that he and Hitler had come to an agreement on future
peace in Europe. Daladier held no such illusions; he expected Nazi Ger-
many to expand beyond the Sudetanland and believed world war had
only been postponed. From the United States came a message of con-
gratulations from FDR for Chamberlain. Most Americans joined Brit-
ons and Frenchmen in celebrating Munich. One power clearly not satisfied
with Munich was the Soviet Union, which had not been invited.
Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Hitler meant that the West bought
peace so that Hitler could drive east against what the democracies deemed
to be Germany's natural enemy. Little wonder the Soviets now decried
the League of Nations and collective security to be dead.35
Joining the Soviets in the chorus was Wellington Koo. Koo wanted
the league to be a credible deterrent to aggression, and recognized that
what the league did or did not do in Asia had an effect on events in
Europe. There was also speculation that invoking sanctions, deemed by
some as embarrassing to both the league and the Chinese, was to be the
Chinese bargaining chip for getting Britain and France to provide China
with concrete assistance as well as satisfying "a growing anti-League sen-
timent in Government circles in China." Whatever the case, Koo's gov-
ernment pressed for sanctions even though Koo warned that such a
demand was "highly inadvisable." Indeed, the powers would not relent
and asked Koo to postpone discussion of the Sino-Japanese dispute
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once Europe was confronted with the Czechoslovakian crisis.36 Koo
pressed for sanctions against Japan. In animated and acrimonious con-
versations, Koo stated that he refrained from invoking sanctions the
year before and last May in return for "nicely-worded" league resolu-
tions that promised action. A year later, "The resolutions remained noth-
ing but empty words." Japan continued its aggression and "China felt
completely disappointed."37
After Munich, Koo sent his government his analysis of the interna-
tional situation. The fact that Britain and France stood by while Hitler
moved into Austria and Czechoslovakia had ramifications for both Eu-
rope and the Far East. France ignored its treaties with Czechoslovakia,
with the result that the weak, small states of Europe were fearful. Koo
described Neville Chamberlain as an old man who ignored "obligations
under international law or the principle of international morality." Koo
blamed Chamberlain's desire to create another Concert of Europe, in
which Germany and Britain would "dominate and control the weaker
and the smaller powers," for undermining the league and believed that
Chamberlain wanted to do everything possible not to offend Japan in
order to protect Britain's Far Eastern interests. British and French ap-
peasement of Hitler angered the Soviets to such extent that Stalin re-
fused to take serious measures against Japan without having the backing
of all the democracies. The only way to win Stalin's support was to enlist
the cooperation of Washington.38
Long before the Munich Conference, though, Koo observed that
the "doctrine of collective security, which was firmly held as the only
sound basis of an organized peace, is considered unfeasible and discred-
ited .. . it is perhaps no longer the fashion to talk much about the League
of Nations." A few days after Munich, Koo told a Chinese audience that
there was "no use to rely upon [the] West[ern] powers" after their failure
to act against Hitler. Self-help was China's hope by depending on "space,
time and number." The next year, attending league meetings became an
even more unpleasant experience for Koo: "perhaps it was because I knew
there could be no practical result from [the] effort and hard work. The
League has been so weakened that any attempt to obtain concrete results
is futile."39
Soon after Munich, Tokyo announced in November the establish-
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ment of a "New Order" in Asia that called for Japan and China to coop-
erate in providing stability in East Asia by defending against commu-
nism and creating a new East Asian culture. This New Order rejected the
old one established at the Washington Conference that was based on the
Open Door principles.40 The next month, China's internal political situ-
ation grew more complicated. After Chiang Kai-shek turned down a Japa-
nese peace offer, Wang Jingwei secretly slipped out of China to Hanoi
and eventually headed a puppet regime established by the Japanese in
Nanjing. Wang preferred Japanese domination to communism. In com-
ing months, Koo received reports of war-weary and pessimistic govern-
ment officials in Chongqing who wanted peace with Japan. In 1938, one
of Wang's subordinates went to Tokyo to propose an end to hostilities,
and in return, Manchuria would become Japan's concession. Later in the
year, one of H.H. Kung's subordinates proposed an anticommunist pact
with Japan and Manchukuo, hence giving recognition of Japan's puppet
state.41 Wang Jingwei's belief that the Western democracies would do
nothing for China and that the war was leading to the communization
of China still held true. The CCP enlarged its sphere of influence beyond
Japanese lines in the north as resistance against the Japanese proved suc-
cessful.42
The three democracies responded to Japan's New Order by reaf-
firming the Open Door. Koo interpreted the protests as evidence of a
"hardening of the American attitude vis-a-vis Japan" and increased co-
operation between the democracies. Koo read too much into the joint
protest. None of the powers sought to apply sanctions against Japan and
preferred assistance to China to retaliation against Japan. Although France
permitted foreign military supplies to flow through Indochina, it refused
to provide military aid. And while Roosevelt viewed economic aid to
Chiang as a way of tying down Japanese armies in China and preventing
further Japanese expansion, he refused to provide military support that
could potentially drag the United States into war with Japan.43 Even after
FDR alluded to the dangerous threat to the democracies created by the
indifference toward international lawlessness and charged that the de-
mocracies of the world could not ignore acts of aggression, Washington
refused to lead those democracies by imposing sanctions.44
As Japan occupied Hainan Island and moved into the Spratly Is-
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lands and as Hitler gobbled up what remained of Czechoslovakia, Chiang
pressed for an alliance, fearing that war in Europe would spur Japanese
expansion. The Chinese leader suggested, among other things, that his
government supply Chinese ground forces that would be supported by
British and French naval and air power. The Chinese believed that the
powers were interested in an alliance with China because they had to
defend political, economic, and security interests in China threatened by
Japanese expansion, especially Britain, which controlled 60 percent of
all Western investments in China. Koo consistently described Japan as a
nation bent on "the conquest of China, subjugation of Asia and finally
domination of the world." Colonization of China made it "impossible to
safeguard legitimate western rights and interests and that respect for
China's sovereignty and maintenance of the open door." Hence, Koo called
for broad cooperation to protect the powers' interests on the basis of the
Open Door. China would defend British and French interests in the Far
East while those two powers battled it out with Germany and Italy in
Europe. The Western democracies rejected the plan fearing it would pro-
voke Japan.45
The importance of the Open Door to China also proved a hard sell
because the European powers worried more about Hitler, who now tar-
geted Poland while Italian forces attacked Albania. Britain made security
guarantees to Eastern Europe but Chamberlain's anticommunism and
French fear of the Soviet Union proved insurmountable in forming an
antifascist alliance.46 Likewise, Stalin favored an alliance against Japan
that threatened the Soviet Union's Far Eastern border, but the British
and French rejected the idea, fearing that a mutual assistance pact di-
rected at Japan would drive Tokyo even closer to Germany and Italy.
Their policy seemed justified when Germany and Italy, not Japan, signed
the Pact of Steel in May 1939.47
Then that summer, Japanese forces blockaded the British and French
Concessions at Tianjin after the assassination of a Chinese-puppet offi-
cial. The British agreed not to interfere with Japanese control in those
parts of China occupied by the Japanese Army. The French likewise pre-
ferred to avoid angering the Japanese, especially if the United States re-
fused to participate in joint action.48 The British press at home and in
China railed against the agreement as being a "Far Eastern Munich." The
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British compromise infuriated Chiang Kai-shek, and the foreign minis-
try ordered Koo and his compatriots to express their "suppressed resent-
ment" of the agreement. When Koo complained to journalists about
Britain's "apparent disposition to accommodate aggression in the Far
East," the British Foreign Office was not amused.49
That same summer, Roosevelt announced abrogation of the 1911
American-Japanese commercial treaty that prevented the United States
from imposing trade sanctions. This step warned trade-dependent Ja-
pan that its vital link to the United States could be cut off once the treaty
expired after January 26, 1940.50 The measure seemed to reveal to Koo
that the United States was willing to get tough with Japan. Chiang Kai-
shek welcomed this particular American action since he was angry with
the British for their appeasement of Japan over Tianjin, fearing that the
same thing could happen in Shanghai where the foreign settlements re-
mained intact. When the United States officially abrogated the treaty in
January 1940, Chiang asked Roosevelt to place economic sanctions on
Japan. Washington, however, would not impose sanctions for another
six months after the commercial treaty expired because of its cautious
policy toward Japan.51
The effort to build a five-power alliance was seemingly dashed
on August 22, 1939, when the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression
pact with Germany. With Hitler's Germany on the verge of conquer-
ing Poland, Stalin could not wait any longer on the West to conclude
an alliance. He abandoned collective security and made a deal that he
hoped would keep the Soviet Union out of war. Like Chamberlain,
Stalin made the mistake of thinking he could indefinitely appease
Hitler. The Nazi-Soviet Pact did permit Stalin to send aid to Chiang
Kai-shek without being drawn directly into the Sino-Japanese War
and prevented a German-Italian-Japan combination directed at the
Soviet Union. Still, the Nazi-Soviet Pact shocked Chiang Kai-shek.
The chance of putting together a combination of powers against Ja-
pan seemed lost.52
Koo found that the Nazi-Soviet Pact infuriated the French who told
him that the Soviets were either promoting war in western Europe for
their own narrow interests, or doing everything possible to avoid being
dragged into a war in Europe. Koo told his government that the Nazi-
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Soviet Pact weakened the Anti-Comintern coalition while permitting the
Soviets to put pressure on Japan now that Stalin averted potential con-
flict with Germany. But if China was to build a broad anti-Japan coali-
tion, there was the problem that France and Britain promoted war
between the Soviet Union and Japan in order to secure their Far East
interests. Nevertheless, China needed military support from the Soviets
and the western powers, and Koo hoped that the Nazi-Soviet Pact would
enable Moscow to provide more aid to China. Koo did worry that Japan
would either try to build closer ties with Germany, Italy, and the Soviet
Union or would seek better relations with Britain and France. He urged
Chiang to seek closer military cooperation with the Soviet Union. If
Moscow insisted on maintaining a defensive posture vis-a-vis Japan, Koo
wanted to persuade the Soviets to back China in order to give the ap-
pearance of a broad united front against Japan.53
The ramifications of the Nazi-Soviet Pact were more negative for
China than Koo perceived. The British believed that the potential for
war in Asia had been reduced and that they were in a position to im-
prove relations with Japan, which brooded over Germany's actions. The
French, likewise, saw the Nazi-Soviet Pact as an opportunity for Anglo-
French mediation of the Asian conflict at China's expense. Koo felt un-
easy that the Western democracies were trying to find some way to prevent
Asia from getting in the way of dealing with European issues. Koo's un-
easiness was "aggravated" when the French suggested that China reach a
negotiated settlement with Japan with a view to bringing Japan in on the
side of Britain and France. France would act as mediator or possibly join
the United States to bring about a settlement if the latter would not worry
about China's fate.54
Just at that moment, the international situation took a dramatic
shift. On September 1, Nazi Germany invaded Poland. On September 3,
Britain and France declared war on Germany. "These are momentous
days in history," Koo noted in his diary, "the beginning of a war which
may alter the face of the world and civilization itself." Koo told the French
that now was the moment for cooperation between the democracies and
the Soviet Union in Asia. Moscow had a free hand in Europe, and it, with
Western support, could bring enough pressure to bear on Japan to bring
about peace in Asia for the next twenty-five years. Koo warned that any
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attempt by Britain and France to reach a rapprochement with Japan would
be seen as a sign of weakness and only encourage further aggression.
With Japan bogged down in China, the powers could, with a firm atti-
tude, work with Japan to broker an arrangement that everyone could
live with. The French, however, expected the Soviet Union to become
involved in the destruction of Poland and not just stand on the side like
a spectator.55 The French were right. The Soviets eventually invaded Po-
land with their own forces. On September 28, Warsaw surrendered, and
soon, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany partitioned Poland among
themselves .
Misperceiving relations between Moscow and Berlin, Koo observed
that the Soviets were switching to the German side "with dangerous pos-
sibilities of reaction" in the Far East. He worried that the war would have
a negative effect on British and French policy toward the Far East and
believed that that the Soviet Union's policy was to have Germany, Brit-
ain, and France "fight" until all sides were exhausted, and "then she (the
Soviet Union) could dictate." Meanwhile, Moscow was "determined to
avoid war but continue to 'make hay.'" Koo warned the foreign ministry
that the Soviet Union and the United States might try to conciliate "Ja-
pan in order to devote attention to Europe." The Chinese diplomat still
entertained the hope that the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the
United States would cooperate. Even if the four parties were unable to
sign an agreement, they could cooperate by "utilizing the strategic posi-
tion of the U.S.S.R. in the north in fact" and by having the democracies
speak to Japan. In fact, Koo's analysis of the situation was wrong. The
Soviets entered into the Nazi-Soviet Pact both to avoid Japanese attack
and to forestall an anti-Soviet alliance including a Nazi-Japanese one.
The Soviet Union was still committed to aiding Chiang Kai-shek, though
in a manner that prevented Moscow from being dragged into war. When
Koo convinced Chiang to pursue an alliance with Britain and France in
order to halt their appeasement, the Soviet Union came out in opposi-
tion to such an alignment.56
Worse, the Soviets threatened to cut back military aid to Chiang's
government. After the fall of Poland, the Soviet Union demanded that
Finland sign a nonaggression pact that permitted Soviet forces to have at
least one base in Finland. Negotiations broke down and Stalin ordered
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the invasion of Finland on November 30. At the outset of the Winter
War, Finland appealed to the League of Nations. A proposal calling for
expulsion of the Soviet Union was introduced. Not wanting to alienate
both sides by outright support or opposition to the resolution, China,
represented by Koo, abstained while the league voted to kick the Soviet
Union out of the organization. Moscow viewed China's abstention as
support for the British and French and cut off aid to Chiang's govern-
ment. Viewing Moscow's anger over his abstention at the league as a
pretext, Chiang believed that in fact, the Soviets were working to reduce
tensions with Japan.57
Besides the Soviet Union, the other obstacle to an alliance was the
democracies. In a year and a half's time, Koo had watched Czechoslova-
kia, Albania, and now Poland disappear as a result of fascist expansion
and the West's appeasement. "In meeting crises, democracies are clumsy
and slow to act," Koo wrote in his diary, "whereas dictators count upon
surprise attack and rapid crushing of victims." In his opinion, there
was quite a contrast between his people and the West. Morale in China
remained high, or so he claimed, on the basis of renewed Chinese
counter-offensives. "The great Western democratic Powers, on the other
hand," Koo observed, "had seemed to be yielding to one demand after
another from Germany, which made it conspicuously evident that the
country was threatening them with superior strength." The result of
that "lack of resistance" on the part of the democracies was now a war
with Germany.58
Back in China, Chiang still pursued an anti-Japan alliance even
though many of his own people thought that the war with Japan could
not go on once there was a European conflict. Yet in those early days of
the war there was much talk and rumor of Anglo-Japanese and Franco-
Japanese talks. Even though the democracies refused to recognize Wang
Jingwei's puppet regime, loaned Chiang money, and kept Indochina and
Burma open, Chiang feared the revival of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.59
The U.S. State Department assured Chiang that a new Anglo-Japanese al-
liance was not in the making but rejected Chiang's suggestion that the
United States create an anti-Japan coalition. Still anxious, Chiang wanted
the United States to use its influence to prevent British, French, and Soviet
appeasement of Japan, especially in the face of the conflict in Europe.60
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Chiang's persistence in bringing about an anti-Japan bloc was dealt
another blow in early 1940 when the phony war was replaced by a real
one. Nazi Germany mounted offensives against the Low Countries, Nor-
way, and France. By June, France was defeated. While Germany occupied
part of France, the new government of Vichy maintained control over
France's colonies abroad including Indochina. France's defeat made its
Asian colony vulnerable to Japanese expansion. Japan demanded that
France close the Indochina border. Throughout the summer of 1940,
Koo remained in France, working with French officials in a vain attempt
to keep Indochina open as a transit point. Koo found the French to be
"powerless" in the face of Japanese pressure, and there were reports that
Germany warned Vichy not to "provoke" Japan. In September, the Vichy
government signed an agreement with Japan, under threat of war, that
allowed Japanese forces to enter Indochina proper, closing off that vi-
tal lifeline. The British also agreed to close the Burma Road in July
1940 for three months in return for a Japanese promise to pursue peace.
The British hoped that there could be an Anglo-American effort to
settle the Sino-Japanese War.61
The closing of the Burma Road refueled Chiang's fear that China
might be sacrificed because of the European war. To assuage those con-
cerns, Roosevelt reiterated that no matter what happened in Europe, the
United States would provide economic assistance.62 Still, Chiang Kai-
shek could not count on the United States to go to war anytime soon. A
majority of Americans opposed going to war, and the Roosevelt admin-
istration sought to avoid war. Chiang tried to win U.S. support by in-
forming it of a note received from Nazi Germany advising Chiang to
reach a compromise with Japan since German-dominated Europe could
no longer help him. Chiang pressed the United States and Britain for an
alliance in order to not only prevent Japanese hegemony in the Pacific,
but also the rise of communism in Asia. If there was a triple alliance,
Chiang claimed he would uphold their interests in Asia and oppose Japan's
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in return for money and mili-
tary aid. And if Britain and America went to war with Japan, he would
throw all his armies against Japan. The State Department rejected Chiang's
proposal, saying that it would not be very effective.63
With the defeat of France, Hitler turned on Britain, now under the
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leadership of Winston Churchill. While the Battle of Britain raged, lead-
ership in the Pacific shifted to the United States where the threat in-
creased. In September 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the
Tripartite Pact or what became known as the Axis Alliance. The parties
agreed to support one another in creating new orders in Europe and
Asia, and to assist each other if attacked by a power not presently en-
gaged in either spheres, meaning the United States. Chiang Kai-shek
welcomed the alliance. It linked the European conflict with the one in
Asia, and, in his opinion, made war between Japan and the United States
inevitable. Koo did not entirely agree. He believed the Axis Alliance guar-
anteed U.S. participation in the European conflict as well, and the prob-
lem for China was which theater would the U.S. prefer to assist first:
Europe or Asia. Although Koo deemed the Asian conflict more impor-
tant than the European one, he concluded that the U.S. would assist Brit-
ain first.64
In the end, Koo's analysis proved to be closer to the truth. FDR
imposed sanctions prohibiting the sell of steel and scrap iron to Japan,
but the president refused to impose an oil embargo against Japan for
fear Japan would search for oil in the Dutch East Indies. At a time when
FDR's military advisers agreed that the United States was not prepared
for war, Washington sought to avoid exposing European imperial inter-
ests and America's colony in the Philippines to Japanese expansion. Koo
even wondered if Washington would seek to mediate the Sino-Japanese
dispute before taking "positive action" against Japan. After being reas-
sured by his old friend, Hu Shi, who now was Chinese ambassador to
Washington, that the U.S. did not intend to mediate the Asian conflict,
Koo hoped that the United States would "liquidate" the Japanese men-
ace now and lay the basis for a "durable peace" in the Pacific. Otherwise,
he feared the United States would have to fight alone in both Asia and
Europe.65 After Roosevelt won his third term in office, he declared that
America would be the "arsenal of democracy." He came up with the idea
of Lend-Lease in which the United States would loan Britain the weap-
ons to defeat Germany and Italy. China also benefited from Lend-Lease,
as $26 million worth of aid went over the now reopened Burma Road.
And China received a $100 million loan from America and a loan of £10
million from Great Britain.66
Sino-Japanese War and the Specter of Sellout 139
Despite these steps to aid China, a seed that created dissension in
the future United Nations alliance was sowed in early 1941. Roosevelt
dispatched his economic adviser, Lauchlin Currie, to Chongqing. In their
talks, Currie impressed on Chiang the need to pursue democracy and to
cooperate with the CCP. Throughout 1939 and 1940, there were numer-
ous armed clashes between Chiang's forces and the CCP culminating in
the New Fourth Army incident of January 1941 in which GMD troops
killed thousands of CCP troops. The incident came at a bad time. The
Soviet Union had just agreed to turn on the spigot only to have the
New Fourth Army incident occur. The Soviets persuaded the CCP to
maintain the united front while the U.S. applied pressure on Chiang
Kai-shek to cooperate so that the Chinese continued to tie Japan down
in China.67
There were other moves by the powers that were not entirely aus-
picious for Chiang Kai-shek. In April, Japan and the Soviet Union signed
a Pact of Neutrality in which both sides agreed to not attack one another
should either be at war with another power. The Soviet Union agreed as
well to recognize Manchukuo. Although Stalin was unaware that Hitler
already had his generals planning the invasion of the Soviet Union, ten-
sion in Soviet-German relations were sufficient to make a deal with the
Japanese to avoid a two-front war. Chiang condemned the Neutrality
Pact, which not only threatened his military lifeline to the Soviet Union
but clearly rendered futile Chiang's four-year attempt to get the Soviet
Union directly involved in war with Japan. And if Stalin could make a
deal with Japan, so could the Western democracies.68
Then in June 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. For Chiang
Kai-shek, the invasion meant a decrease in aid from that country be-
cause Stalin could not afford to provoke Japan at this moment of crisis.
In July, Japan occupied southern Indochina, presenting a clear threat to
both British interests in Asia and the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. The
occupation of southern Indochina prompted the United States to join
with Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Holland in imposing an oil
embargo on Japan. FDR also announced that China would be on an equal
footing in an entente consisting of Britain, the United States, Australia,
and Holland. The entente though did not go far enough for Chiang, who
wanted an alliance that provided him with the political, military, and
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economic assistance to fight the Japanese and the CCP. The British and
FDR refused to enter into such an alliance, seeing it as inciting war rather
than relaxing tensions.69
In 1941, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Koo to be Chinese ambassa-
dor to London. For several weeks, London contemplated whether to ac-
cept him or not. Some in the British Foreign Office intensely disliked
him, describing him as one of Britain's "bitterest enemies" from the 1920s.
They distrusted him because of alleged financial improprieties on his
part and opposed his appointment because he was not close enough to
Chiang. The foreign office recalled that in 1938, Koo had been appointed
ambassador to Moscow, though he allegedly declined that position. The
foreign office thought otherwise and could not see any reason "why we
should accept a man who . . . was turned down by the Soviet government
on the same grounds as we ourselves opposed, namely that he was not
close enough to the Generalissimo." The foreign office tried to persuade
Chiang to appoint someone else, but the generalissimo pressed for Koo's
appointment and the foreign office finally relented.70
Immediately, Koo set out to win British political and economic
support for China's cause, but not as much assistance was forthcoming
as the Chinese would have liked. In light of recent events, the Chinese
increasingly feared a sellout and complained that Britain only supported
China out of concern for its own interests and not for China's sake. One
member of the foreign office admitted that Britain and the United States
"bolster up China's resistance for our own ends" and further argued:
"China's best guarantee against our 'selling out' to Japan is that it is as
much in our own interests as in hers that she should continue to resist
Japan." However, given the Nazi threat, "we cannot be expected to un-
dertake lightly any further commitments which might embroil us with
Japan." But many agreed with Sir John Brenan, who argued that Britain
had been so cautious in its attitude toward Japan "that the Chinese are
not unjustified in suspecting that we are deliberately keeping the way
open for a deal with Japan at China's expense. So far our only declared
Far Eastern policy has been sympathy for China coupled with the desire
to improve our relations with Japan." Even if Britain could not provide
more concrete assistance, it could at least bolster Chinese morale by
making "an unequivocal public declaration of support" because the col-
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lapse of Chiang's resistance would "be a very serious blow" to Britain's
world position. Although many in the British government agreed that
China had to be kept in the war, British policy remained cautious in
order to avert hostilities with Japan.71
This explained why the British rejected efforts by Koo to more
greatly involve Britain in the Asian conflict. Over the summer of 1941,
Britain and the Soviet Union signed an alliance that focused on the de-
feat of Nazi Germany. Koo wanted to know if Britain would come to the
Soviet Union's assistance in the case of Japanese attack. The British re-
sponded in the negative and were annoyed that Koo even asked the ques-
tion. Upon reading the notes of the conversation, Foreign Minister
Anthony Eden wrote, "I do not like Dr. Koo nor trust him, and see no
reason why we should answer his question."72
In July, after Japan moved into southern Indochina, Koo worried
that the Japanese would attack the Burma Road. He wanted British air
support to protect his government's last lifeline to the world. Eden re-
fused to consider the request. Such a step would be an act of war against
Japan on Britain's part. Britain did decide to freeze Japanese assets and
abrogate commercial treaties with Japan. However, they were hesitant to
inform Koo of these actions. They feared that the Chinese would leak
the news creating the impression that Britain and China were acting in
concert, and they initially feared that informing the Chinese of their
measures "might have given an opening to the Chinese at an awkward
moment for us for their persistent proposal for an alliance."73 Despite all
that the British were trying to do to aid China, Koo pressed for more.
Reminding the British that they were doing themselves a favor by keep-
ing his government in the war, he still asked for air support against the
Japanese should they move against the Burma Road. Indeed, Chiang
wanted an international air force established in China in which a Brit-
ish volunteer group could fly alongside the American volunteer group
that had been established. Britain turned down the international air
force scheme, but agreed to divert aircraft purchased from the United
States to China.74
The British were clearly doing what they could to keep China in
the war without being dragged into war in Asia. Caution dominated their
policy toward China. In August, when a member of Parliament asked if
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Britain was prepared to recognize Chiang's government as an ally against
aggression, the British Foreign Office wanted the question withdrawn:
"Anything we may say must be either unnecessarily provocative to Ja-
pan or disappointing to the Chinese." Brenan himself commented that
"a declaration of alliance with China would entail the opening of hos-
tilities with Japan, a development which we and the United States wish
to postpone for as long as we can."75 There was a good reason to be
cautious. Britain stood on the verge of extinction at the hands of Nazi
Germany.
In China, though, Chiang believed he was not treated as an equal.
In August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill held their Arcadia Conference.
There they laid down the basis for the Atlantic Charter, which estab-
lished that Britain and the United States would wage war on the prin-
ciples that there be no territorial aggrandizement and no territorial
changes anywhere without: the free consent of the peoples involved; re-
spect for self-determination and the restoration of self-government in
those areas dominated by Germany; equal access to raw materials and
markets; and a postwar organization for security to replace the League
of Nations. Koo complained to Eden that Chiang Kai-shek was "greatly
disappointed that at the close of the conference no gesture had been
made to China comparable with that which had been made with Rus-
sia." And Chiang felt that since his people "had been bearing a heavy
burden almost alone for many years," their voice should be heard. He
wanted the United States and Britain to firmly announce to Japan that
the West not only viewed Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia as a
threat, but would be equally concerned if Japan attacked the Burma
Road. Eden argued that the less said about Asia publicly during the
conference the better. However, Eden commented that Roosevelt would
probably make a statement about Japanese aggression in the future and
Britain and Holland would follow the U.S.' lead. Koo's persistent que-
ries with regard to conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill ir-
ritated the British, but some in the foreign office knew they had to
indulge Koo while London stalled on Chinese questions regarding aid
and an alliance.76
Chiang was not satisfied with that explanation. At a dinner party,
Madame Chiang harangued her American guests with the charge "that
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China after 4 years fighting against aggression was ignored at the
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, expressing] the opinion that the democ-
racies were following the policy of appeasement toward Japan and in-
dicated that this provoked Chinese resentment." Lauchlin Currie
likewise conveyed to Washington Chiang's belief "that the democracies
regard her [China] as inferior and of not being worthy of being con-
sidered an ally."77
Making matters worse, there was no public statement warning Ja-
pan against aggression after the Arcadia Conference. Instead, Churchill
announced in late August that Japan and the United States were about to
sit down for talks in Washington. Initially, Chiang had nothing to worry
about. The United States insisted that Japanese forces withdraw from
China, a point Tokyo could not yield. Except for the northern prov-
inces and Hainan Island, Japan proposed to withdraw all troops from
China within two years, evacuate all Japanese forces from French
Indochina immediately, and promised to not attack the United States
if Washington went to war with Germany. The U.S. rejected this pro-
posal because Japanese forces would remain in China. Japan then gave
the Americans a second proposal: In exchange for limited renewal of
trade, including a quantity of oil, and a lifting of the embargo, the Japa-
nese would withdraw their forces from the southern half of Indochina
and promise not to advance into Southeast Asia. Again, Washington turned
down the proposal.
Roosevelt gave assurances to Chiang that the talks were "explor-
atory," seeking a general settlement on the basis of U.S. principles, and
that aid would continue to China as long as Chiang resisted. Neverthe-
less, Chiang and his wife tensely watched those negotiations, fearing a
sellout. In his diary, the generalissimo noted that some people felt that
the attitude of Britain and the United States toward China was not sin-
cere and often betrayed China. Koo met with Richard Law, British Un-
der-Secretary of State, who declared that it was "inconceivable that the
United States should have any idea of selling China down the river." Still,
Koo had the impression that Britain wanted the United States to make a
deal with Japan in order to concentrate on Europe. Koo's mind was so
absorbed with the war in the Pacific that in the course of talking with
Law and listening to the latter remark that "events in Europe would prove
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to be decisive in the Pacific as well as in Europe," Koo "seemed surprised
at the idea that there was a war in Europe." Koo then blurted out an
acknowledgement that there was a war in Europe, but he still concen-
trated on the Pacific. "I tried as much as I could to bring his mind back to
the Russian front," Law wrote after their meeting, "and he tried with
equal zest to bring my mind back to the Pacific."78
For the next couple of months, Koo and his people bided their
time and waited out the talks in Washington. The British were anxious
that Koo say nothing that would create problems between Britain and
Japan. When Koo prepared to give a speech over the British Broadcast-
ing Service on October 10 to celebrate the Revolution of 1911, the for-
eign office was divided over what he should say. Some feared he would
discuss the notion of an alliance between China, Britain, Holland and
the United States and "inflame an already tense situation." Brenan dis-
agreed, saying that efforts to restrict Koo "would only increase Chinese
suspicions of our insincerity."79
Although Koo assured his government that the United States would
do nothing to undermine the Nine Power Treaty, the fear of betrayal
became acute. In November, Roosevelt entertained the idea of present-
ing a modus vivendi of his own to Japan: a ninety-day truce in Asia in
which China and Japan would sit down and come to terms while Japan
withdrew from southern Indochina, with Washington lifting the oil em-
bargo. In a state of tremendous agitation, Chiang Kai-shek vented his
anger with Washington on Owen Lattimore, his political adviser, who
observed that Chiang Kai-shek's "reliance on America is the founda-
tion of whole national policy and this would be destroyed by any loos-
ening of economic pressure or unfreezing on our part while leaving
Japan entrenched in China." According to Lattimore, Chiang felt that
after four years of war with Japan, China "has not won a single ally and
the nation feels politically isolated." Chiang wanted Roosevelt to either
suggest to Britain and Russia to form an alliance with China or invite
China to join the U.S., Britain, and other Pacific powers in a defensive
alliance. In Chiang's opinion, either proposal would "safeguard China's
equal footing among antiaggression peoples and remove the stigma of
discrimination."80
In the meantime, the Chinese worked to undermine U.S.-Japanese
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negotiations. The Chinese embassy in London leaked the modus viv-
endi to the press. Meanwhile, Churchill commented that the collapse
of China would threaten the democracies' interests in Asia at a time
when the Nazis stood outside Moscow. Soviet surrender to the Germans
or Japan's striking north against the Soviet Union would send the Ger-
mans back West toward Britain. The British and Chinese backlash con-
vinced FDR to drop the modus vivendi and to demand complete Japanese
withdrawal from China, even though Japanese forces were on the move
in Southeast Asia, and Moscow and North Africa seemed within grasp of
the Nazis.81
Despite his concerns about Japanese movements in and near China,
Koo told the American Press Association in late 1941 that the Japanese,
who were negotiating with the Americans, were only interested in con-
vincing Washington to lift the oil embargo implemented over the sum-
mer. He described Japan as having an "ambition [that was] unbounded
and unalterable," but Japan would not declare war now. Instead, Japan
would strengthen itself while the European war exhausted the West. Al-
though many people believed war with Japan was only a matter of weeks
away, Koo disagreed. He argued that Japan "was bluffing and would con-
tinue to do so till the last second, in hope of frightening the U.S.A. and
extracting concessions." He expected Japan to strike Russia, only attack-
ing into Southeast Asia, when Great Britain and the United States were
preoccupied in Europe. Thus, Japan's attack Pearl Harbor on December 7
left Koo "somewhat stunned." He agreed with others that "it was the best
thing for China," but he had not expected this Japanese move. A Japan
bogged down in China was unlikely to want to wage war against the
West as well. He deemed such a gamble foolish because it would bring
Japan to "total ruin."82
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor proved advantageous for China. The
United States immediately declared itself to be in a state of war with
Japan. Koo told his government that should the United States declare
war on Germany and Japan, the GMD government should follow suit.
On December 9, Hitler declared war on the United States. That same
day, China declared war on Japan, Germany, and Italy.83 There was very
little Chiang Kai-shek could do to help his allies fight Germany and
Italy, but he could, in theory, assist Britain and the United States in
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fighting Japan. The broad coalition that Koo and his government had
sought for so many years to create finally came about. What Koo did
not realize was that keeping an alliance intact was nearly as difficult if
not more difficult than building one. Over the next four years, rela-
tions between Chiang's government and his allies were strained by dif-
fering war aims. Looking to the postwar period, Koo did everything in
his power to keep the alliance intact and to manage the crises that oc-
curred within the alliance.
Chapter 6
SINO-BRITISH TENSIONS,
1941-1944
ON JANUARY 1, 1942, WASHINGTON TRUMPETED the United Na-
tions Declaration in which the signatories agreed to devote all resources
to the defeat of the Axis powers. The signatories were listed in alphabeti-
cal order, but the names United States, Britain, the USSR, and China
headed the list, signifying that these four nations were great powers.
For the first time in China's history, China was, in William Kirby's words,
"an 'ally' in the modern military-diplomatic sense of the term."1 The
man responsible for China's rise as a "great power" was Franklin D.
Roosevelt. With the failure of the league during the 1920s and 1930s,
Roosevelt subscribed to a great power notion of collective security in
which Britain and the United States would maintain the peace. Once
the war got underway, FDR expanded his concept to include China
and the Soviet Union in a grouping that he referred to as the Four
Policemen.2 Koo, whose life goal had been to recover China's sover-
eignty, hoped that China would become a great power and welcomed
the declaration.
Yet only three of the policemen were engaged in war with Japan.
The Soviet Union remained neutral. Although united in their desire to
defeat Japan, strains in relations between Chiang and his allies, Britain
and the United States, were inevitable because the allies' war aims varied.
For Chiang Kai-shek, the United Nations' alliance opened the door to
eliminating the last remnants of the unequal treaty system, recovering
147
148 V.K. Wellington Koo
territory lost to the imperialists since the Opium War, raising China's
international standing, and securing loans and supplies to strengthen
his government by uniting the country by force. Chiang also planned to
use the prestige that the alliance gave him to work for the independence
of other countries suffering from colonialism. Chiang subscribed to Pan-
Asianist ideas long articulated by numerous Chinese, including Sun Yat-
sen. In laying out his Principle of Nationalism, Sun spoke of the need
for China to attain its historical position as leader of Asia. Only then
could China fulfill its responsibility to "Rescue the weak, save the fallen"
and oppose the great powers. Carrying on Sun's ideas, Chiang Kai-shek
declared in 1942 before a Chinese audience that included Koo that he
wanted "to see freedom restored to the small and weak countries in Asia
and the world." The generalissimo observed that Japan's claim to be an
Asian leader was simply a quaint way of saying domination or hege-
mony. On the other hand, China had "a duty to work for freedom and
equality of all nations in Asia and the world." Chiang would not use
force to liberate the oppressed peoples. China would be a benign ex-
ample for the weak and small nations who would "look to China as their
natural leader and her civilization as a great heritage."3
In 1943, Chiang's ideas were elaborated upon in the book China's
Destiny in which he declared that China had been a leader of Asia for
thousands of years. And there was "no historical evidence of economic
exploitation or of political domination of the peoples of Asia when China
was strong and prosperous; nor was there any imperialism or colonial-
ism." The wars that China fought in 5,000 years of history were '"righ-
teous wars' for self-defense." In contrast, the Europeans were imperialists,
and Chiang blamed imperialism as the cause of war in general. "There-
fore, I believe that the end of the Second World War must also mark the
end of imperialism. Only then can the permanent peace of the world be
firmly assured. . . . If China cannot be free and independent, the other
nations of Asia will each fall under the iron heel of the enemy, and world
peace cannot have a solid foundation."4
Besides making China a leader of Asia, Chiang intended to use the
alliance to eliminate his communist foes. Chiang believed that China
had already paid its dues after several years of war with Japan while the
rest of the allies avoided conflict with Japan at almost any price. Unless
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provided massive amounts of aid or unless his interests were threatened,
Chiang remained content in pinning down Japanese forces on the Chi-
nese continent while the allies carried the burden of defeating Japan.
After Pearl Harbor, Chiang never launched a major offensive against the
Japanese. Chiang placed his best troops opposite those of the commu-
nist forces, and in 1942 he launched offensive operations against them
while maintaining a defensive posture vis-a-vis Japan.5
Chiang was able to attack his old foe without fear of retribution
from the Soviet Union because no aid flowed from Moscow to Chongqing.
Nazi forces were still deep in Soviet territory, and Stalin remained com-
mitted to his Neutrality Pact with Japan to avoid giving Japan an excuse
to attack his rear flank. Chiang pushed for Soviet entry into the war pos-
sibly because he hoped to see the Soviet Union weakened, thus permit-
ting Chinese expansion, and probably because he wanted the Soviets to
carry the burden of fighting Japan.6 But since Chiang could not count
on the Soviet Union for any form of assistance, this meant that the Brit-
ish and Americans were crucial in keeping his regime alive.
Nevertheless, relations between Chiang Kai-shek and his demo-
cratic allies were tense. One issue that placed the two countries at odds
was war strategy. In the days after Pearl Harbor, Chiang called on Britain
and the U.S. to join China in developing a strategy for defeating Japan,
with China's wartime capital of Chongqing as the center for coordinat-
ing Pacific operations. Chiang envisioned Chinese ground troops work-
ing with British and American naval and air units. His assumption was
that Japan would be defeated first and Germany later. By making the
Pacific theater more important than that of Europe, he could end the
war quickly; reduce the number of Chinese casualties, since they would
be backed by massive firepower; and acquire more war material and more
of a political voice needed to shape postwar Asia. To Chiang's chagrin,
the British and American position was that a "Germany first" strategy
was preferable.7 Roosevelt and others in Washington deemed Britain's
survival far more crucial to U.S. security than was the survival of China.
At the same time, the Americans did not want to see China knocked out
of the war, thus freeing tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers to go to
other areas of the Pacific. To assuage Chiang's pride, the allies made him
Supreme Commander of the China Theater, which included responsi-
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bility for Thailand and Indochina. By the end of 1942, Roosevelt told
Chiang Kai-shek that China would be one of the Four Policemen after
Japan was defeated. Together, the two countries would maintain law
and order in Asia.
The British viewed China in different terms. Churchill went along
with Roosevelt's fiction that China was a great power, but the British
prime minister feared that Chiang, who was described as a fascist dicta-
tor, would become Franklin Roosevelt's partner in liquidating Britain's
Empire. And despite Western press reports of China's victories, the Brit-
ish saw that all was quiet on the front between Japanese and Chinese
forces flying the GMD flag. The British did not trust the Chinese, believ-
ing that their codes were compromised or that information was being
leaked across enemy lines to the Japanese.8
As a result of such attitudes, the British managed to reopen some
old Chinese sores. Although Chiang Kai-shek was in theory the com-
mander in chief of the China-Burma-India Theater, Britain struck Koo
as feeling that it was "primarily up to her, rather than China, to hold the
line against Japan in this part of the world." China was not high on any
list of priorities. Chiang wanted more troops, supplies, and money. The
Chinese felt snubbed by London's refusal to provide any kind of military
assistance even though the British were barely able to supply their own
forces, much less try to aid both the Soviet Union and China. The Chi-
nese press in Chongqing railed against the "Germany first" strategy, but
Koo found that most people in British society supported their
government's policy. Chiang Kai-shek thought his Anglo-American al-
lies' war strategy wrongheaded. He wanted to end the war with Japan as
quickly as possible so that he could go about the work of reconstruction
and eliminate his domestic enemies. A prolonged war was not to Chiang's
advantage, especially since China had already been at war since 1937.
Chiang failed to appreciate that Germany would launch another offen-
sive against the Soviet Union within a few months.9 A Soviet defeat would
potentially lead to the collapse of the British and possibly to a Japanese
push for India.
In addition to differences over strategy, many Chinese were furi-
ous with the British over the loss of Hong Kong to Japanese forces in
December. The Chinese offered to help defend Hong Kong and Burma
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in the summer of 1941, but the British turned down the offer, believing
it provocative of Japan. Also, Britain could not fulfill Chiang's request to
equip 100,000 Chinese soldiers. The Chinese believed that the British
underestimated the Japanese and failed to take the losses of territory
seriously, whereas "to China they were vital." When Japanese forces in-
vaded Burma, Chiang offered two armies. The British again said no,
preferring to fight the Japanese with only British troops out of fear of
Chinese territorial ambitions. For Chiang, the security of Burma was
necessary since the Burma Road remained one of his lifelines. The Brit-
ish, however, believed Japan unable to launch an attack. But on January
20, 1942, two Japanese divisions pushed into Burma, and Japan took
Rangoon without a fight. The British handling of the Burma campaign
convinced Chiang that the British wanted to weaken China while pro-
tecting their own interests.10
British defeats in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Burma impacted the
Chinese in two respects early in 1942. On the one hand, the Chinese
were depressed by Japan's sweeping victories in Southeast Asia, the "Ger-
many first" strategy, British refusal to treat China as an equal, and British
unwillingness to give India independence. "Chinese are down in the
dumps. More so indeed than I have even known them," noted Sir A.
Clark Kerr, British ambassador to Chongqing. "Our stock is low and is in
danger of falling still lower." On the other hand, the Chinese now viewed
themselves as superior and the British as inferior. The Chinese, accord-
ing to Sir H. Seymour who replaced Kerr, now believed that the war
brought about the "disappearance ... of European and American domi-
nation in Far Eastern affairs and that the new China may hope to take
her place as leader of Asia." Chinese victories over the Japanese in 1938
and 1939 and British defeats in 1941 and 1942 gave the Chinese a "feel-
ing of superiority ... making the Chinese intolerant of foreign and par-
ticularly British advice." Worse, Chiang's armies did no fighting anywhere
with the Japanese despite promises from Chiang that he would attack on
all fronts against Japan if Britain and the United States came into the
war. The British press repeated Chinese propaganda that spoke of GMD
victories even though they were not fighting. The result was what Brenan
of the foreign office described as the "building up [of] a picture of Chi-
nese vigour and efficiency compared with British defeats and incompe-
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tence which is going to make it difficult for us to take a different line later
if it should become necessary to do so."11
The British Foreign Office felt compelled to bring the critical press
reports emanating from Chongqing to Koo's attention. Koo acknowl-
edged that he knew of such reports and "frankly admitted that they wor-
ried him." However, Koo claimed that "a series of events had helped to
create the present by no means happy situation" in Sino-British rela-
tions. In particular, Koo pointed to Britain's initial refusal to grant Chiang's
government another loan. The previous January, Chiang asked for a
£100 million loan from Britain, an amount that Anthony Eden consid-
ered rather extravagant. The British offered £50 million, but Koo in-
formed Eden of Chongqing's unhappiness with the conditions attached
to the money, particularly since the United States did not attach any to
its own loan. Chiang instructed Koo to convey to London that since the
loan was a "symbol of economic collaboration between democrat[ic]
countries there should be no conditions what [so] ever nor security nor
stipulation as to allocation of proceeds."12 Koo asked for a revision of
the loan's terms that would permit China to use the money after the war,
but the British refused, insisting that the money was only for wartime
use and not postwar reconstruction aid. The foreign office believed that
Koo was acting on his own initiative in pressing for a revision of the
loan's conditions, because he would soon be traveling to Chongqing and
wanted to point to his success in revising the agreement. Eden argued
that Chiang did not care about the conditions of the loan, because he
only wanted it to be "a picture on the wall which he could display to his
people and did not care much whether he could use it or not."13 Never-
theless, the Chinese refused to borrow money on British terms. Chiang
Kai-shek told Koo that Britain's terms caused China to lose face, and
Koo was convinced that the breakdown in negotiations would have an
adverse effect on Sino-British relations.14
The breakdown in loan negotiations did strain relations, but not as
much as Chiang's attempt to be the leader of Asia. For sometime, the
GMD government espoused the notion of freeing India from British
colonialism for India's and Asia's sake. In August 1941, Chiang declared
that once China was free, he would immediately work for the indepen-
dence of India and Korea. In February 1942, Chiang and his wife paid a
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visit to India. Initially, London looked favorably on the visit in order to
better Sino-British relations.15 In no time, the British regretted the deci-
sion after Chiang Kai-shek evoked support for Indian independence and
sought to meet Mahatma Gandhi. Chiang told the Viceroy of India that
he did not want "to interfere in Britain's internal affairs," but that "China
still hopes ... to help India become free." In Chiang Kai-shek's mind, India
had to be "free now and independent after the war" if the allies were to
have India's support against Japan. The British, however, did not want
Chiang to meet Gandhi. "It would I am sure be a great mistake," wrote
Winston Churchill, "for him [Chiang] to travel many hundreds of miles
across India to parley with Gandhi about whether the British Empire in
India should come to an end or not."16 Chiang feared that the loss of India
to Japan would seal his fate since the allies supplied China through India.
He hoped that Gandhi would not look to Japan as a savior and called on
the Indian people to unite with China in resisting Japanese aggression.17
After his visit to India, Chiang wanted Koo to assess British public
opinion. And if Churchill raised the subject, he wanted Koo to point out
that if Britain voluntarily gave the Indian people political rights, India
would no longer look upon the empire with disgust.18
On the basis of newspaper editorials and comments made in Par-
liament, Koo reported that though some in Britain agreed that London
needed to reassess its policy toward India, there was opposition to per-
mitting the Indians a role in the war.19 The majority opinion in Parlia-
ment was that Britain lacked the military supplies needed to arm the
Indians and that only the British colonial army could defend India. Years
later, Koo remembered that British officials argued that if Britain with-
drew from India, there would be "twenty years of anarchy and disorder."
When Koo asked why India could not rule itself after two hundred years
of contact with the Occident, the reply was that "occidental influence
only penetrated the top strata of Indian society." Koo also found the Brit-
ish Foreign Office quite upset with Chiang Kai-shek over his statements
regarding Indian independence. They accused China of suffering from
"persecution" and an "inferiority complex." Koo met with Winston
Churchill and found him "a little peeved and sullen." Churchill blurted
out that "the British were not decadent or defeatist as was said of them
in" Chongqing and then returned to his normal, genial mood.20
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Pressure from Britain's allies, though, pushed London to send a
mission led by Sir Stafford Cripps to India in March 1942. Cripps did
not bring a promise of independence, but instead declared that India
would be granted Dominion status after the war. Gandhi rejected the
proposal not only because the British promise had to await the conclu-
sion of the war, but because he believed that such a plan would lead to
India's breakup, not unification. Gandhi launched his "Quit India" move-
ment as a way of forcing Britain out of India while telling followers to
put up peaceful resistance should the Japanese, in fact, begin to occupy
Indian territory. Churchill told Roosevelt that the Indian National Con-
gress could not speak for the Indian people. The top leaders including
Gandhi were arrested, sparking widespread demonstrations and riots
that led to many deaths and the arrests of thousands. Toward the end of
June, the British ambassador explained to Chiang that his country could
not permit the Indians independence now because Britain could not
fight Japan and maintain order in India at the same time. Chiang re-
torted that he was not interested in fomenting chaos in India but only
had the war effort in mind. Chiang explained to Koo that while he did
not want to harm Sino-British relations over a British domestic ques-
tion, he had to give his support to Indian independence given the history
of Western intrusion into his own country.21
Disappointed by his British ally, Chiang appealed to Roosevelt to
use his own influence to bring about Anglo-Indian cooperation and per-
suade the British to grant India independence now. Instead, Churchill
rejected Roosevelt's mediation of the Indian question, and British offi-
cials told Koo that China should not interfere in Great Britain's personal
affairs. When the Americans and British decided to grant India inde-
pendence after, not during, the war, Chiang told Koo that the decision
undermined the UN Alliance's underlying principles. In the future, the
allies "would have no credibility with the world." Naturally Koo sup-
ported his government's policy with regard to India given his own anti-
imperialism. He believed that the allies had to come up with a platform
that could challenge Japan's claim of seeking an "Asia for the Asiatics."
At the same time, he did not want his government to say things that
would damage Sino-British relations.22
Wanting to repair the damage to Sino-British relations and aware
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of how anxious the British government was that Koo return to China for
a visit to meet their own qualms about him, Koo returned to China in
1942. He even became a member of the GMD, possibly to assuage fears
abroad that he was not close enough to the generalissimo.23 In any case,
Koo voiced support for an American-British-Chinese alliance after the
war, because such an alliance would buy time for "world reconstruction"
as well as reconstruction in China. Otherwise, Britain might drift to-
ward Japan in the postwar period. T.V. Soong, the foreign minister,
frowned on the idea of an ABC alliance, arguing that it "would destroy
China's influence in Asia over the weak and small countries." Koo re-
minded Soong that Britain would still be a major political and military
power after the war, and that it was "wise to keep her from flirting" with
Japan. Japan might even join the Soviet Union against the Anglo-Ameri-
can group. If China only cooperated with the United States, holding
aloof from Britain could be reason enough for the latter to cooperate
with Japan. In other words, Koo still feared a new version of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance. Friction between Britain and China would defeat the
purpose of an anti-Japan alliance, and if "forced to choose between the
two," the United States "would certainly choose" Britain. Finally, an ABC
alliance would "confirm China's position as a major power in the world."
He made essentially the same argument to Chiang Kai-shek, saying that
such an alliance would give China a ten to fifteen year reprieve to "build
up our strength—stronger in fact means more weight to our voice." Koo
shared his ideas with many GMD leaders, but came to the conclusion
that opinion was "so divided it was too early to push the idea of a Sino-
British alliance, especially as feeling amongst the leaders was very strong
and misunderstandings ran deep."24
Koo, as is typical with most diplomats, was simply the man caught
in the middle trying to placate both sides in order to reduce tensions.
Chiang Kai-shek, who felt very bitter about the British, was a difficult
man to mollify. One of Chiang Kai-shek's nationalistic objectives was to
eliminate extraterritoriality, one of the primary goals of the GMD's revo-
lutionary diplomacy. Chiang demanded that his Anglo-American allies
renounce extraterritoriality, moving China one step closer toward grant-
ing China equality in international affairs. In a conference held at Chiang's
residence, Koo could not but notice the "general tendency to discrimi-
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nate against Great Britain." Such sentiment placed Koo in a difficult
position, because the British Foreign Office warned him that it wanted
negotiations to be carried out on a basis of equality and sought more
recognition of the important role Britain played in the Pacific War, as
well as economic concessions. The British noted that the Chinese were
more arrogant in their attitude toward Britain because of the latter's
military defeats, and there was a desire to "abandon extraterritoriality
with as good as grace as possible."25
While Koo remained in China, Chiang's government sat down with
representatives from the United States and Great Britain to negotiate
new bilateral treaties. Sino-American negotiations went fairly well. In
October 1942, the United States agreed to abrogate its extraterritorial
rights, and on January 10,1943, the new treaty was signed. Sino-British
negotiations did not go so smoothly. First, there was the problem of
Tibet, which remained independent and possessed ties with Great Brit-
ain. Koo thought it "impolitic" to raise Tibet in connection with the
present treaty; it was a question that could wait. Many in the British
government suspected that Chiang would engage in Chinese imperial-
ism by asserting control over Tibet. Press statements by Chiang and TV.
Soong suggested to the British "that the more chauvinist elements in the
[GMD] are making their voice increasingly heard and their ambitions
are certainly directed towards extending Chinese influence among the
countries adjacent to China." There was also evidence that Chiang was
trying to build supply routes through Tibet for the purpose of conquer-
ing it. The generalissimo, however, told Koo that Britain "must stop [its]
intrigues [in Tibet] to stir up ill feeling against China: otherwise [there
would be] no improvement in relations." Chiang claimed that the Brit-
ish were preventing China from extending its influence into Tibet, but
he concurred with Koo's view and felt that not raising Tibet was a way of
showing Chinese magnanimity toward Britain.26
Another issue affecting the treaty negotiations was India. Koo
sought a formula that "would satisfy the . . . Asiatic people and yet meet
the needs and views of the British and other colonial empires in Asia."
On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek still pursued his policy of leading
Asian nations to freedom. Chiang thought Britain's policy toward India
to be "unwise but understandable." However, if Gandhi died in prison,
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he would become a martyr and Great Britain would be all the more hated
and despised. Having said that, Chiang ignored India as both sides nego-
tiated.27
On the issue of Kowloon, the mainland territory facing Hong Kong
Island, Chiang was not so magnanimous. Every Chinese patriot wanted
to recover territory and sovereignty lost to the powers in the nineteenth
century. Koo assured Britons that China had no territorial ambitions
with regard to Hong Kong. Koo claimed later that Britons from all walks
of life were interested in returning Hong Kong after the war was won. In
reality, the British Foreign Office believed that the Chinese people ex-
pected Hong Kong to revert to China after the war. One official admit-
ted that a united and strong postwar China made the British recovery of
Hong Kong impossible.28
During talks, Chiang threatened to forego the whole Sino-British
treaty unless Britain agreed to hand Kowloon back. The Americans also
pressed the British to tie Kowloon with the treaty. Britain decided to dig
in its heels and not relent on Kowloon. At a minimum, Koo believed
that Britain should declare its intention to return Kowloon but took the
position that it was a territorial question to be postponed till after the
war. Raising such questions now only created dissension in the alliance,
and China needed Britain when dealing with Soviet Russia in the post-
war years. Chiang approved Koo's formula only to have the British ne-
gotiators turn it down. Koo feared a breakdown in negotiations and
ultimately a breakdown in the United Nations' front, but Chiang Kai-
shek softened his position, saying that the treaty benefited China. How-
ever, when the British brought their proposed text regarding Kowloon
back to the table, it was worse than the first formula. Chiang concluded
there were only two options: "refuse to sign" or say nothing about
Kowloon and take it by force after the war.
Koo, who feared not signing would show a serious rift in the UN
Alliance, suggested signing but with a reservation on Kowloon.29 De-
spite his misgivings, Chiang, persuaded by Koo, eventually gave in and
the treaty was signed and China reserved the right to raise the Kowloon
question at a later date. However, Chiang made it clear to the British
that China was signing "in consideration of the solidarity of the United
Nations," and "that the people were naturally dissatisfied with the Br [itish]
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refusal to discuss the Kfowloon] question." On January 11,1943, Britain
signed the new treaty, giving up its extraterritorial rights, but the British
attitude toward Kowloon hardened and proved more resistant to
Roosevelt's suggestion that Britain surrender the territory as a gesture of
goodwill. Publicly, Chiang declared that the new treaty put China "on
an equal footing with Great Britain and the United States."30 Privately,
he initially thought the treaty "was a defeat." Koo never had any doubts
about the treaty's significance. He thought the treaty "was really an epoch-
making event—the biggest treaty in a century." He later argued that
trade with Britain would increase after the war just as trade with Ger-
many increased after World War I once the new Sino-German Treaty
had abolished extraterritoriality.31
Some scholars have argued that China was no longer treated as a
second-class power after the Sino-British Treaty became official, but that
view is clearly mistaken. Though tensions over Hong Kong were re-
duced, relations with Britain in general did not improve with the signing
of the treaty. Chiang wrote later in the year that Britain's refusal to give
up Hong Kong was a "stain on cordial relations between China and En-
gland." Nor was the foreign office amused when Chiang heaped praise
on Roosevelt and the United States for signing the new treaty while only
giving Britain a brief note of appreciation. The difference in tone be-
tween the two announcements left some with the "impression that the
Chinese feel gratitude to the Americans for a favour conferred but only a
sense of justice in our case."32
In the remaining weeks that Koo resided in China, he could see the
great impasse that existed in Sino-British relations from the Chinese point
of view. Although there were government officials who agreed with Koo's
idea of pursuing an ABC alliance and working for better relations, there
were many who were quite embittered. And although people like Presi-
dent Lin Sen remarked to Koo that the "Chinese people never cherished
any ambition for aggression against other countries," many in the gov-
ernment wanted to extend China's influence beyond its borders, sug-
gesting a desire to break up the British and French colonies in Southeast
and South Asia. There was a belief that China should not only recover
Hong Kong and Kowloon after the war but should participate in any
postwar discussions over Burma and Malaya. Some even reminiscenced
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of days past when northern Vietnam was a province of China, assuming
that China would control north Vietnam.33
Naturally, such thinking instilled a fear that China would be
irredentist in the postwar period. Many Britons believed that after the
war, China would occupy all of Britain's concessions in China as well as
Burma and Malaya, where there were large Chinese populations. Koo
learned from a high-level U.S. government official that Britain pressed
the United States to concentrate on Europe, in part because "China after
victory would become imperialistic and be unmanageable." Indeed, some
in the British Foreign Office were convinced that China would prove
more dangerous than Japan after World War II. Koo thought this was
typical British propaganda, but he recognized that his own people were
partially to blame. In 1942, Lauchlin Currie, FDR's representative, in-
formed Chiang that the American people were troubled by Chiang's Pan-
Asianist speeches and questioned whether China in the postwar period
would develop into a militaristic or imperialistic nation. China now
spoke in a "high tone" to both Washington and London "and the people
have been unwisely arrogant." Koo believed that the downside to all the
positive press that China received in the late 1930s and early 1940s led
Chinese government leaders "to think they were real heroes" and to be-
come overconfident "in estimating their position of influence in inter-
national politics," laying the seeds of "so many misunderstandings and
so many causes of friction."34
Koo agreed with his friends that Chiang Kai-shek's claim that China
would take no action "but only assumes more responsibility in Asia is
unwise because it carries an implied desire to be the leader of Asia."35
Koo sympathized with the "Asiatic colonial people," but believed that
"by emphasizing the need of equality in treating the people of Asia re-
gardless of colour, China appeared to have an inferiority complex as if
she was asking for recognition of her own status by the other United
Nations." He preferred a formula based on the Atlantic Charter to meet
the needs of both Asians and the colonial empires.36
Before leaving China, Koo sat down with Chiang Kai-shek to dis-
cuss Sino-British relations. Koo argued that Britain would seek closer
cooperation with China in the postwar period because of its fear of the
Soviet Union and would probably form an anticommunist alliance with
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the United States. He expected Britain to cooperate with China just as
Britain cooperated with Japan against Russia in the post-1895 period.
Chiang's decidedly anticommunist government could be counted on to
join Britain in facing up to the Soviet Union. Moreover, since China
possessed a large population, Britain would not want to see the China
market monopolized by the United States, especially when China would
remain one of, if not the largest, market for British goods. Koo expressed
hope that his government would be prepared to deal with the questions
of Hong Kong, Burma, Singapore, Malaya, Thailand, and North Viet-
nam in the postwar period. Koo expected no further colonial expansion
from Britain in order to maintain what empire it had left. He wanted to
settle the outstanding problems between China and Britain so both could
work with the United States in establishing an ABC alliance that would
place China on equal footing with the powers.
After listening to Koo's argument, Chiang expressed views that were
negative. Chiang felt that a Sino-British alliance would make the Soviet
Union suspicious and would tie China's hands in dealing not only with
Moscow but Tokyo. If Britain proposed an alliance, Chiang preferred
the ABC alliance, but if the United States refused then Chiang would
consider making a pact with the British. Chiang was skeptical, how-
ever, that the United States would form an alliance, given America's
tradition of avoiding such agreements in peacetime. Chiang described
"English diplomacy" as "shrewd and cunning," and could make a good
presentation when discussing forming alliances, but he felt that the
British would "adhere stubbornly to their traditional policies." Chiang
had not forgiven Churchill for commenting that China's communist prob-
lem was "similar to Britain's Indian problem." Chiang remarked that
this was "intolerable and a gross discourtesy" given that the communist
problem was an internal Chinese concern and not the same as "the prob-
lem of the liberation and independence of India." If Britain stopped
interfering in Tibet, then China would be quiet about India. As for Hong
Kong and Taiwan, FDR assured Chiang that those territories would re-
vert back to China with the former becoming a free port. As for Singapore,
Burma, and Malaya, Chiang claimed his policy was simply to insure
that the Chinese people there received treatment equal with British
nationals. FDR also informed Chiang that the British were adamantly
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opposed to other countries advising Britain on what to do with its pos-
sessions.37
In March 1943, Koo traveled to the United States to meet with
Madame Chiang, who had already been there for some time. In an effort
to improve Sino-British relations, Koo pressed the Madame to visit Great
Britain. Koo feared that if she did not go to Britain after visiting Wash-
ington, this would lead to "much speculation and misunderstanding in
Great Britain" and permit China's "enemies to sow the seeds of discord
among the allies." Not helping Koo's efforts was Winston Churchill who
publicly described Britain's postwar responsibilities and referred to the
future peace organization that would be represented by Britain, the United
States, and Soviet Russia. To the displeasure of the Chinese, they were
left out. His statement that Britain would have to "rescue" China in-
censed them even more. Koo thought these statements "distasteful and
slighting" and "typical of Churchill the imperialist and the realist." When
Koo tried to convince T.V. Soong of the need for his sister to visit Great
Britain, Soong remarked that Churchill's speech "made it all the more
inadvisable. Too much like condescension in the face of a slap at China."
Koo disagreed, saying that to reject an invitation would have "deplor-
able" consequences for Sino-British relations.38
In vain, Koo employed the same arguments that he made in China
to convince Madame Chiang to visit Great Britain. Koo returned to his
concern, shared by many in the Chongqing government, about having "a
victorious Russia . . . north of China, free from worries from Germany
and Japan, a big compact mass of power and strength, and with a venge-
ful Japan eager to alienate China from her friends, our postwar position
in the world would not be too happy and even dangerous if we could not
keep [Britain's] goodwill and friendship." He further argued that China
needed the help of the U.S. and Britain in stabilizing China's "interna-
tional position as one of the great powers" and to buy time to carry out
reconstruction. Koo's argument was a reiteration of the ABC alliance if
Russia refused to join, an alliance that would give China time to rebuild
itself.39
Koo never succeeded in persuading Madame Chiang to travel to
Britain. The tour of America took a toll physically and emotionally, and
Chiang Kai-shek and Roosevelt both believed that she should return to
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China. Yet the Madame could not forgive the British for past discrimi-
nation. And Koo, to a certain extent, could understand the Madame's
attitude toward the British. Britain made few friends in China by being
one of the imperialist powers, and many Chinese believed that their
country's troubles all led back to the "colonialism and political domina-
tion" by powers like Britain. "As a Chinese," Koo commented later, "I
could understand the reaction of my countrymen both in government
and in public circles."40
Koo was obviously willing to moderate his antipathy for other pow-
ers in the interest of the UN alliance, which served as a tool to facilitate
patriotic aspirations. As a result of the alliance, the powers finally treated
China, at least theoretically, as an equal. Extraterritoriality, one of the
last vestiges of the unequal treaties, was eliminated. Furthermore, the
alliance ensured the return of Chinese territory lost to Japanese imperi-
alism. Before leaving the United States, Koo met with Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who promised that not only would Japan be disarmed but
Okinawa and Taiwan would be returned to China. FDR even declared
that the Caroline and the Marshall Islands would be held by the United
States until China developed a navy, at which time China could take pos-
session. And China and the U.S. would administer Indochina, pending
complete independence, since "the native people there after a century of
French administration are (worse) no better off today than they were
then."41 Naturally, China would acquire Manchuria, and the former for-
eign concessions in places like Shanghai and Tianjin would come under
full Chinese control.
Despite his dislike of British policies, Koo tried to be more of a
statesmen and less of an anti-imperialist in order to reduce tensions in
Sino-British, and ultimately Sino-Western, relations. He took a farsighted
view in that he looked to the postwar years when China needed the help
of other powers in rebuilding and protecting China. And yet there was
no getting around the fact that relations between China and its allies,
particularly Britain, fell to a great low by the time Koo returned to Lon-
don. The "growing gulf in the feelings and relations" between both sides
absorbed all of Koo's thoughts, and he felt disappointed that he had
worked to no avail to improve them despite the slight improvement that
was taking place when he left Chongqing. "I am the more disappointed,"
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Koo wrote in his diary, "that so many incidents should have arisen in the
past two months to darken them again. The more deplorable because
they were all incidents which a little common sense or tolerance would
have been able to avoid. They were so unnecessary."42 Over the next few
months, though, Koo saw an improvement in British attitude as he ob-
served many expressions of British goodwill toward China in which he
was invited to present many speeches and had the opportunity to meet
with many government leaders.
While Koo set out to do the necessary publicity work to improve
relations, a surprising event occurred that seemed to repair some of the
damage. In December 1943, Koo learned that Chiang Kai-shek and the
Madame had traveled to Cairo to meet Churchill and Roosevelt. FDR
initially envisioned a four-power conference, but Stalin refused to leave
the Soviet Union, ostensibly because of the war effort. Chiang went to
Cairo prepared to discuss a number of issues including the future inter-
national political organization or United Nations, the independence of
Korea, and the recovery of Taiwan and Manchuria. He tactfully refused
to raise Hong Kong and Tibet directly with Churchill and avoided dis-
cussion of India. The Cairo Declaration did declare that Manchuria,
Taiwan, and the Pescadores would be restored to the ROC. The powers
also agreed that "Korea shall become free and independent." Hence,
Chiang secured commitments to support the most important aspects of
his agenda. Roosevelt also explained to Chiang that since the Soviet Union
would eventually intervene against lapan, taking Soviet forces into Man-
churia, that Chiang should permit the Soviet Union access to a warm-
water port in Manchuria and use of the railways there that connected
with the ports. Chiang agreed to consider Roosevelt's proposal if the
arrangements did not infringe on Chinese sovereignty. Roosevelt and
Churchill also agreed to commit their forces to a landing in southern
Burma. Koo heard that Chiang and Churchill did not hit it off at first
but that the atmosphere slowly improved. The downside to the Cairo
Conference, however, was that it justified British claims that China could
not play the role of a great power.43
In the days after the conference, a torrent of criticism appeared in
both the British and American presses. In March 1944, Britain's Econo-
mist ran an article that defined a great power as "a country capable of
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waging active and autonomous war against another great power." Using
that definition, the article asserted that China's inclusion as a great power
was "based on considerations other than Great Power status." "China is
not a Great Power, and will not be a Great Power for many decades to
come, even if the internal coherence and the economic development of
the country, in the post-liberation years, are all that is now hoped." The
article went on, "There would be dangers if the present inclusion of China
in the Big Four were to lead to China being classified as a Great Power
and reliance being placed on a strength that does not exist." No wonder
that the article struck Koo and his compatriots as being "especially unfa-
vorable to China."44
What disturbed Koo most was that at a time when the Chinese
press had greatly toned down its criticism of Britain, the press in America
and in Britain and its dominions increasingly attacked China for its to-
talitarianism, corruption, and fascism. Up until this point, images of
China during the war years were generally favorable, but now, gradually,
Americans learned the truth about the conditions in GMD-China and
Chiang's willingness to fight the communists more than the Japanese.45
Meanwhile, people in the British Foreign Office and the Ministry of In-
formation called the Chinese "arrogant" so-and-sos who had "not been
doing much fighting and could not do much." The general feeling, as
explained to Koo, was that China would either break up after the war,
and/or become extremely nationalistic or imperialistic. Koo blamed the
communists and Whitehall for the propaganda and believed that focus-
ing on China's shortcomings without taking into consideration its hard-
ships was unjustified especially since it was an ally. He faulted the allies
for not accepting China as the fourth great power.46
The powers now demanded that Chiang's government become more
democratic. Although he assured Britons that China would become a
democracy, Koo recognized that China was not yet prepared for such a
development. One day while taking a walk, "the thought came to mind
that the idea of democracy based upon the theory 'All men are born
equal' is open to question. Human beings are no more equal to one
another than animals." Koo saw a difference between, say, "a pure breed
dog and a mongrel." "It seems law and order are designed by superior
and wise men to protect not only people in general but primarily them-
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selves first because in trials of physical strength or brute force, the least
orderly or most violent would always have the advantage over the re-
fined, cultured people." Koo was an elitist, though he did believe that
"equality of opportunity should be guaranteed to all in a true democ-
racy." He did not say how the government would fulfill the latter, but he
showed signs as well that he rejected America as a model for Chinese
political development. Instead, he concluded that Britain's "way of life
was more suitable to China than the American way."47
In comparing Great Britain, the United States, and China, Koo no-
ticed that there were great social differences that contributed to the rise
of democracy in the first two. "Thinking over the highly developed po-
litical and social systems in G.B. and U.S.A.," Koo wrote in his diary,
"it occurs to me that democracy is certainly the highest form of govern-
ment but it is the most difficult, requiring a high average level of public
and individual intelligence and morality to make it succeed. It primarily
depends upon the development of a patriotic spirit." China went un-
mentioned in this analysis, but presumably his country did not have what
it took to be the democracy that its Anglo-Saxon allies expected it to be.
Indeed, before the war ended, Koo commented that China's new laws
"were too advanced for the Ch [inese] people" and instead of being "based
upon the experiences and models of the Occident where the average man's
intelligence is very high" they should be made "in accordance with
Ch [inese] established customs and practices." And he believed that one
reason for the bad press was that Americans traveled to China which
struck them as "behind the Western nations especially U.S.A." and that
there was "so little progress in China after [ward that] for years they had
heard glowing reports" about the idealistic, hard working and fighting
Chinese.48
Koo conceded that "In a democracy, leaders came forth more easily
in a time of crisis as well as in times of peace. The Government's task is
thus made easier, unlike in a country of totalitarian and authoritarian or
personal government where the leader shoulders the most and worries
the most and still achieves less than in a democratic country."49 On the
other hand, democracies could be badly run, as he thought France had
been in 1940. After Pearl Harbor, he believed "the democracies were
poor nations to make war, always getting caught because of slowness in
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preparing and of want of vigilance." Flaws aside, the "respect for law in
the Anglo-Saxon countries" impressed Koo deeply, and he admired this
aspect of democratic government.50 And he believed that where a Par-
liament or Congress checked governmental power, one found less cor-
ruption or unpopular policies.
Despite the admiration, he remained convinced that China was not
a democratic nation because it lacked the social basis common to the
Western democracies. China could have developed into a democracy
earlier if Great Britain had not nipped such a movement in the bud. In
1945, Koo participated in the jubilee anniversary of the death of General
Charles Gordon. A British official asked Koo to attend since the dead
soldier was also known as Chinese Gordon, a name he received after
supposedly putting down the nineteenth century Taiping Rebellion. For
that reason, Koo almost refused to go because he believed Gordon had,
in fact, quelled a "democratic and revolutionary movement for the free-
dom of the Chinese people, at least at its beginning."51
China at the moment could not become a democracy, but after the
war ended, Koo felt that China could move in that direction. China was
not a great power much less a democracy, though he did not acknowl-
edge this fact in public. However, when Churchill once again spoke of
the three great powers, not four, Koo admitted that "China is of course
backward in many respects. The most acute of them is the shortage of
trained and experienced men, with the consequence that she has to draft
half-baked, inexperienced men into the service for important responsi-
bilities. . . . It is at once ineffective and wasteful, yet probably the com-
mon experience of nations trying to catch up with others."52 China needed
peace to catch up. For example, if China was to be a competitor in the
world market, the Chinese people needed "more goods and capital and
skills . . . and know [that in order for] trade to grow and develop, [the
market] must be made lucrative," and there would be no "cooperation
from abroad unless it is profitable to those giving it." He assured British
industrialists, though, that in the postwar period, his government would
unify the country and pursue liberal trade policies."
Koo's first years as China's ambassador to London were truly diffi-
cult ones. Koo looked to the postwar years when China needed not only
peace to reconstruct itself after years of war. To ensure national security
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and maintain China's place as one of the Four Policemen, his govern-
ment also needed to keep Britain and the United States as allies. The
petty arguments and jealousies did not endear Britain to China and vice-
versa. If his government lost Britain as an ally after the war, there was
still the United States, but events of 1944 and 1945 would undermine
American images of China and Koo's vision of postwar cooperation.
Chapter 7
SINO-AMERICAN TENSIONS,
1944-1945
WHILE KOO SAT IN LONDON fretting over the state of British-Chi-
nese relations, Sino-American relations experienced their own tensions.
By the end of 1943, government officials in Washington realized that
Chiang Kai-shek's potential contribution to the war effort against Japan
was minimal. In February 1942, Gen. Joseph Stilwell arrived in China to
make the Chinese army more combat effective. Commander of all Ameri-
can forces in the China-Burma-India Theater, Stilwell controlled the
Lend-Lease supplies going to China and was FDR's military represen-
tative to the generalissimo. Almost immediately, Stilwell and Chiang
were at odds over strategy: Stilwell wanted to retake Burma while Chiang
did not. Chiang feared that another Chinese defeat in Burma would
lead Japan to take out bases in Kunming that were vital for the Hump
supply route over the Himalayas. Chiang preferred to remain on the
defensive. Stilwell and other Americans grew impatient with Chiang's
dallying, and press reports of Chiang's dictatorship gradually captured
the attention of Washington. By the time of the Cairo Conference,
Roosevelt wanted to find a new leader in China should Chiang's govern-
ment collapse.1
At the end of 1943, decisions made by three of the UN allies did
not bode well for Chiang Kai-shek. In November 1943, after the Cairo
Conference, Roosevelt met with Churchill and Stalin in Teheran and
raised the issue of the Soviet Union and the Far East. Stalin declared that
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Gromyko, and V.K. Wellington Koo. Photo courtesy Library of Congress.
the Soviet Union would come into the war against Japan three months
after the defeat of Nazi Germany, but Stalin wanted a warm-water port
somewhere in the Pacific. FDR offered, and Stalin accepted, the Port of
Dalian in Manchuria. And with the potential Soviet entry into the war,
the operation to land Anglo-American forces into southern Burma was
cancelled now that China was not needed to defeat Japan. In January,
FDR rejected Chiang's request for a $1 billion loan. At Cairo, FDR ad-
vised Chiang to implement some of Stilwell's suggested reforms includ-
ing combining Chiang's army units with that of communist ones and
even forming a GMD-CCP coalition government. Chiang agreed to do
so if he had assurances from the Soviet Union to not lay its hands on
Manchuria. After Cairo, Chiang was quite disappointed, particularly as
the Americans showed increasing interest in his enemies, the CCP. Chiang
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blamed the change in American opinion and accusations that he was not
taking the war to Japan on communist propaganda.2
In the spring of 1944, Sino-American relations hit an all-time low.
In April, Japan launched the "Ichigo Offensive." Thirty-four Chinese di-
visions disappeared under the weight of the Japanese assault. In May
and June, the Japanese advanced farther, easily capturing cities as Chi-
nese forces withdrew without firing a shot. By August 8, Japanese forces
were in a position to overrun the Fourteenth Air Force's bases. The illu-
sions entertained about Chiang Kai-shek were now gone. The offensive
revealed the corruption, factionalism, and incompetence that lay behind
Chiang's government. It also showed Chiang's true colors as he refused
to use his best troops to support the provincial forces while hoarding
his American supplies. The Ichigo Offensive also undermined political
support for Chiang within China as liberals lost faith and as anti-Chiang
movements gained momentum in the provinces. The tremendous ca-
sualties suffered at the hands of the Japanese meant that Chiang's
powerbase had been dealt a mortal blow from which Chiang would not
recover.3
It was in this atmosphere of Japanese success on the ground that
the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was held to discuss the creation of a
United Nations. In August 1944, the Chinese Foreign Ministry ordered
Koo to Washington to attend the conference and assist the Chinese del-
egation with the construction of a new postwar organization for keep-
ing the peace.4 Koo's experiences with the league led him to pursue a
more improved method of collective security. Less than a month after
the creation of the UN Alliance, he wrote "While international law by its
nature is apt to remain static until modified, the needs of the interna-
tional community are bound to be dynamic." He called for radical mea-
sures, such as "an international police force to enforce peace and . . . an
equity court to adjudicate differences."5
Koo's thinking paralleled Roosevelt's Four Policemen approach in
that he supported the creation of regional organizations that would be
part of an international organization, making it a truly global one. Koo
argued that there had to be "a regional group of freedom-loving coun-
tries to co-operate in the safeguarding of peace and security . . . [that]
functions as a part, and within the framework, of a general international
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organization endowed with the necessary power of preventing war and
enforcing peace in the world and prescribing for observance everywhere
the uniform rule of law and the same standard of conduct."6 As the war
progressed, Koo received encouraging and discouraging signs of the pow-
ers' attitude toward the future international organization. On the one
hand, in 1943 FDR shared with Koo his desire to not have a European
council, but a world council in which "peace would be planned this time
on a world basis," giving Koo hope that a new world could be built. The
next year, however, in a meeting of the War Crimes Commission, repre-
sentatives for Britain, Australia, India, and Holland gave the impression
that they would establish a separate regional organization for maintain-
ing the peace in the Pacific without China.7
When he arrived in the United States, Koo found that he was head
of a delegation that really had no official plan for how this international
organization should be constructed. Five draft plans were drawn up in
China, but as was explained to Koo immediately after his arrival, a list of
"Essential Points" were drawn up to raise at the conference.8 Along with
the points was a list of attitudes approved by Chiang Kai-shek. In his
Chinas Destiny, Chiang laid out the argument that imperialism had to
be vanquished and that China needed to be rehabilitated and indepen-
dent in order to be the linchpin of peace and stability in Asia. For that to
be achieved, the future international organization had to embrace the
principles of self-determination and equality. Failure to abide by those
principles killed the League of Nations, and he opposed the appearance
of notions like World Powers and Spheres of Influence in the UN char-
ter.9 The delegation was told that the stronger and more powerful the
future security organization, the better. Chiang wanted his delegation
to enjoy a position at the conference equal to the other three powers,
but if they disagreed on any issues, the delegation was to pay close
attention to the American point of view. Failing that, the Chinese del-
egation was to decide whether there was an opportunity to put forth
its own principles. However, the delegation was to not take too strong
a stand, to try to get along with the Soviets, and to work to make the
conference a success.10
The Chinese delegates did not get a seat at the meetings held be-
tween the other three great powers because the Soviet Union refused to
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meet with the Chinese as they had when Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin
met at Teheran earlier in the year. Although Stalin preferred to maintain
Soviet neutrality in the Pacific War in order to avoid conflict with Japan
until the European war was over, he, like Churchill, scoffed at the idea of
China as a great power then or in the postwar world. Instead, the deci-
sion was made to break up the conference into two sessions with the
Chinese participating in the second one with the Americans and Brit-
ish.11 One reason why the Chinese hurriedly drew up their "Essential
Points" was so that the three powers would know China's views while
hammering out an agreement. Koo told the Americans that his gov-
ernment never intended for the conference to be divided, and there
were proposals made by both the Soviets and British that he found
troublesome and in need of discussion. In particular, the Soviets wanted
a member who was engaged in a conflict to still have the right to vote in
the Security Council.12
Although the delegates did not want to antagonize their allies, par-
ticularly the Americans, the Chinese felt angry over their treatment by
the other powers. Before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference commenced,
Churchill made another speech referring to only three great powers and
stressing the need to elevate France to major power status. After Koo
arrived in the U.S., the Chinese leaked details of the future world organi-
zation to James Reston of the New York Times, possibly to express dis-
pleasure over the Soviet refusal to include China in the talks. The leak of
China's "Essential Points" annoyed Koo because they "embodied some
radical proposals." He believed that China should do nothing to alienate
the United States and Britain during the conference, but instead work
with them to make the conference successful.13
Whatever notions Koo entertained about close relations with the
allies, the Chinese found themselves increasingly isolated. The Quebec
Conference of 1944 excluded China, even though one purpose of the
meeting was to discuss a strategy to defeat Japan. Another conference
was to be held with the Soviet Union at Yalta with a view to getting the
latter into the war against Japan, with China again having no say in the
discussions. Koo and his compatriots could see that Roosevelt and
Churchill wanted to end the war with Japan without spilling much Ameri-
can and British blood. "The Russian card appears to them much more
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valuable than the Ch[inese] ally who is now in such [an] unfavourable
plight," Koo noted in his diary. And the British could see that press re-
ports of corruption and Chiang's dictatorship took their toll on China's
image. The British Ambassador to Washington noted "Surprisingly little
mention, for instance, has been made of China in connexion with the
talks at Dumbarton Oaks. The slump in general Chinese stock is an ac-
complished fact and appears to be increasing."14
Worse, the CCP received good press coverage. From July through
October, while the Ichigo Offensive was still underway, American and
British journalists wrote glowing articles about Mao's government and
its mobilization of the peasants to fight guerilla warfare against the Japa-
nese. Displeased with the favorable press reports coming out of Yan'an,
Koo felt the real facts would show that such press reports were hollow,
but he opposed "washing dirty linen" in public, particularly since the
allies deemed victory over Japan as of secondary importance. He like-
wise opposed using Thomas Dewey, the Republican presidential candi-
date in 1944, to put pressure on the administration, calling such a move
"dangerous" and more likely to antagonize Roosevelt.15
The Chinese diplomat no longer hoped for a future four-power
alliance. Instead, he believed that the four could agree to "enforce peace
treaties with Japan and Germany," and in this way, Britain and the United
States could assist China "against [the] possible danger from [the]
U.S.S.R." Meanwhile, Koo avoided antagonizing the Soviets and refused
to state publicly that China was worried about its neighbor in the north.
Besides, Roosevelt warned the Chinese to get along with the Soviets be-
cause the United States could not be of much help at the moment should
conflict break out between the two sides.16
While waiting for the powers to complete their work, Koo spoke
with various Americans about the Chinese proposals. In his opinion,
they were not rigid, but Stanley Hornbeck, a longtime acquaintance of
Koo's who worked in the U.S. State Department, thought that of all the
plans, the Chinese proposals were the most elaborate. In his opinion,
they would be voted down because the Soviets wanted to build a simple
house devoted to the minimum requirements of security, whereas the
Chinese proposals "represented the ideal maximum." The Americans and
British stood somewhere between those extremes.17
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Along similar lines, James Reston warned Koo that it was "unwise
for China to insist on the point that we maintain each other's political
independence and territorial integrity." The U.S. delegation worried about
that point and the idea of an international police force, because there
was much American opposition to this principle and it might jeopardize
passage in the Senate. Reston added, "It is like the return of the ghosts of
1919." More disturbing was news from Reston that the Soviets insisted
on the unanimous vote among the permanent members, but there was
no mention of a provision should the permanent members disagree or
should one of them become a party to a dispute. The Chinese believed
that the permanent members could not vote should they be involved in
a dispute, and Koo told the British that the notion was a "generally ac-
cepted principle."18 Koo met with Franklin Roosevelt, who remarked that
the Soviets were saying "that in a case in which she was involved she
wanted to be both a defendant and a member of the jury." Koo told FDR
that "the question was of great importance because it touched the foun-
dation of the new organization." Stalin also wanted all of the Soviet Re-
publics admitted into this new international organization. Roosevelt
suggested to Koo that all of China's provinces be included. At first, Koo
thought the president was joking, but FDR went on to say that he wanted
to see China become a great power to keep the peace in Asia while
Roosevelt kept his eyes on Europe.19
On the eve of China's participation in the conference, the delega-
tion met to discuss strategy. Looking at the Chinese proposals, Koo must
have learned from his mistakes at the Paris and Washington Conferences.
He wanted to avoid creating a "dispute" with the delegates from the United
States and Britain, so he argued that the delegation needed "flexibility
and latitude" and that China should present "a more realistic and practi-
cal list of proposals." Koo knew that the "Essential Points" had been drawn
up with Chongqing's approval, but there were a number of issues he
preferred to avoid discussing. When Koo was in China, some Chinese
officials wanted to raise the idea of the principle of equality of the races.
Koo wanted to press for the same principle but not in a manner that
jeopardized "cordial relations with Americans." Now Koo advised against
raising the issue of racial equality entirely, recalling the experience of the
Japanese at the Paris Peace Conference. H.H. Kung, who headed up the
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delegation, admitted that raising the issue might be desirable, but there
was the fact that the United States "had its own negro problem." And
since China already had attained equality, to raise the issue suggested
that China had not. Koo agreed.
Koo observed as well that the British and Americans disagreed on
the "roles to be played by the Assembly and the Council." He preferred
the American Plan, which stressed "the importance of the Council." In
his opinion, the Security Council should be given a "more important
role in order to ensure executive efficiency." He added that "in matter of
form the small nations should be given an equal status in the World
Organisation, but in the interest of effective action, importance should
be attached to the Council." Koo supported the idea of an interna-
tional police force, but believed that "any hard and fast formula for a
strong armed force would meet with a great deal of opposition from
the British and Americans and would finally result in no force at all."
Hu Shi argued that great powers involved in a dispute "should not be
allowed to vote in the Council." Koo commented that the American
Plan was unclear on that point , and believed that the "World
Organisation should on the one hand aim at the preservation of peace
and on the other try not to lose the sympathy of the small nations."
Some members of the Chinese delegation favored the internationaliza-
tion of air forces, but Koo believed that the proposal would be turned
down by the other three powers. He himself opposed the idea because
China had little in the way of an air force and as a result would have little
voice as to its use. He also came out against the idea of enumerating acts
that constituted aggression.20
After weeks of waiting and receiving profuse apologies from the
Americans for the delay, the Chinese part in the conference began on
September 29. Edward R. Stettinius Jr., the head of the American delega-
tion, impressed upon Koo the need to wrap up the second session by
October 9 because the document had to be published before the Soviet
delegation left for home. Chinese amendments would not be included
in the conference document itself. Stettinius also wanted to hurry the
Chinese session along, because he felt the Chinese did not understand
how to make an effective international organization. The American del-
egates thought the Chinese placed too much faith in international law
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and emphasized social and economic concerns while placing far less
emphasis on security.21 Koo, who in August assured the Americans that
his delegation would be more accommodating than Chongqing, was left
with little choice but to go along with the Americans and accept the fact
that his delegation would play no meaningful role.
Meanwhile, the situation on the battlefield in China worsened. The
Japanese army threatened American airfields in Guangxi Province. Stilwell
informed Washington that unless given command immediately and un-
less some of Chiang's old political rivals were placed in high positions of
power, the United States might as well pull out of China. In July and
August, FDR implored Chiang to appoint Stilwell commander of all
Chinese armies including that of the CCP and that Stilwell should have
the final authority as to how Lend-Lease supplies were dispersed. For a
nationalistic soldier like Chiang Kai-shek, FDR's request was an ex-
treme humiliation. The generalissimo refused to allow his armies to be
combined with that of the CCP's, and played down the Japanese threat.22
Unfazed, Roosevelt begged Chiang to put Stilwell in command before
it was "too late to avert a military catastrophe tragic both to China and
to our allied plans for the early overthrow of Japan." FDR reminded
H.K. Kung that China was one of the four great powers because of the
United States. If there was civil war, Roosevelt predicted Britain and
the Soviet Union would "seize the opportunity" to take advantage of
China.23
Roosevelt then threatened to cut off aid to China if Stilwell was not
placed in command. Chiang agreed to FDR's demand but asserted that
the American commander had to be someone other than Stilwell. Pri-
vately, he believed that Roosevelt was treating China like a U.S. satellite.
Germany and the Soviet Union had never made such demands of him in
the past, and reorganizing Chinese armies in a manner that created
military efficiency undermined his powerbase. Of China's 300 divi-
sions, only thirty were loyal to Chiang; the rest were loyal to residual
warlord commanders who distrusted Chiang, especially when he with-
held Lend-Lease supplies from their units or kept his armies in reserve
while they had to fight off Japanese offensives. H.H. Kung wanted to
take a militant attitude by blaming Britain and the United States for
the losses in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, putting China in a tight
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spot in the first place. Naturally, Koo opposed such talk because a war of
words would prove more detrimental than beneficial for China, but Kung
refused to keep silent and believed that the American attitude was like
salt in a wound.24
This strain in allied relations occurred before the Chinese played
their part in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Koo deplored "the men-
ace of friction bet [ween] the leaders" of America and China. He agreed
with those who said that China's military leaders were "too ticklish about
sovereign rights in dealing with [the] U.S.A., which we regard as our best
friend and ally and which after all has no political or imperialistic ambi-
tions in China." Koo wanted Chiang "to take a far-sighted statesmanlike
view for China's sake, and, if necessary, accept the demands." Since the
U.S. was China's "best friend," and had "no ambition in China," the gen-
eralissimo needed America to win the war. China was a great power be-
cause of the United States, but China would lose its position should it
refuse to fight in the last months of the war. Britain's attitude toward the
United States was one of "deference and tolerance," and this likewise "was
the U.S. attitude toward the USSR in the interest of early victory." Koo's
remark was a reference to U.S. attempts to dismantle the British Empire
while averting its eyes from Soviet moves into Eastern Europe. Since it
was wartime, China needed to show the same toleration toward the al-
lies. Kung refused to send a cable to the generalissimo that took such a
position, saying that it would turn Chiang into a nominal head with
Stilwell exercising full power.25
So Koo sent a cable that laid out his thinking. He explained to
Chiang that the Americans simply wanted to win the war as quickly as
possible, and since that was China's primary goal, China needed Ameri-
can friendship now and after the war. Koo suggested patience and toler-
ance of the Americans in order to save the country.26 Others already made
similar statements to Chiang Kai-shek, and though he appeared "agree-
able," he remained concerned about his own prestige and the idea that
the CCP would be just as well-equipped as his own army. Chiang wanted
Roosevelt to guarantee that the CCP would not rebel and overthrow his
government, but FDR refused to give the generalissimo such an insur-
ance policy. Chiang told Roosevelt that the "Chinese people could stand
being treated as slaves for the duration in order to get aid," but Chiang
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himself "would not tolerate being treated as a thief," referring to Stilwell
taking control of Lend-Lease supplies. He declared that he would fight
"Allied imperialism." Chiang suspected that communists had infiltrated
FDR's government and that Roosevelt had made a deal with Stalin that
conceded north China as a sphere of Soviet influence.27 Chiang soon
sent a message to FDR demanding Stilwell's recall.
While FDR pondered his next move, the Chinese-American-Brit-
ish sessions began at Dumbarton Oaks. Koo had found the wait trying,
"but China's present position is such that we have to be patient." How-
ever, the Chinese delegation was embroiled in controversy. Although Koo
initially convinced the delegation to back away from what he deemed to
be the radical ideas contained in China's Essential Points, the delegates
grew uncomfortable with their standing at the conference and the future
UN. The delegation reached a consensus that the delegates have their
"say without insisting on it." H.H. Kung feared that without an interna-
tional air force, the UN "could not be relied on" because the "teeth were
not strong enough." Another third world war seemed inevitable. Koo
agreed with one his colleagues who expressed fear that China was in
"danger of getting a zero" out of the conference and that China needed
to insist on some of its points in order to make a contribution and not
disappoint the people back home. The problem for Koo was knowing
which points the delegation could "insist upon with a reasonable hope
of success."28
Just as the Chinese prepared to sit down with the Americans and
British, some delegates wanted justice and a definition of aggression in-
serted in the charter, or otherwise the UN would be of "no use to China
who is likely to be 'aggressed.'" Koo leaned toward those who said "peace
is the necessary condition for ministering justice." But when a confer-
ence of the technical delegates was called, it quickly became, in Koo's
words, "political." Some in the delegation, particularly those with a mili-
tary background, declared that if the principles of justice, a guarantee of
political independence and territorial integrity, a definition of aggres-
sion, and an international police force and air force were not included in
the UN charter, the UN "would be a useless organization." Other del-
egates came out in favor of the document that was drawn up by the
other three big powers, saying that the UN would be more effective in
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keeping the peace than the League of Nations. The other side, however,
suggested that if those principles could not be included, China might
withdraw from the conference. Kung disagreed, pointing to the tensions
in Sino-American relations because of the Stilwell affair, and noting that
it was better to not insist on anything. Koo argued that the whole pur-
pose of this meeting with the British and American delegations was not
to permit China an opportunity to suggest revisions to the UN charter,
but rather to maintain China's position as one of the four great pow-
ers. For that reason, China had to work to make the conference a suc-
cess.29
After the Chinese sat down with their American and British coun-
terparts, they went over the document from the first session. Koo and his
compatriots were troubled by the principle of unanimity in voting, that
is, the right of a permanent member and only the permanent members
to exercise a veto at any time. Moreover, the Soviets wanted a party to a
dispute to have the right to vote as well. Koo regarded "the question of
voting in the Council . . . to be the root of the whole question of an
organization."30 If the UN operated by that principle, the small powers
would have little voice, as Koo's counterparts acknowledged. Indeed, the
Americans and British surprised Koo by leaning toward the Soviets. A
member of the American delegation told Koo that once a big power went
to war in defense of its interests, "it would not matter much if it was
allowed to vote against action directed against itself." Some U.S. senators
even voiced the concern that under the original American plan, the U.S.
would be "obliged to go to war when it did not wish to." The Chinese
position was similar to the original Anglo-American formula. Accord-
ing to Koo, China wanted such an international organization in order
to end the "policy of force" or "gunboat policy" practiced by the great
powers against Africa and Asia. Personally, he did not want to see "China
shunted aside" and the Security Council making decisions "to the dis-
regard of China."31 Yet, the three powers were not about to reopen a
major debate that took place during the first session, so the Chinese
dropped the subject.
Following the discussion of other matters, the Chinese presented
their own views of how to strengthen the UN, which, Koo declared,
needed to be guided by certain principles. The Americans thought the
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Chinese principles "extremely idealistic," but as Robert Hilderbrand has
written, the principles reflected the Chinese "desire to create an organi-
zation with teeth in it." Yet Koo would not insist that those teeth be in-
serted in the UN charter. He wanted to show that his government was
cooperating and hoped to reduce some of the tensions in Sino-Ameri-
can relations. Koo wanted the conference to be success and he wanted to
protect China's position as a great power. In a cable to Chiang Kai-shek,
he argued that if the powers perceived China as an obstructionist, China's
international position would suffer.32
Laying out seven particular points, Koo expressed the Chinese view
that the future international organization be guided by international law
so that the organization did "not degenerate into an instrument of power
politics." To assure the small powers, Koo called for a provision concern-
ing respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of
member states. He wanted the term "aggression" to be defined more ex-
plicitly so as to "facilitate swift action by the Council, inspire confidence,
restrain potential aggressors and enable world opinion to recognize an
aggressor immediately." Along with expressing support for an interna-
tional air force, the Chinese favored creation of an international court
with "compulsory jurisdiction . . . over justiciable disputes." The British
supported the Chinese on the point, but the Soviets were opposed and
the Americans were reluctant because of the U.S. Constitution.33 Finally,
Koo called for more cultural cooperation as a way of preventing war.
The Chinese believed that creation of an international cultural office
could encourage friendship and peace movements and reduce tensions
between nations.34
After discussing these points with his counterparts, Koo eventually
cut his seven points down to three. All sides agreed upon the principles
of justice and the development and revision of international law, but the
other points were tabled. Koo wanted the three points published along
with the Dumbarton Oaks document in order to give the Chinese ses-
sion equal status with that of the Soviets, but the Americans and British
refused, saying that doing so would only further complicate matters with
the Soviets. Koo acceded to their wishes that the Chinese proposals be
published after the Soviets approved them.35
At the end of the conference, Koo gave a speech before the Chinese
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delegation assessing the results. The purpose of the conference, as far as
China was concerned, was to maintain China's position as a great power
and "cooperate" with Britain and the United States. The hope was that
an international organization more effective than the League of Nations
in ensuring the "independence and integrity" of all nations would be
created. There was also a desire to retain the "sympathy of the Small
powers," to whom Koo wanted to give more of a voice instead of having
the organization rest solely on the tune called by the great powers. Koo
found aspects of the conference to be mixed in quality. Some were inad-
equate, others practical, and still others were idealistic. Yet he deemed
the Dumbarton Oaks Conference to be generally satisfactory. The new
Security Council "would be more powerful and effective than the Coun-
cil of the League of Nations." It would be in constant session, available
to meet with twenty-four hours' notice. The future United Nations
could impose sanctions, have a security force, allow for rebus sic stanti-
bus in which old treaties could be revised, and do all "in accordance
with the principles of international law and justice." Koo played up
China's contribution as being "valuable" and claimed later that it was
at Dumbarton Oaks that China finally achieved the status as a fourth
great power. He had to acknowledge, though, that the majority of the
work was done by the three powers, with China simply giving a stamp
of approval.36
Some American internationalists condemned the document that
came out of this conference saying the future United Nations would be
dominated by the great powers. In most circumstances Koo might have
agreed because he had not quite reconciled himself to the Rooseveltian
internationalist viewpoint that excluded the concerns of the small pow-
ers, but this was the best that could be achieved under the circumstances.
He took solace in his belief that China had given a "moral tone to the
plan by basing the new organization in deciding disputes upon justice
and law."37
In the last days of the Dumbarton conference, Sino-American rela-
tions took a turn for the worse. On October 5, FDR agreed that Chiang
could remain supreme commander of Chinese forces, but the president
wanted Stilwell to retain his command in Burma. And the Roosevelt ad-
ministration agreed to pay China $25 million of a $500 million loan in
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gold. This loan delighted Kung, but Koo suspected that "the concession
was due to the desire to calm China down" now that Roosevelt ran for
reelection to an unprecedented fourth term of office.38 Chiang Kai-shek,
however, viewed Roosevelt's note as so "tactless" that Chiang "exploded
and changed his mind." Chiang refused to be cowed by "high-handed
pressure."39 Stilwell's continued presence would only further damage Sino-
American relations. Chiang reminded Roosevelt that it was only recently
that China had discarded the unequal treaties, and on the battlefield,
China had to protect its "sovereignty." Roosevelt yielded and Stilwell was
recalled on October 18. The CBI Theater was also divided into the China
Theater and the Burma-India Theater. Stilwell's replacement, Gen. Albert
Wedemeyer, did not command Chinese forces.40
Stilwell's recall left a bad taste in the Americans' mouths. For a brief
moment, FDR considered Mao Zedong and the CCP as a viable option
in China. Over the summer, the Dixie Mission, a group of American
military and technical experts, proceeded to Yan'an. For the next sev-
eral months, reports to Washington spoke of the night-and-day con-
trast between life in Yan'an and that of Chongqing. Absent was the
corruption and factionalism, and present were a democracy, national-
ism, fighting spirit, and an elan unheard of under Chiang's regime.
The Americans also believed that Mao Zedong wanted to work with
the United States. Mao propagandized the Americans by removing
American illusions about Chiang Kai-shek and creating new ones: that
the CCP shared more in common politically with the United States
than with the GMD. Mao hoped to win military, economic, and politi-
cal aid from the United States, because the Nazi invasion of the Soviet
Union led to a decrease in Soviet aid to the CCP. Meanwhile, Chiang
launched an offensive against the CCP with 500,000 troops in what
became known as the "Third Anti-Communist High Tide." The Sovi-
ets had no leverage, but the United States did tell Chiang to reduce
hostilities with the CCP.41
The day that Chiang rejected retaining Stilwell, Koo met with Harry
Hopkins, FDR's chief aide, who raised the issue of China and the bad
military situation there. Hopkins observed that "China was also not do-
ing her best" and warned that American interest in China would wane if
China did not play a prominent role in the defeat of Japan. Hopkins
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added that unlike Britain and the Soviet Union, Roosevelt wanted
China to be a great power. Koo interjected that the American press
and the CCP were exaggerating the situation. The communist prob-
lem was serious, but Koo thought that "the real remedy . . . lay in the
adoption of constitutional government under which the Commu-
nist party would be recognized as a political party enjoying equal
rights with other political parties, including the [GMD]." And Chiang
Kai-shek "should be safeguarded" because the CCP would "hesitate
to overthrow" the generalissimo, supposedly because they had no
comparable leader.42
Privately, Koo felt differently. In a memo written that same month,
Koo asserted that the CCP wanted its own military and administration
while coexisting with the GMD. "Their clamor for democracy is but a
political slogan," Koo continued, "to win sympathy abroad for their party."
On the other hand, the concerns of the Americans were on his mind.
Chiang declared that he would "not yield on a question involving sover-
eignty and the future of China," and that China would fight alone as it
did in the early years of the war so that "she would be freer to do wha t . . .
she saw fit." Koo thought this was the "stubborn view of an angered leader."
Everyone knew that China was in a very bad way with the exception of
Chiang Kai-shek, who, according to Koo, "was kept in the dark as to
the real situation because his subordinates would not tell him the
facts."43 Koo saw that only the U.S. supported the notion of China as a
great power, and now even China's closest supporter had legitimate
doubts about China's ability to play an effective role in keeping the
postwar peace.
Koo's view of the United States as a power that would not under-
mine Chinese sovereignty underlay his willingness to accept Stilwell's
leadership of Chinese forces. Unlike Chiang Kai-shek, who believed that
Stilwell or Roosevelt would ultimately undercut his own leadership in
numerous ways, Koo viewed America as a true friend in the harsh world
of international politics. The diplomat looked at the long term when
China needed a friend in the fluid postwar period. That faith in the United
States, however, was about to undergo a severe test.
Before returning to Britain, Koo met with several American offi-
cials who raised the issue of the Soviet Union and the Far East. When he
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met with Hopkins, FDR's aide mentioned the potential Soviet threat in
East Asia. Previously, Koo spoke of renewed Soviet irredentism after the
war, but now he completely reversed himself by saying "he did not think
Russia would pursue a policy of territorial expansion in the Far East." He
admitted, though, that Moscow wanted access to the Pacific, and that
Japan's defeat "would remove an obstacle to the building of Russian na-
val strength in the Far East."44
A few days later, Admiral William Leahy, a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, expressed to Koo his opinion that China's fighting ability
in October diminished in comparison to previous years. Although China's
air force had improved, the same could not be said for the land forces.
Leahy believed the Soviet Union needed to enter the war against Japan,
but the Soviets expected to receive a warm-water port in the Far East in
return for declaring war on Japan. He added that neither London nor
Washington opposed such a price. Koo responded that such a move would
negatively affect the peace in East Asia and his people would be "suspi-
cious." In years past, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-
Japanese War turned the Liaodong Peninsula into a battleground. China
recognized Korean autonomy, and viewed giving the Soviet Union a
warm-water port as "dangerous." Leahy continued to insist, however, that
the only way to get the Soviet Union into the war was by granting it a
port in the Far East.45
In a not-so-subtle manner, Leahy made Koo aware of what occurred
at Teheran the previous year and what would happen at Yalta in coming
months. The Americans were inclined in November 1944 to enlist Soviet
aid, especially as the war effort in China worsened. The week that Stilwell
was fired, Japanese forces restarted the Ichigo Offensive and overran air
bases without resistance even though Chiang claimed that his forces could
hold out for two months. It looked as if the Japanese would drive on to
Chongqing, causing panic and confusion there. While Chinese and al-
lied troops were being funneled into the area, the Japanese halted their
advance with their objectives reached, but the damage was done. Chiang's
government obviously was in no position to play a role in defeating Ja-
pan.46
The United States also lost its ties to the CCP, and Mao's hopes to
win assistance from Washington were dashed. In 1944, FDR sent Gen.
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Patrick Hurley, former secretary of war under Herbert Hoover, to China
as his personal emissary. In November, Hurley, now U.S. ambassador
to China, visited Yan'an after Chiang Kai-shek expressed willingness
to negotiate with the CCP. Hurley signed an agreement with Mao that
promised American military aid and political assistance by bringing
together a GMD-CCP coalition government. However, when Hurley
returned to Chongqing, Chiang demanded that the CCP surrender its
military in return for political representation, so Hurley declared that
the United States would only provide political, economic, and mili-
tary assistance to Chiang Kai-shek. Nevertheless, Mao did not stop
pursuing assistance from the United States, and Washington did not
rule out working with the CCP. In December, U.S. forces in China were
already working on contingency plans to pull out of the China theater
should Chiang's regime collapse. It was clear that Soviet intervention
against Japan was necessary and that the two latent superpowers had
to prevent the Chinese civil war from dragging them into a great power
conflict.47
In February 1945, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill met at Yalta.
Roosevelt not only wanted to get the Soviet Union into the Pacific War
but sought cooperation with Stalin to avoid conflict over China and pro-
tect global U.S. interests. Stalin could now focus on Asia because he no
longer had to fear fighting a two-front war. Allied armies were in Ger-
many, and Hitler's Third Reich stood on the verge of defeat. Stalin wanted
to prevent Japan from rising from the ashes like a phoenix and threaten-
ing Soviet interests, but he also feared a Sino-American alliance directed
at the Soviet Union. The Soviet leader concluded in October 1944 that
only Soviet intervention into the Pacific War could accomplish those
objectives. It would guarantee the flow of Lend-Lease supplies and other
American aid, prevent Japan and the United States from reaching a
negotiated peace, and expand Soviet influence into northeast Asia. Be-
fore the Yalta Conference commenced, Stalin restated his price to come
into the war. He wanted the lease of two warm-water ports in South-
ern Manchuria, Liishun and Dalian, as well as the CER. Stalin made
one other demand: The allies had to accept Soviet domination of Outer
Mongolia.
After some negotiating, Stalin agreed to internationalize Dalian but
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still demanded a lease of Liishun. Stalin agreed that Chiang Kai-shek
should remain the leader of China even if a GMD-CCP coalition gov-
ernment was formed, and he suggested that a treaty could be signed be-
tween Moscow and Chongqing in April. Although Chiang would not
learn the terms of the agreement until June, he received bits and pieces
of information in the interim.48
Koo returned to China in March 1945 to discuss the Dumbarton
Oaks Conference and the upcoming San Francisco Conference with the
generalissimo. Koo met immediately with T.V. Soong, who was still for-
eign minister, and argued that it was time to put the communist prob-
lem to rest before the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and became
embroiled in the China question to Chongqing's detriment. Soong de-
murred. He and Chiang felt that the Soviet Union would enter the Asian
conflict anyway, but thought that Soong should at least travel to Moscow
and reach some kind of agreement.49
A few days later, over dinner with the generalissimo, Koo discussed
a wide range of topics that concerned the postwar period. When the
topic turned toward the Soviet Union, Chiang expressed the opinion
that the Soviet Union understood the Chinese better than any other power
and that Stalin knew that the Chinese people "would not stand for either
communism or disunity, and if the U.S.S.R. tried to divide China into
two countries, it knows the Ch[inese] people would oppose it and the
U.S.S.R. does not want to antagonize the whole Chfinese] nation."50 The
two men also discussed a cable from Roosevelt stating that as a "demo-
cratic gesture," China should appoint representatives of the CCP to the
Chinese delegation planning to attend the upcoming San Francisco Con-
ference. When Chiang learned the gist of Roosevelt's message, he be-
came "irritated and agitated." Chiang remarked that "conditions in China
were different from other countries," and he believed that "Com[munist]
delegates . . . [would] make trouble."
When queried as to why Roosevelt would send such a message,
Koo gave several possibilities. Some nations were already complaining
about the great powers having permanent seats, and since Roosevelt
"sponsored China's position as a Great Power," he was "anxious about
China's status in the Conference] and likes to see her represented] there
as strongly as possible." Roosevelt might be concerned, too, that if the
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"question of unity of China is not solved now, it may become an interna-
tional question and thereby become more complicated and difficult to
settle." Finally, communist propaganda could very well be influencing
Roosevelt. When Koo suggested that it was "advisable not to close the
door to his [Roosevelt's] suggestion," Chiang "asked why it should not
be closed, implying that it should." The CCP "all along refused to ac-
cept orders from the Central Government," Chiang emphasized, "and
that there would be difficulty rather than help from their inclusion in
the delegation." Despite his ire being raised by FDR's demand, Chiang
acquiesced.51
On March 18, Chiang Kai-shek called for Koo to discuss another
cable from FDR. As before, Roosevelt urged Chiang to settle the CCP
problem. Then he revealed Stalin's desires: In order to enter the Pacific
War, Moscow wanted joint control of the CER and a lease for Liishun
where the Soviets could have a warm-water port. Koo did not believe
that Roosevelt had agreed to any of the points, but given the heavy losses
in the Pacific campaign, FDR wanted to get the Soviets into the war with
Japan to bring about victory. Chiang could not understand why the
Americans did not see the disadvantage to the United States of giving
Liishun to the Soviet Union. Koo agreed, but believed that Washington
wanted to end the war with Japan and get Soviet cooperation in estab-
lishing the United Nations. He suggested that Washington be made aware
of those disadvantages before agreeing to Stalin's demands. Koo remained
concerned however about Liishun. He learned soon after that Chiang
Kai-shek had suggested to Roosevelt at the Cairo Conference that China
and America could use Liishun jointly. Fearing another "scramble for
concessions," Koo warned TV. Soong that China had to walk cautiously.
If China gave the Soviets a port, the other powers would line up wanting
their own port.52
When Koo left China for the United States at the end of the month,
he could see that the atmosphere on the eve of the San Francisco Confer-
ence was not favorable. The great powers were still arguing over how
many votes each power would have in the UN. More troubling, though,
was the rise and fall of China's status as a great power in less than four
years. Fault lay, or so said Koo, in the fact that Chongqing "did not always
understand the American, British or Russian psychology and much of
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the friction which had arisen from time to time in our relations with
them was due to this lack of understanding." The perception persisted
that China did nothing to expedite the defeat of Japan, whereas the other
powers were being bled white on the battlefield. While the other great
powers made progress in the war, China "lagged way behind and we do
not seem to realize it." By not pressing the fight against the Japanese, the
GMD government paid a heavy political price internationally. "The re-
sult," Koo continued, "is that we are now practically left on the side even
in the consideration of the war in the Pacific, as if we are of no conse-
quence."53
While in the middle of contemplating China's international posi-
tion, Koo received the stunning news of Roosevelt's death. He called
Roosevelt a "firm and steadfast friend of China," a "great war leader and
an idealistic statesman representing] the hopes and aspirations of the
liberty-loving peoples of the world." He wondered now about the pos-
sible effects on Sino-American relations. President Harry Truman, as
with many Americans, was an unknown, but the reports that he and
TV. Soong received suggested that Truman "would be firm with Soviet
Russia."54
Before Roosevelt died, the Chinese remained officially uninformed
that the Soviet Union had been granted permission to lease Liishun.
The Americans only gave hints. While Truman studied the details of
the Yalta agreement, T.V. Soong learned that Stalin did not want Man-
churia but only wanted to recover the Soviet Union's original lease rights
to Liishun and the CER.55 Chiang Kai-shek's position was that leasing
any port would "revive [the] 'sphere of influence' policy of other powers
and would be opposed by the Chinese people." As far as Koo was con-
cerned, he believed that public opinion in China and the world had to be
prepared "for a showdown." The world needed to be informed that Man-
churia was Chinese, not Soviet, territory. A "policy of leased territories
and spheres of influence would only be sowing the seeds of future con-
flict in the F[ar] E[ast] and the Pacific."56 He told Admiral Leahy that
"the international complications and crises in the Far East in the last 50
years had been due principally to the attempt to control Manchuria."
Reversing his stance of the previous October, Koo asserted that there
had to be a better solution, such as giving the Soviet Union a warm-
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water port in Korea "which would be a reasonable contribution for Korea
to make to the cause of international security in the Pacific" as long as
the port was part of a "general plan of security for the western Pacific
and Far Eastern Asia."57
In the meantime, as more details of the Yalta agreement leaked to
Chongqing, Chiang instructed Koo and Wang Shijie, soon-to-be foreign
minister and Chiang Kai-shek's confidant, to analyze how China should
respond. Koo explained that in the days before Roosevelt died, the Ameri-
can president concluded that China possessed insufficient power to de-
feat the Japanese. Moreover, Americans were unwilling to see more young
American boys sacrificed, so Roosevelt had to get the Soviet Union into
the war against Japan. Koo surmised that since the Soviets knew that this
kind of territorial expansion did not fit the tenor of the times, Stalin
wanted the agreement to remain secret. In his opinion, the Soviets would
be "isolated" at the upcoming San Francisco Conference. Koo suggested
that the delegation cooperate with the Soviets so that the Russians would
not make any demands over Manchuria. Wang Shijie, on the other hand,
believed that the Soviet Union entertained territorial ambitions both in
Europe and the Far East. In regard to the latter, he thought the Soviets
wanted to return to the position they had in Manchuria before the Russo-
Japanese War.58 Neither Koo nor Wang, however, had any particular policy
to offer.
Chiang already knew what his policy would be. With Roosevelt, the
great leader but communist appeaser, gone, he would make no conces-
sions to the CCP rebels even though his closest advisers supported mak-
ing a political deal with the communists before entering into negotiations
with Stalin. He hoped that the United States would continue to back him
despite his intransigence toward the CCP. And because of the growing
tensions between Washington and Moscow over the failure to grant Po-
land free elections and over the future of postwar Germany, Chiang hoped
that the Soviets would be more willing to make a deal more favorable to
Chiang to keep peace in Asia while they were preoccupied by tensions in
Europe.59
As Chiang Kai-shek maintained a tough line with the CCP, Koo
took the responsibility to "counteract the insidious campaign going on
to make the Am[erican] people believe that the Soviet [Union] had a
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legitimate interest in Manchuria and to justify her covetous eyes on it."
And he advised T.V. Soong, now that both men were in San Francisco, to
not make a visit to Moscow if Stalin refused to compromise over Man-
churia. China needed to consider whether it was worth the price to ask
the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan. Soong was impressed by
the argument but went to Moscow anyway.60
On April 25, 1945, the San Francisco Conference convened with a
view to completing the work done at Dumbarton Oaks. Koo described
the atmosphere as "anything but favorable" because of the voting proce-
dure for the Security Council. The Chinese delegation went into the con-
ference committed to establishing a different one. While he was in China,
Koo learned that China would object to the American solution to voting
in the Security Council. If the American position was adopted, it was
meaningless for China to join the new security organization. In fact, Koo
wrote in his diary that maybe it was "better for China to stay out of the
ranks of the great powers, because then we could say what we wanted."61
Eventually, though, the Chinese did accept the Yalta Formula for voting
in the Security Council in which a great power could exercise a veto. Koo
described the final vote as ending the great battle between the great
powers and the small powers, and as "almost always happens, the big
powers in the end carried their mutual will." Chongqing allegedly ac-
cepted the Yalta Formula because "in order to make the new interna-
tional organization succeed, it would be necessary to preserve the unity
of purpose and spirit of cooperation between the Great Powers, with-
out which the machinery of the Security Council would break down."
Although not ideal, it was a "practical compromise." "Perhaps after
working together and acquiring the habit of cooperation between the
Great Powers in the first years after the war," Koo told a foreign diplo-
mat, "there might be an opportunity to revise it when suspicion and
distrust would have dissipated and understanding and confidence con-
solidated."62
Going into the conference, China's other major proposals included
an amendment that would better enforce the rulings of the International
Court of Justice should any party refuse to abide by the Court's deci-
sions. In fact, the Chinese considered this provision to be "necessary and
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very important," and wanted the Security Council to take action in such
instances. The delegates representing the other three powers refused to
accept this provision, simply stating that the amendment was undesir-
able. Only the Soviet delegate gave an explanation: The Security Council
would, like the Court, have the power to issue "decisions binding upon
the parties." The opposition forced the Chinese to reserve their posi-
tion.63
Hence, throughout the conference, Koo simply followed the tune
called by the other delegations. Besides going along with the Yalta For-
mula for voting, Koo backed the United States proposal that under the
trusteeship system, there be strategic areas that would come under the
control of the Security Council, meaning the big powers. The small powers
rejected this proposal because the trusteeships were created to allow ter-
ritories to "evolve toward self-determination and independence." Plac-
ing those territories under the control of the Security Council smacked
of colonialism and was the League Mandate system all over again. In a
1943 conversation between FDR and Koo, the two men agreed that the
League Mandate system had led to colonialism, with Koo adding that
his government preferred "liberation and independence." Two years
later, a meeting of the Chinese delegation viewed the trusteeship ques-
tion as "very important for our country's future destiny," and as a
"struggle" between Britain and the United States "for world power or
at least a building up of strength as world powers."64 "Reluctantly," Koo
went along because of American insistence. The Chinese did get a pro-
posal adopted that allowed the United Nations to eventually take over the
administration of these trust territories. And true to his concern for small
powers, Koo suggested that they have an opportunity to review the work
of the conference as well as the "question of unanimity of the permanent
members."65
Otherwise, Koo's contributions to the conference were limited to
modifying the language of the Charter and putting forth rules of proce-
dure. When his opinion was sought on the location of the new UN, Koo
replied, "Geneva invoked many unhappy memories of the League which
had disappointed the hopes of the Chinese people and the world," add-
ing that since "we are setting up a new world... it should start in the new
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world." At least at this moment, Koo entertained the hope that the new
postwar organization could work more effectively than the League of
Nations.66
China's inability to be a leader in the creation of the UN was obvi-
ous. In fact, an Australian delegate complained that China was no longer
the spokesman for the smaller powers, a charge Koo vociferously denied.
After the war though, the Chinese were criticized by a member of the
U.S. Department for not taking the lead at Dumbarton Oaks and San
Francisco: "instead of striking out boldly and taking the initiative in
matters about which they may have had strong opinions, they have as-
sumed a quite secondary role, acting as conciliator and never as leader
on major issues, and as far as voting is concerned, almost without excep-
tion following the lead of the United States." China disappointed its
friends by showing up at Dumbarton Oaks with a "bold and imagina-
tive plan" that would have placed greater responsibility on the great
powers and have given greater authority to the small powers. In the
end, China acquiesced to the other powers "even though their own
plans called for a stronger organization." Likewise, the pattern contin-
ued at San Francisco in which the Chinese were willing to sacrifice
some sovereignty for collective security only to retreat to commenting
on procedures.67 These criticisms, though, were too harsh given China's
weak position in 1945. China could not afford to alienate the other powers
and had to cooperate.
By the end of 1945, Koo believed four things had to occur in order
for the peace to be safeguarded in an atomic age: control of all weapons
of mass destruction; an international force with "all the newest weap-
ons" and the ability to manufacture them at the disposal of the UN Se-
curity Council; prohibition of the manufacture and use of weapons of
mass destruction; and the abolition of the veto power by permanent
members of UN Security Council. Two years later, he revealed his dis-
pleasure with certain aspects of the creation, particularly the veto issue.
Koo wanted the UN to succeed because "[t]here is really no sound or
effective alternative. We know into what plight the old system of the bal-
ance of power and rival alliances has led the world."68 He preferred an
organization that prevented power politics, but peace depended on
whether the other three powers cooperated, especially the Soviets, who
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held the key in the Pacific. Quoting President Truman, Koo hoped that
the Soviet Union and the other powers "would use their immense power
'to serve and not to dominate.' If the powers renounced expansionism or
domination, the peace of the future would be safe. Otherwise, security is
a relative thing and the greater the zone of security [sought], the greater
will be the need for further territory to defend it."69
While Koo was busy in San Francisco, T.V. Soong met with Stalin
to negotiate a treaty. Now officially aware of the promises made to Stalin
at Yalta, Chiang initially did not want to enter into negotiations with the
Soviets as long as they wanted to "lease" the ports in Manchuria, but by
late June he gave the green light for talks.70 When informed that Soong
would be traveling to Moscow, Koo opposed the trip saying that if China
was "not prepared to yield—which we should not—it would be useless
to make a visit without working out a plan of action." Koo preferred that
his government temporize and wait until the war with Japan ended to
see how the international situation developed.71 Nevertheless, Soong went
to Moscow and held the first round of talks. Stalin demanded that Chiang
Kai-shek recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, but Chiang
wanted Stalin to cut off support to the CCP. Stalin was amenable if he
got a thirty-year treaty over Manchuria, Soviet-control of Liishun, and
Soviet ownership of the railways.
Negotiations were interrupted by Stalin's trip to Potsdam. A sec-
ond round of Sino-Soviet negotiations commenced on August 7, the day
after the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. While
the negotiations continued, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on
August 8 and rushed troops into Manchuria. The United States now told
Stalin that the Chinese should not have to make concessions beyond the
Yalta Agreement, but Stalin insisted that Roosevelt gave him a sphere of
influence over ports in Manchuria. Because of Soviet entry into the war,
Wang Shijie believed that an agreement had to be signed. The next day, a
second atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki and Japan surrendered days
later.
On August 14, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was signed.
The Chinese and Soviets agreed to an alliance to prevent a resurgence of
Japanese aggression. The CER and Southern Manchurian Railway were
united into one Chinese Changchun Railway that would be jointly owned
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for thirty years, at which time it would return to sole Chinese ownership.
Both countries would use Lushun's naval facilities, and the Soviets agreed
to respect Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. The Chinese agreed to rec-
ognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, though a clear boundary
was not established in order to expedite the signing of the treaty. Stalin
gave assurances that he supported the unification of China under the
leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. One issue that went unresolved was "war
trophies" by which was meant ownership of Japanese investments in Man-
churia, but otherwise Chiang paid the price to win Soviet support for his
government and not the CCP.72
Once Koo had an understanding of the treaty's contents, he pointed
to "missed opportunities and unnecessary concessions." For example,
Koo thought the boundary in Outer Mongolia should have been stated
in the treaty. Otherwise, "the absence of definition leaves it open to en-
croachment from year to year by Outer Mongolia. . . . As one who has
struggled for more than four decades" for a "policy of recovering lost
territory and restoring China's sovereignty and independence," Koo com-
mented later, "I am naturally very disappointed with the Chinese stand
taken at Moscow."73
The treaty did little to improve China's position vis-a-vis the So-
viet Union, and the anger vented against the treaty by Chinese public
opinion affected China's relations with other countries. There were re-
ports that the GMD army planned to retake Hong Kong and that Soong,
who was still head of the Executive Yuan, would raise the Hong Kong
question at the upcoming Foreign Ministers' meeting. Koo advised Chiang
and Soong to negotiate directly using Washington's good offices and
warned that the British were "very sensitive to our apparently torturous
way of using U.S. influence to force a settlement." The British would not
give up their colony and the United States made it clear that Hong Kong's
status as a colony would remain unchanged. After Japan surrendered,
Chiang and Soong both demanded that Japanese forces in Hong Kong
surrender to GMD troops, but the United States preferred that the Brit-
ish have the honor of retaking Hong Kong. The only explanation for
Chongqing's policy toward Hong Kong that Koo could come up with
was that Chiang Kai-shek was using Hong Kong "to offset possible re-
action of Ch[inese] people to the Sino-Russian treaty and agreements
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at Moscow." Since Churchill's government was voted out of power dur-
ing the summer, the British warned the Chinese "not do anything to
embarrass or weaken the position of the new Government in London
which wants first of all to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the nation and
the world." For his part, while involved with the creation of the United
Nations, Koo instructed the diplomatic and military personnel in Lon-
don "not to get into [an] open and direct clash with [the] U.S.A.,
U.S.S.R., and U.K. on any questions unless our own vital interests are
affected . . . and try always to conciliate their differences with one an-
other." 74
Koo believed that the Sino-Soviet Treaty was the result of the al-
lied perception of Chiang's government as weak, which in fact it
was. He alluded to the misunderstanding between Washington and
Chongqing over China's war policy, the British and Soviet inability
to take China seriously as a great power, and Moscow's desire to get
into the Pacific War, reaping spoils without the sacrifice.75 Such
thinking led to decisions at Teheran and Yalta to bring the Soviet
Union into the war on the assumption that the Soviet contribution
was vital to defeating Japan.
During World War II, Koo found himself in the difficult position
of serving a genuinely patriotic leader whose nationalistic war aims and
Pan-Asianism created tensions with his British and American allies. As
middleman, Koo could only moderate Chiang Kai-shek's nationalistic
tendencies, such as his insistence on recovering Tibet and the Hong Kong
territories. As a young man, Koo took a hard-line position toward areas
no longer controlled by China, but now he softened his stance. Koo
wanted his government to give up its old "policy of coercion and mani-
festing superiority" and pursue a new policy "vis-a-vis the minorities in
China especially] along the borders" that would secure the "goodwill
and friendship" of those people and "make them feel their relation with
the Chinese and China were beneficial to them in fact."76 Koo never pre-
vailed on Chiang Kai-shek to see his country as the allies did: weak, cor-
rupt, and unwilling to take the war to Japan. In the end, Koo's diplomatic
reasoning and propaganda could not whitewash the reality that China's
weaknesses undermined any hope of it being a truly great power. Now as
China entered the postwar era, Koo hoped that the United Nations, based
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on four or five powers, would permit China a voice while it dealt with its
internal problems. The emerging international political power system,
however, relegated China to minor power status because of that country's
lack of power internally and internationally. And the Chinese civil war
and great power rivalry soon chased away the peace that the Chinese
longed for.
Chapter 8
COLLAPSE OF THE ROC,
1945-1949
DURING WORLD WAR II, KOO ASSURED FOREIGNERS that in the
postwar period, there would be no more civil wars and that the commu-
nist problem would be easily resolved. He claimed as well that China
would become "a fully-fledged democracy after the war."1 But with Japan's
surrender, both the CCP and Chiang's forces set out to retake territory
held by the Japanese and to disarm Japanese forces. Chiang disregarded
the advice of many that he launch a war against the CCR He chose
instead to negotiate. Civil war might cost Chiang U.S. aid, but negotiat-
ing avoided alienating the Americans and bought time for Chiang to
move his forces into Japanese-occupied territory, especially Manchuria.
Mao talked, but the CCP, elated by Soviet intervention into Manchuria,
set out from Yan'an to link up with the 1.5 million Soviet troops. CCP
membership now totaled 1.2 million, and the size of the army was 910,000
by April 1945. The CCP also controlled territory that held 90 million
inhabitants. Manchuria's industries and agricultural surplus there would
give the CCP a good base from which to operate, and its proximity to the
Soviet Union facilitated receiving Soviet aid. As Chiang's forces moved
slowly and cautiously into occupied territory, the CCP moved quickly
toward Manchuria while warning the Americans that aid to Chiang would
lead to civil war.
Calls were made immediately to the United States for transport to
move GMD troops into Manchuria. The Americans were not interested
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Koo speaking before United Nations General Assembly, October 1946 (UN photo,
courtesy of National Archives)
in communist expansion any more than Chiang, so Gen. Douglas
MacArthur ordered Japanese forces to surrender only to Chiang's troops,
not the CCP. And in early October, U.S. Marines landed in Hebei and
Shandong Provinces. Concerned by the American landings on Chinese
soil, the Soviet ambassador told Chiang that Soviet forces would with-
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draw from Manchuria by December 1. This gave Chiang an opening to
ask for permission to put GMD troops in Dalian. The Soviets not only
said no but declared that Japanese factories were deemed "war booty"
and both sides could negotiate their disposition. Meanwhile, talks with
Mao went nowhere and Chiang considered military action but backed
away from that step, knowing it would anger the Soviets. Chiang knew,
too, that the United States wanted to see his forces in Manchuria. To get
American power behind him, Chiang pulled what forces he had in Man-
churia back to Beijing. The Soviets, who had blocked GMD activities in
Manchuria, now apologized and agreed to help Chiang occupy Man-
churia, fearing further American intervention into the area. The Soviets
agreed to stay in Manchuria until GMD forces arrived, so Chiang asked
the Soviets to stay until February 1946.2
While the political situation grew tense in China, all was not going
well for Chiang's government abroad. From September to October 1945,
the powers gathered in London for the Foreign Ministers' Conference to
deal with European questions. The whole notion of a council of the For-
eign Ministers representing the Five Great Powers originated at the
Potsdam Conference of July.3 Although many of the issues discussed did
not involve Asia and even though France was not one of the original four
great powers, Secretary of State James Byrnes suggested that China and
France participate on an equal basis in drawing up peace treaties, though
neither had a final vote or say over the finished product. Although the
Berlin Protocol written during the Potsdam Conference stated that nei-
ther France nor China could play a role in drafting treaties regarding
defeated Germany, all of the delegates agreed with Byrnes' proposals.
Very quickly, the atmosphere of the meeting proved to be in Koo's
words "discouraging, even depressing." The Chinese delegates could only
sit on the side and watch as tempers flared between the American, Brit-
ish and Soviet delegations over Japan, Romania, and Greece. China did
side with the other delegations against the Soviet Union in proposing
collective trusteeship for Italy's colonies, but Koo and the delegates
watched the Soviets and Americans battle it out over the Balkans. The
United States refused to sign treaties with Bulgaria and Romania be-
cause their governments were not democratic. Infuriated, the Soviets
reminded the Americans that they already dominated Japan and Italy,
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and, while the Soviets could tolerate democracy in Hungary and Fin-
land, Moscow would not stand for unfriendly governments along its
borders in the Balkans. When the Americans still would not recognize
the East European countries as being under the Soviet sphere, V.M.
Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, pointed out that according to the
procedures established at Potsdam, France and China could not partici-
pate in discussions of the East European treaties. Clearly, Molotov was
not impressed with the Anglo-American effort to use France and China
to build an anti-Soviet bloc. Molotov also called for creation of an Allied
Control Council composed of representatives from all five powers to
oversee the American occupation of Japan. Though the Soviets were cor-
rect in their interpretation of Potsdam, Byrnes opposed Molotov's pro-
posal because he feared that neither would be treated as equals on the
UN Security Council.
Unable to make headway, the conference broke up in October. The
conference not only failed to usher in a new era of peace but expanded
the cracks in the UN Alliance that had long existed. Koo wrote in his
diary that it was preferable for China to have never been invited to the
meeting than to participate and lose face by being told it could not par-
ticipate in the signing of those treaties. If the Soviets got their way, "it
would mean the break-up and destruction of the" United Nations, "leav-
ing the guarding of the peace of the world . . . to three or even two [pow-
ers] in so far as questions arising [in regard to] the peace treaties are
concerned."4
The growing rivalry between Moscow, London and Washington
and the weakness of Chiang Kai-shek further diminished China's great
power status. Despite Soviet promises to cooperate with Chiang in Man-
churia, President Truman decided to send George C. Marshall, recently
retired Army Chief of Staff, to China where reports from American of-
ficers there suggested that Chiang's forces were too weak to take over
Manchuria if confronted with communist opposition. There was also
concern that calling for unification of China under Chiang Kai-shek
would not only heat up the Chinese civil war but bring the United States
and the Soviet Union into direct conflict. Marshall's mission was to bring
about a peaceful settlement of CCP-GMD political and military differ-
ences. Marshall was not going to China as an honest middleman, because
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his instructions ordered him to support Chiang Kai-shek, even if Chiang
proved more of an obstacle to peace than the CCP. Although Marshall
had little respect for Chiang especially after the Stilwell affair, Marshall
still wanted Manchuria to come under GMD control. On December 15,
Truman issued his policy for China: U.S. Marines would remain in China
where the United States would not only disarm the Japanese but also
strive for the creation of a "unified, democratic and peaceful nation."
Truman's speech scolded the GMD for its one party rule while blaming
the CCP for insisting on retaining its army. "It was a very outspoken one
and I could not but wish that we had succeeded in settling the commu-
nist question ourselves already," Koo lamented in his diary, "It was so
unbecoming to our prestige as one of the big 5."5
Late in December, another Foreign Ministers' Conference was held
in Moscow between Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. A
major issue on the table was Korea. Although the United States had its
sphere in Japan and in China, the Soviets extended their influence into
not only Manchuria and Mongolia but northern Korea as well. A final
communique from the conference stated that a Far Eastern Advisory
Commission and Allied Control Council would be established in Japan,
but the United States and Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Com-
mander of the Allied Powers, really ran the occupation of Japan. Korea
was divided in two, with the Soviets retaining influence in the north
while United States oversaw the south. All three powers supported with-
drawal of Soviet and American forces from China along with a unified,
democratic China under Chiang's leadership, broad political participa-
tion in all branches of government, and the end of civil war. In a state-
ment reminiscent of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, all three powers
promised to not interfere in China's internal affairs.6
For Koo, the communique was "painful," because China was treated
as a question, similar to Romania or Korea. Despite fighting Japan for
eight-years, "the question of control of Japan also was settled behind our
back," and the Soviet Union's late entrance into the Asian conflict made
it an equal partner with China, the United States, and Great Britain. "Now,
not only Korea is taken out of [our] hands but even our own domestic
situation has been made a subject of [an] international conference with-
out our participation." Koo did not blame others, though. The onus lay
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with China for not reorganizing its army in 1942 and 1943 along lines
suggested by Stilwell so that China would be prepared at the end of the
war "to take over Manchuria and even Korea." Koo opposed the growing
friction between the CCP and the GMD. He wanted unity first because
in the postwar period, "the doctrine of power politics [was] in full-swing
. . . [and] China could not play her part without a unified government
with a unified army and administration." Until this was done, China
would have little voice as a power. "I do hope our people at home will see
the anomalous and humiliating position of China in the international
domain."7
Over the next few months, tensions between the Soviet Union and
the United States increased in the Middle East over Turkey and Iran.
Stalin gave a speech in February 1946 that declared that the Soviet Union
lived in a hostile world, and communism and capitalism were incom-
patible. The next month, Winston Churchill visited the United States,
and in Fulton, Missouri, the former Prime Minister called for coopera-
tion of the English-speaking people to create a new world order, because
from the Baltic to the Adriatic an iron curtain had descended across the
Continent allowing the Soviet Union to rule Eastern Europe. As Soviet-
U.S. hostility moved toward a Cold War, the fact that the United States
was now a power to be reckoned with was not lost on Chiang Kai-shek.
Britain was in decline as a power and in coming months, the British
withdrew from Greece, Palestine and India, the Crown Jewel.
In March 1946, Koo returned to China. The previous September,
T.V. Soong informed Koo that the latter would become the Chinese am-
bassador to Washington, because Sino-American relations were far more
important than relations with Britain. But he wanted Koo to spend some
time in China. According to Soong, Chiang Kai-shek liked Koo, and sim-
ply thought Koo to be "a little timid." The only people that Chiang sup-
posedly did not like were those "with independent views" or who pointed
out the generalissimo's "mistakes in judgement."8
It was not a propitious moment to be in China. On January 1,1946,
the CCP publicly rejected Chiang's one-party rule and called for the es-
tablishment of an executive committee composed of members from vari-
ous parties to form a coalition government in Manchuria. Chiang refused
especially as GMD forces continued to be transported to Manchuria by
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the United States. However, he agreed to talks with the CCP because he
could not afford to lose American support. He also knew that antigov-
ernment demonstrations in various cities in China made launching an
attack against the CCP unfeasible. Marshall achieved his primary objec-
tive of bringing about a cessation of hostilities; by the end of February,
he worked with both sides to lay down the basis for a coalition govern-
ment and the integration of CCP units with GMD ones. But when Feb-
ruary 1 arrived, Soviet forces were still in Manchuria, denying the GMD
territory yet reclaimed. Stalin wanted Chiang to yield economic conces-
sions in Manchuria. In particular, the Soviets demanded joint control of
various industries with Chiang's government.
Koo arrived in China just in time to attend the meeting of the GMD
Central Executive Committee. Those directly involved in negotiating the
Sino-Soviet Treaty of the previous year came under fire for having "un-
necessarily sacrificed China's sovereign rights" by making concessions to
the Soviets in regard to Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. There was con-
siderable consternation over Soviet refusal to withdraw their troops de-
spite the February 1 deadline. And Moscow's dismantling of Japanese
industries in Manchuria for transportation back to the war-ravaged So-
viet Union led to a great deal of rancor. Complaints were made as well
about the cease-fire agreement reached between the GMD and the CCP
as a result of Marshall's mediation; many in the GMD saw this as inter-
ference in China's internal affairs. The Central Executive Committee
wanted to send Moscow a strongly worded diplomatic note that raked
the Soviets over the coals for their activities in Manchuria and faulted
them for the communist problem. Koo tried to little avail to soften the
language of the diplomatic note, fearing strong Soviet reaction.
Chiang Kai-shek was, however, able to nip such talk in the bud.
Angered by the criticism directed at him over the Sino-Soviet Treaty and
the January truce agreement with the communists, Chiang bluntly told
the Central Executive Committee that if it was prepared to retake Man-
churia by force, then the note would be sent to Moscow as written. Oth-
erwise, it had better reconsider if it preferred to use "diplomacy and
political means" to secure the return of Manchuria. Chiang also threw
down the gauntlet: Any criticism leveled at those responsible for the Sino-
Soviet Treaty was in fact criticism of his leadership since they were merely
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following his instructions. "Do you or do you not trust me?," Chiang
Kai-shek asked, "Do you or do you not have confidence in me?" The
critics, who reaffirmed their allegiance in Chiang's presence, were silenced
at least for the moment. "It was an eye opening incident" for Koo who
could see that Chiang's "firm attitude and suitable remarks enabled the
awkward situation to be surmounted."9
Koo's stance on the Soviet-CCP problem differed from that of most
people in the government. China made plenty of concessions "to buy the
goodwill of Soviet Russia," and Koo felt that "it was not wise to quarrel
over the 'war-booty,' thereby nullifying the good effect of our previous
sacrifice." Better to split the booty down the middle and convince the
Soviets to withdraw than to give them an excuse to remain in Manchu-
ria. He feared that China's airing of its grievances would only serve to
"further stiffen their [the Soviets'] attitude." China could recover Man-
churia if the Chinese refrained from making provocative statements that
would only further alienate the Soviets, making Manchuria "a possible
cause of a third world war." "It was most important to get back the terri-
tory first and only of secondary importance to get back as many indus-
trial plants as possible," Koo argued, because "U.S. promises could not
be relied upon, because [the] U.S. did not know its own mind as to how
far it should go. It could afford [to] sit backs [sic] and have nothing to
fear." Koo disagreed with those who wanted to take a harder line with the
Soviets because, in his mind, America was mercurial, "and is not always
dependable as to its strength and final purpose."10
Although he believed that the United States was China's "primary
friend really interested in helping us become strong and united" and
agreed with T.V. Soong that "little could be expected from Russia," Koo
thought that Nanjing's policy should be to "forestall any friction or ani-
mosity." The government could not assume American support should it
take on the Soviet Union. He told Chiang Kai-shek that it was impera-
tive that China engage in "quick negotiation with Soviet Russia on eco-
nomic questions." "If we pursue a policy which would alleviate her
suspicion and make her feel [that there is] nothing to worry about from
us," Koo went on, "she would refrain from supporting [the] C.C.R against
the Gov't, as she is realistic and knows the Gov't is much stronger than
[the] C.C.R" Chiang demurred because he was convinced that the Soviet
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Union "would never drop the C.C.P.," and wanted to retain "the C.C.P. as
a weapon." In any case, Koo felt that China could use American aid to
build up its forces below the Great Wall and should not send troops to
Manchuria in order to avoid exacerbating relations with Moscow.11
As for the CCP, Koo likewise refused to take a hard line. The diplo-
mat promoted unity between the GMD and the CCP, which he believed
would have a positive influence on China's foreign friends who expected
to see democracy and prosperity develop in China. In late 1945, Koo
advised the Chinese delegation to the International Youth Conference,
which included a communist member, to maintain a united front. He
later asserted his belief that political party quarrels were unnecessary
since there was a common goal of every political party. "All wanted to
make China strong and powerful so she could take her place in the fam-
ily of nations." It was Koo's conviction, as he explained to one Chinese
communist, that "No nation can be strong unless it is united; in the test
of power politics of the modern postwar world, China could not play
her part without a unified government and army." Japan was defeated;
now was the time to unite in reconstruction.12
Although Koo wanted China to experience peaceful reconstruc-
tion, tensions continued to arise between Chiang and the Soviet Union.
On March 6, Chiang's government protested the Soviet Union's refusal
to withdraw and demanded an immediate pullout. Five days later, the
Soviets announced their withdrawal from Manchuria. Stalin had already
backed down in crises involving Iran and Turkey, and he could see that
having troops in Manchuria was another political liability. Anti-Soviet
demonstrations in China stiffened Chiang's resolve to not make eco-
nomic concessions. Moreover, the presence of Soviet troops only in-
creased support for Chiang's government, which claimed it was recovering
national sovereignty, and the Soviets ran the risk of alienating Chiang,
who could use force to grab Manchuria. By withdrawing from Manchu-
ria, the Soviets removed any reason for American forces to remain in
north China. With Soviet withdrawal, the CCP made plans to take con-
trol of Manchuria through military means while using the Marshall mis-
sion to limit GMD advance into the Northeast. Although both sides agreed
to send truce teams into Manchuria to enforce the ceasefire, neither side,
especially the CCP, wanted them to work effectively. The Soviets also
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refused to help the GMD extend its influence into Manchuria. With
these developments, both sides thought of how to militarily eliminate
the other. Chiang refused to reorganize the government in Manchuria,
leading the CCP to accuse Chiang of breaking his promises. Marshall
tried to convince both sides that a military solution was not feasible,
but the GMD would not consider a truce as long as the CCP held
Changchun, a city taken by the Chinese Red Army on April 18. The
GMD later regained control of the city and forced the CCP to seek a
truce, but Marshall warned Chiang Kai-shek that he could not win a
military victory in Manchuria.13
By May, Koo saw the hope of a reorganized government based on
the idea of national unity fade away quickly. The reorganization that did
take place was superficial. Such a development may have disappointed
Koo, who wanted to get on with the business of reconstruction. He re-
jected the opinion of those in the government that force was an option
for dealing with the communists. He did not believe public opinion in
China and abroad would support such a policy. Trying to solve the com-
munist problem by force would be "suicidal" in Koo's opinion, because
there was no certainty of success nor guarantee that force could solve the
problem quickly. Koo preferred to cooperate with communists in creat-
ing a coalition government. This course would "at least ease the tension,"
and even if the attempt failed, no one could blame Nanjing for "refusing
cooperation." "What China needs most is a period of tranquility," Koo
argued, "to enable the work of reconstruction to start and go on." "If it
[reconstruction] succeeds in this respect, the whole nation would sup-
port it and the C[ommunists] would lose their ground for agitation and
opposition."
Making reconstruction problematic was the Soviet-U.S. rivalry in
Asia. When asked if the Soviet Union would continue its policy of com-
munizing the world, Koo replied in the affirmative. The pitting of com-
munistic Soviet Union against the capitalistic, democratic, Anglo-
American camp made the world unstable as both sides struggled for
domination. This struggle, which could spill over into Manchuria and
other fringe areas of China, would prove detrimental to China's desire
for reconstruction. China could not become entangled in the Soviet-
American rivalry in Manchuria nor could China take the firm stand that
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the United States was taking. Both countries could "speak out frankly or
retaliate up to the point of war," but "we [are] not in a position to do so,
and we would be the first to suffer." Nor did he think the Americans
would go to war in order to oppose "Soviet expansion" because they did
not acknowledge the "lesson of Pearl Harbor." The people of America
and Britain were alike in this regard: They "like to see their Gov't adopt
[a] firm policy but as soon as [the] danger of war appeared as a result,
they would cry for peace. This is the weakness of democracy in conduct-
ing foreign relations." In this respect, Koo may have had in mind the
Anglo-Saxon appeasement of the 1930s. Now that there was growing
tension between the two emerging superpowers, the American people
would not support going to war until the Soviets pulled a Pearl Harbor.
Whereas the Soviet Union faced no domestic political constraints, the
United States was not dependable because of American public opinion.14
When Chiang Kai-shek sought Koo's views on the Manchurian situ-
ation, both men agreed that the present tensions in Manchuria were the
result of America's "mistaken policy . . . at Yalta." Both concluded that
Marshall, who pushed for reorganization of the GMD government so
that communists and liberals would be included, was desperate to find a
solution because his and the Truman administration's reputations were
on the line, particularly with presidential elections only two years away.
With that in mind, Marshall had to "succeed in his effort to bring about
peace, unity, and democracy in China. Otherwise, he would have noth-
ing with which to defend his Yalta policy, which was really a stab in China's
back." Both men agreed, too, that "U.S. foreign policy was often naive
and impulsive, very generous when it was in the right mood but very
brutal when displeased." One can only speculate that Koo was referring
to how Washington's growing unhappiness with Chiang Kai-shek had
led to agreements like Yalta and now the Marshall Mission.
The Marshall Mission proved to be a failure because Chiang Kai-
shek did not trust the communists to the extent that Marshall did, and
he pointed to incidents where the CCP showed its true colors by not
cooperating or ignoring agreements. Chiang wanted the United States
to take a firm stand against the Soviets, "and not be diffident in regard to
Manchuria." "In 10 or 15 years," Chiang opined to Koo, "Soviet Rfussia]
will not make war and she respects strength and firmness." Moreover,
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Chiang wanted the United States to make it clear to the CCP that Ameri-
can aid would flow to him in order to strengthen the government. In
Chiang's opinion, the GMD had to be strong because only then would
the CCP "come to terms." Chiang admitted that he did not possess the
power "to persuade the United States to adopt this policy unless it de-
cided to do so itself," but the onus for the successful strengthening of his
government lay with the United States as far as Chiang was concerned.
Chiang also expected the communists to give up Changchun. If the CCP
cooperated, then and only then would Chiang permit a coalition gov-
ernment. Otherwise, he "would leave them in Manchuria where they
are, and not attempt to force them out. In China proper, Chiang would
"clear them out altogether" and use that as a base, to "build up a strong
China." Chiang complained that the Americans were giving him aid, "but
only secretly and not in full measure." Nevertheless, he did not count
upon U.S. aid as an "essential factor." Should the Soviets reintervene in
Manchuria militarily, "there would be no danger of involving" the United
States because all GMD troops would be withdrawn to China proper
where they could await "a settlement of the Manchurian question by
international means eventually."
When asked for his reaction, Koo again argued the need for recon-
struction. Since Marshall and the Truman administration wanted their
China policy to succeed, the GMD could exploit this American desire to
avoid failure and reap benefits in the form of aid. Once the government
implemented reconstruction and rebuilt China, this would make the
communists more pliant, and Moscow would likewise be more willing
to work with Chiang Kai-shek. Koo frowned on restarting the civil war
because both the Chinese and American people would oppose it. Mos-
cow would back the CCP, but Washington "could not and would not give
full support" to Chiang should he wage his civil war. To maintain the
status quo meant "drifting and continued uncertainty," and China's eco-
nomic situation and international position would deteriorate further.
Koo advised Chiang to establish a coalition government and not rely on
force.
After presenting his own view, the two hour tete-a-tete with Chiang
came to an end, but it was clear to Koo that Chiang was about to pursue
a new policy and "not meekly and wholeheartedly follow U.S. bidding."
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Chiang believed that Marshall was making too many concessions to the
communists.15 Koo would have acquiesced to American demands to re-
form and democratize the government in order to win support. He was
willing to do whatever was necessary to acquire aid and assistance. This
stance set him apart from Chiang, whose nationalism tolerated FDR's
incessant demands but would not countenance Truman's and Marshall's.
Soon after this long conversation with Chiang, Koo sat down with
Marshall to discuss the China issue. Almost immediately, Marshall de-
scribed the political situation as not unlike that in the United States, and
viewed the conflict between the GMD and CCP along lines similar to
those that occurred between the Republicans and Democrats. Marshall
remarked that the rivalry between the two was natural because "there
was nothing but struggle, one to keep the power and the other to wrest it
from their opponents. Obstruction was to be expected from political
opponents." To prove his point, he cited two examples: Roosevelt's re-
fusal to carry out Herbert Hoover's ideas to solve the banking crisis of
1932 until after the former was inaugurated and hence was in a position
to get the glory; and Wilson's nomination of Louis Brandeis to the Su-
preme Court which was attacked by William Howard Taft as a "Leftist
act." "But it was nothing of the kind," Marshall continued, "Political
struggle bet [ween] parties always took the form of exploiting any ad-
vantage. The struggle between the GMD and the CCP was no different.
"It was said [that] the [CCP's] method was unscrupulous," the general
declared, "but that had nothing to do with Communism." Marshall
praised the CCP's negotiating skills, which he deemed just as "clever" as
those used by every Westerner he had ever dealt with, but added that this
"had nothing to do with Communism either." Although he rejected as-
sertions that he did not understand China, at least this conversation re-
vealed that he did not and that he was imposing his understanding of
American politics on the Chinese scene.
Marshall also observed that neither side was "lily-white." Both the
CCP and the GMD engaged in deception, manufacturing canards, and
not observing the truce agreement to the letter. Marshall thought Chiang
Kai-shek "was sincere in his desire to reform," and acknowledged that
"reforms could not all be done in a week." The general believed that if
Chiang "succeeded in his reforms to 60 percent it would be a great credit
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already. Any political party too long in power in any country would be-
come corrupt and the thing to do would be to democratize the present
gov't." The only other alternative was force, and Marshall was convinced
"that war would mean the collapse of the [GMD] as a party and the fall
of the Gov't in the end." Marshall asked Koo "to try to work on the lead-
ers of the [GMD] to make them see the folly of their present policy of
sabotaging cooperation with the Com[munists] because it would only
mean their own destruction in the end." The general ended the talk with
the warning that the GMD leaders "might think that the U.S. would be
bound in the end to help the Gov't side" and would put the Seventh Fleet
into action, but Marshall "said that was an illusion. He could in no cir-
cumstances allow the fleet to interfere on any side." Despite Marshall's
frowning on the utility of force, Koo learned that same day that the mili-
tary "was for a showdown." And the civilian leaders, even though they
entertained their own misgivings about a military solution, so distrusted
the communists that they saw no other alternative but war.16
Around the time that Koo spoke with Marshall, the communist
forces at Changchun were defeated. Now the CCP asked for a truce, but
Chiang ordered his commanders to press the victory. Marshall insisted
that Chiang not seek a military solution, but Chiang's blood was up. He
accused Marshall of protecting the CCP with his mediation and would
have pursued his civil war. Instead, Marshall threw cold water on Chiang's
offensive by threatening to pack up his mediation mission and leaving.
Chiang could not afford to lose American aid, so on June 6 Chiang agreed
to a fifteen-day truce, but not before making it clear that if this attempt
to resolve his differences with the CCP failed, he would choose war.17
Several days later, Koo prepared to travel to Washington to take up
his new post. Before departing from China, Koo met with Chiang Kai-
shek twice to discuss publicity work in the United States. On both occa-
sions, Chiang stressed the need to cultivate church organizations,
particularly Catholic ones, which he viewed as "influential in forming
[American] public opinion." Koo suggested that U.S. business and edu-
cation leaders be targeted as well as radio and television broadcasters.
Following the British model, Koo advised that Chinese leaders cultivate
relations with their American counterparts. All could be done without
making people feel they were being used. "Americans had two traits,"
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Koo told Chiang, "they were sentimental and yet at the same time very
realistic and practical, afraid of being made suckers and dupes."
In the meantime, Koo put together a strategy for reaching Ameri-
can public opinion. In a memorandum, he focused on the political, cul-
tural, and journalistic spheres. Beginning with the political, Koo stated
the importance of developing close relations with American congress-
men and senators, participating in voluntary organizations such as the
Council for Foreign Relations, and of hiring "stooge writers." That is,
American friends and sympathizers of China would write articles and
letters, though in a manner that did not associate China with any par-
ticular political group. In the cultural sphere, Koo wanted to go into
American schools with art exhibits and textbooks as a way of educating
American young people about China. Finally, Koo sought closer ties with
journalists and wanted to see a governmental agency with appropriately
trained people distributing news releases about China.
What would be the message? Changing the stance that he took ear-
lier with Chiang, Koo now agreed with Chiang's idea of "Unification
before democracy and even peace" because otherwise reconstruction
would founder. Koo assured Chiang that the Americans could accept
this argument since Abraham Lincoln "had to resort to force in order to
unify the rule of the Federal government. Without the struggle of 1861—
65, [the] U.S.A. might be still divided and ineffective today as a country."
Impressed by that example, Chiang laid out the points to be "stressed for
publicity in America." The first was that Chiang wanted peace, not civil
war, but the communists refused to respect the agreements that they had
made with him. A second point to be emphasized was that unity "is ab-
solutely necessary before [China] could be a strong and prosperous coun-
try," and Chiang cited the example of Lincoln that Koo provided. Finally,
Chiang wanted Koo to refute Marshall's criticism that China was not
democratic and was still under one party rule by informing Americans
that nonparty men were holding important government positions and
that the communists were to blame for the lack of democracy, since they
"prevented the convocation of the National Assembly to draft a consti-
tution."18
Koo arrived in Washington in July, but his publicity campaign got
off to a bad start. To begin with, Koo nearly had a physical breakdown.
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The diplomat suffered from insomnia and exhaustion and was prescribed
daily Vitamin C shots to give him the necessary energy to carry out his
duties. Then Koo had to use his first news conference not to emphasize
the points outlined by Chiang but to deflect the effect of statements made
by Chiang's sister-in-law, the widow of Sun Yat-sen. Madame Sun de-
manded that the U.S. government cease supporting Chiang Kai-shek, or
otherwise there would be a war between the Soviet Union and the United
States. Koo allowed Madame Sun the right to have her opinion but de-
clared that her views did not represent that of most Chinese. He also
used the occasion to lay the onus on the communists for their lack of
cooperation.19
Coming on the heels of Madame Sun's statement were some Ameri-
can responses to the civil war. On June 30, the truce ended and Marshall
proved unable to get both sides to agree to an extension after negotia-
tions broke down. In July, after Chiang launched another offensive against
the CCP, Marshall imposed an embargo on arms shipments to China;
the embargo lasted through May 1947. A ceasefire was again proposed,
but Chiang demanded the withdrawal of CCP forces from the areas where
he pushed his troops. To this demand, the communists said no. On Au-
gust 10, President Truman cabled Chiang Kai-shek his regret over
Marshall's inability to make his mission a success because of "selfish as-
pirations" on the part of both the GMD and the CCP. Truman politely
warned Chiang that his decision to use force instead of "democratic pro-
cesses to settle major social issues" was leading some people in the United
States to call for a new policy toward China.20
In undertaking publicity work to rehabilitate the image of the GMD
government, Koo faced numerous obstacles. Koo traveled all over the
United States answering questions, trying to dispel Americans of what
he called communist myths. In an effort to "revise" American foreign
policy, Koo turned to the owner of Time, Inc., Henry Luce. Born in China,
this son of missionary parents was a longtime supporter of Chiang Kai-
shek.21 Either at Koo's prompting or on his own initiative, Luce met with
Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican Senator from Michigan, and Secre-
tary of State James Byrnes. Koo supplied the men with a memorandum
that laid out the "efforts of our government to enlist communist coop-
eration to achieve national unity. It suggested that in view of [the] lack
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of sincerity on the part of Chinese communist party," Washington "should
modify its policy . . . and support [the] Generalissimo in his effort to
attain [the] largest measure of unification and democracy possible at
[the] present moment."
Although Koo later denied the existence of a China Lobby, he ex-
ploited his connections with prominent Americans in order to both lobby
Congress and influence the Truman administration's China policy. Such
activity was necessary since people like Madame Sun were lobbying
against Chiang Kai-shek.22 Wherever possible, Koo painted a picture of
GMD China as a country in transition, seeking to become "united, peace-
ful, democratic and prosperous." He described China as moving away
from one-party rule under Chiang Kai-shek to that of a "genuine consti-
tutional representative government." He acknowledged that there was
opposition to the new constitution that his government was trying to
promulgate, but he went on to remind his American audiences of the
opposition to America's Constitution of 1789. He portrayed the GMD as
taking liberal political and economic measures in order to industrialize
and modernize China. On other occasions, Koo tried to discreetly and
subtly explain to Americans that the onus of Yalta lay squarely at
Washington's doorstep.23 These were the types of arguments that Koo
put forth to counter the bad press China received in the United States,
but no amount of propaganda could veil events in China.
In October 1946, Marshall requested to be recalled. He deemed his
mediation mission a failure as Chiang's forces scored successes against
the CCP. Right-wingers in the GMD government were glad to see
Marshall go, because they believed his mediation denied them the op-
portunity to destroy the CCP once and for all. There was also resent-
ment of Washington's demands for internal reform, which smacked of
foreign intrusion into China's internal affairs. On the other hand, the
GMD could not complain too much. Despite Marshall's arms embargo,
the United States still supplied to the GMD millions in reconstruction
aid and military supplies, and sided with Chiang's government against
the CCP. The war was Chiang's to win or lose.24
In January 1947, Marshall returned to the U.S. and was named sec-
retary of state. Chiang viewed Marshall's new appointment as ominous.
Relations between the two men were often strained after heated argu-
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ments during negotiations. And since Truman would see Marshall as a
China expert, Koo expected Marshall to have complete control of the
U.S.'s China policy. Members of the Republican party warned Koo that
America's China policy would change. And people like Sen. Vandenberg
hoped that the Chinese government would undergo thorough reform
and that the corrupt, incompetent, feudalistic-thinking officials be purged
and replaced by enlightened, incorruptible, capable individuals in order
to change American public opinion. Although Koo believed Marshall to
be a good, honest, open-minded man, he feared that Marshall would put
all the blame for his failure on the GMD government after he returned
to the United States. Marshall issued a statement blaming both sides for
their inability to come to terms, but Koo soon learned just how bitter
Marshall was with Chiang Kai-shek over his failure in China.25
On January 29, 1947, the State Department announced that all
mediation efforts would cease and U.S. forces would be withdrawn from
China. The announcement was followed by a renewed GMD offensive.
Over the next several months, Koo met with Marshall to discuss a vari-
ety of issues: measures to improve China's economy; the need for a coa-
lition government in Nanjing that represented other political parties;
China's trade restrictions, which angered American businessmen; a loan
for reconstruction in China; and military aid. But Koo found Marshall
and the State Department resistant to granting further aid to Chiang
Kai-shek. Marshall demanded internal reform before he would agree to
loan Chiang more money.26 He also found U.S. officials quite cold in
personal relations. After one conversation with Marshall, the secretary
of state refused to tell Koo how long he would be away from Washington
during a conference in South America. "In the past 30 years I have con-
versed and done business with at least 30 to 40 foreign ministers of a
dozen countries, including half a dozen United States Secretaries of State,
but this is the first time I have found it difficult to have a cordial free
exchange of views, not merely on questions of general interest, but even
on special questions of particular interest to China and the U.S.A. There
is almost always an atmosphere of formality and stiffness."27
Although Koo could explain away such attitudes to Marshall's mili-
tary demeanor, he found it difficult to fathom the Truman administra-
tion's hostility toward Chiang Kai-shek, given America's commitment to
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fighting communism. In Greece, the government faced off against Greek
communists who received military aid from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
On March 12,1947, Truman told Congress that the Soviet Union planned
to take advantage of this civil war to expand communism and that the
United States should pursue a policy of supporting free people through-
out the world who are resisting armed subjugation and internal subver-
sion. Truman asked for $400 million in military and economic aid for
Greece and Turkey. Koo thought the Truman Doctrine to be a sound
and welcomed replacement to what he deemed to be the ad hoc nature
of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Yet Washington avoided giving
much support to Chiang even though the principles embodied in the
Truman Doctrine were applicable to the Far East. Later Truman publicly
stated that the Chinese situation was considered serious from an inter-
national point of view. If that was true, Koo thought China "was entitled
to equal or even greater attention than the Greek situation." He hoped
that "the U.S. would show greater interest in it in the form of moral and
material support." He feared that U.S. withdrawal from China would
lead to the communization of China.28
Despite Koo's pessimism, Washington had not entirely thrown
Chiang to the wolves. Although Marshall hoped that withholding aid
would deter further civil war, the reigning assumption within Marshall's
State Department was that aid to Chiang would expand, especially since
his troops were mostly armed with U.S. weapons requiring U.S.-made
ammunition. By May, Marshall lifted the ban. Truman also ordered the
navy to provide equipment and parts. Members of the cabinet, espe-
cially the secretaries of war and navy, increasingly sided with providing
aid to Chiang and criticized Marshall's policy of withholding aid and
withdrawing American forces. Pressure also came from Congress, where
pro-Chiang politicians asked the same question Koo was asking: If the
United States could lend Greece and Turkey a helping hand, why not
Chiang Kai-shek?29
People in Washington had good reasons to worry about Chiang's
fate. By May 1947, Chiang's offensive showed signs of weakening. Over
the last several months, the CCP gave up a lot of territory as it retreated,
but it was not routed or wiped out. Soon it switched to guerilla tactics.
The People's Liberation Army took the initiative against Chiang's forces,
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who were now overextended. In the early months of 1947, PLA forces in
Manchuria launched a series of hit-and-run attacks on GMD troops that
inflicted heavy casualties and supplied the communists with ammuni-
tion and weapons. And they never lost the initiative for the rest of the
civil war and soon surrounded GMD forces, who only held the cities in
Manchuria. There was much popular resentment in Manchuria against
Chiang Kai-shek. Wherever GMD troops went, be it Manchuria, Taiwan
or other Japanese-occupied territory, they engaged in carpetbagging that
only further alienated the local people.30
There was no evidence that Chiang's defeat was inevitable, but these
setbacks for Chiang were cause for concern in Washington. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff suggested further American intervention to prevent the
expansion of Soviet power into South and Southeast Asia, but Marshall's
State Department argued that the United States could do nothing to save
the situation in China. Chiang only had himself to blame for not taking
American advice to reform. Besides, increased American intervention
might provoke the same of the Soviet Union. Such attitudes, though, did
not prevent Marshall from providing as much military equipment to
Chiang as possible. And Marshall decided in July to send an American
mission under Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, who replaced Stilwell in 1944, to
China. There, Wedemeyer found morale low, and when he left in August,
he suggested that Chiang could still win if he would only institute eco-
nomic and political reform. Wedemeyer's comments infuriated Chiang
Kai-shek, whose ardor for U.S. aid cooled for a time. In a message to
Chiang, Koo blamed Marshall for supposedly not providing any aid or
assistance because of "grudges which he does not seem to forget against"
Chiang. Koo also faulted the State Department for "much unfavorable
propaganda" that put Chiang in a bad light by making charges of "cor-
ruption and inefficiency" against the government. Koo said such no-
tions originated with communists but were picked up by Washington
"to justify lack of help to her [China] ."31
Again, Koo could see the difference in Washington's attitude to-
ward Europe from that toward China. After being appointed secretary of
state, Marshall went to Moscow for long negotiations over Germany which
remained divided into zones of occupation by the British, French, Sovi-
ets, and Americans. Marshall wanted to make a joint effort to relieve
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Europe of its economic distress, but Stalin refused. Marshall feared the
expansion of communism in Europe if nothing was done to resolve the
economic plight. When he returned from Europe, Marshall called for a
plan to reconstruct Europe. The European Recovery Plan, or what be-
came known as the Marshall Plan, asked Congress for $13 billion in eco-
nomic aid; eventually, Congress approved a package giving Europe $17
billion over four years.
There was no such plan for China, even though the United States
was in 1947 reconsidering its occupation policy in Japan. When the
Americans took over Japan, demilitarization and democratization drove
U.S. occupation policy. But with the onset of Soviet-U.S. rivalry, the
United States backed off democratization and liberalization of Japan and
focused more on rehabilitating Japan's economic power. A reconstructed
Japan could renew old trade ties with Southeast Asia, thus improving
Asia's economy and preventing the spread of communism. Germany and
Japan played a prominent role in the containment of communism, but
not China.
Although the Truman administration's attitude toward Chiang Kai-
shek in 1947 was hardly an amicable one, there were Americans who
sympathized with China's plight. Koo later referred to November 1947
as the turning point in which pressure within the United States began to
build on the Truman administration to do something for China. It was
that month that Koo became aware of the views of various American
Congressmen, cabinet leaders, and other friends of China that a new
China bill was needed. In the fall of 1947, some Congressional leaders
pressured the Truman administration to give Chiang more aid, and Henry
Luce ran articles and newspaper advertisements that proposed provid-
ing Chiang with $1.35 billion over three years. In November when Truman
asked Congress to provide assistance for Western Europe, members of
both Houses demanded to know why money for China was not included.
Arthur Vandenberg worked with the State Department to provide $18
million to Chiang, but the pro-Chiang congressmen sent a clear message
to Truman that aid to Europe could be held up should money not be
forthcoming to Chiang. Although Koo complained that the $18 million
was a "mere gesture to appease China's friends," at least his government
had friends in Washington.32
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Without doubt, Chiang Kai-shek needed friends at the end of 1947.
The CCP not only made gains in northern China, but the PLA captured
cities in Manchuria. U.S. advisers on the ground suggested that Chiang
pull his forces out of Manchuria while he could, but he rejected the ad-
vice. As the situation in China deteriorated day-by-day, Koo could see
that the GMD could not win the civil war without American help.33
While Chiang was in retreat in China, pro-Chiang forces in Wash-
ington launched an offensive on his behalf. Chiang suffered defeat on
the battlefield, the economy worsened in China, and Marshall's State De-
partment did what it could to avoid being dragged deeper into a China
quagmire. But the pressure for aid to China intensified, and Marshall
worried that the European Recovery Plan would be held up unless some-
thing was done for China. On February 18,1948, Truman sent the China
Aid bill to Congress asking for $70 million in assistance to Chiang Kai-
shek. Koo "could detect between the lines that there was no enthusiasm
behind it" as there was for the Marshall Plan. Newspapers noted that the
"heart of Gen. Marshall was not in it." Indeed, Marshall had already be-
gun to ask various Chinese intellectuals if there was a political alterna-
tive to Chiang Kai-shek.34
Although Koo was pleased that a China Aid bill had been sent to
Congress, the delay in implementing the aid package and Marshall's op-
position was not encouraging. Marshall told Congressional leaders that
he was not interested in providing long-term aid to Chiang Kai-shek
and that a great deal of military supplies had already been given to China,
a statement that Koo described in his diary as false. Marshall believed
Chiang's government to be doomed, making China an ineffective ally.
Koo argued that his government needed four things: "commodity credit,
silver loan for preliminary stabilization, program reconstruction projects,
and military aid." In trying to build up support among Americans, Koo
argued that the China Aid package should be a part of the European
Recovery Program, because "China and Europe formed 2 parts of one
picture and U.S. policy to contain Communism should not discriminate
in favour of Europe and against China." Koo described the present de-
fense of China as more important to the United States than the defense
of Pearl Harbor against Japanese attack in 1941.35
To Koo's relief, the China Aid Act passed on April 2. China would
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be given $463 million in military and economic aid, with $125 million in
military assistance being made immediately available. However, the
United States was under no obligation to become involved in the civil
war. Still, Koo believed China's economy would stabilize and "slow down
inflation." He thought the GMD army could defeat the communists if
only Nanjing could get its hands on more military aid. "China in 5000
years of her history had had many crises, some worse than the present
one, but had always managed to surmount them," Koo wrote in his di-
ary. China might not have peace in his time, but the next generation
could enjoy that peace because the "Chinese people were sound and sen-
sible and hard working." He thought 1948 was no worse than 1938, be-
cause no one thought the GMD could defeat the Japanese then. He
claimed to have had faith in 1938 "that the world would come to China's
aid in the end, and it did." Hence, it was important for everyone to "have
faith." Koo later commented that Chinese like him, from the educated
class, "always believed in the eternity of China, perhaps on account of
their training in the Confucian classics and in Chinese culture."36
Yet 1948 was worse than 1938. From September 1948 through Janu-
ary 1949, the PLA launched three campaigns that saw GMD defeat in
Manchuria, the loss of north China and the collapse of the last GMD
obstacle to communist advance toward the Yangzi River. In September,
Koo received a confidential cable from Chiang Kai-shek that appealed to
Truman "to do everything in his power to facilitate and expedite mili-
tary aid" under the China Aid Act. The letter's "language [was] very press-
ing, almost alarming in its tone." Koo learned from visiting Chinese
officials that Chiang "was losing his grip on the situation." GMD
progressives and younger members of the party were telling Chiang to
his face that he needed to surrender some of his power to the cabinet
and replace the deadwood in the party with some fresh, young blood. In
one instance when Chiang was confronted, he simply put on his cap and
walked out the door in anger, refusing to answer.37
As the GMD lost ground to the communists, there was one last
remaining hope: that a Republican be elected president of the United
States. Since it was mostly Republicans who spearheaded the drive to
provide aid to China, GMD leaders felt certain that the election of Tho-
mas Dewey, former governor of New York, would bring about a dra-
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matic change in U.S. policy toward China. All the polls taken weeks be-
fore the election suggested that Dewey would be a sure winner, but to
the shock of the GMD, Dewey was defeated. Worse, the Democrats con-
trolled both houses of Congress. Koo told Chiang Kai-shek that now
there would be less friction between the White House and Congress over
issues of foreign policy. Koo did not believe that Truman would be a real
detriment to China's cause. Truman possessed no ill-will or prejudice
toward Chiang, but because of his lack of experience in foreign affairs,
the president had in his first years deferred to Marshall who was, in Koo's
opinion, the real force behind America's China policy. With his election
by the people, Truman was in a position to assert his own views. Where
Koo expected trouble was in Congress, particularly the left-wing of the
Democratic Party. Koo was also disturbed with the reaction to the Ameri-
can election at home. American newspapers printed numerous reports
of GMD disappointment and dissatisfaction with the Democratic vic-
tory, and Koo warned his government against expressing such views, say-
ing that the American people had made their choice. It was not China's
place to quarrel with it.38
While Truman savored victory, Chiang Kai-shek tasted the bitter
gall of defeat. The loss of Manchuria was imminent, and in desperation,
Chiang begged Truman to speed up military aid. It was during these
moments of crisis that Madame Chiang went on another mission to the
United States to speak with Truman and Marshall. She begged Marshall
to send an "outstanding American officer" to China to be "the 'spark
plug' of the Chinese military effort." Marshall refused, saying that such
an officer would need to take over the entire Chinese government to
accomplish his mission.39 In the end, the Madame's mission was a fail-
ure. The Americans were not interested in making a commitment to
Chiang Kai-shek.
Although George Marshall stepped down as secretary of state, the
State Department still retained its animosity for Chiang Kai-shek. When
Koo met with Robert Lovett, the acting secretary of state, and W. Walton
Butterworth, the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, he learned
that Chiang again requested the United States to send a high-ranking
military officer to take command of Chinese forces. The answer to the
latter question was a flat no. The Chinese diplomat was told in "cold and
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very unsympathetic" terms that it was unreasonable for Americans to
take command of Chinese forces that had just suffered defeat in the field
and to take responsibility for a civil war. When Koo asked for more aid,
he received the retort that supplies were not the problem, it was the lack
of will to fight. When Koo asked about the situation in Manchuria,
Butterworth "gleefully" replied that all was calm, giving Koo "the im-
pression that the communists were not bad people after all and that one
could do business with them." Koo, feeling depressed and rather sur-
prised that Chiang Kai-shek wanted Americans to command his troops,
left the two Americans. "How long had it been that the Generalissimo
had been emphasizing no infringement on China's sovereignty?"40
As Manchuria slipped away from GMD grasp, Koo "felt depressed
by reports from China" and by the "defeatist attitude" emanating from
the Truman administration. Looking back on China's historical past, Koo
could not believe that China would be lost to the communists. Although
he declared Marshall's analogy of the CCP as being too simple, just like
that of the Republicans or Democrats, Koo admitted later that he thought
they only wanted political control. He did not expect the Chinese com-
munists to implement measures in the 1950s that would lead to the deaths
of thousands of landlords and other individuals who were deemed a
threat to the communist revolution. "I always thought that while they
may have embraced the communist ideology, that was for their political
purpose of assuring themselves of the support of Moscow, and therefore
the eventual success of their political struggle. I didn't expect that they
would go to the extreme of acting in a manner so alien to Chinese tradi-
tion and Chinese political philosophy. That was probably naivete on my
part." Koo was not alone. In his opinion, not only did Washington fail to
see the true nature of the communists, but neither did Chinese liberals
who believed China needed a change of government.41
On January 14,1949, Mao Zedong issued his eight-point peace pro-
posals that, among other things, demanded the abolition of the GMD
government and branded Chiang Kai-shek, T.V. Soong, and Wellington
Koo as war criminals. Chiang turned down the peace offer but announced
his retirement. In the last months of the GMD government's nominal
control of China, Koo believed the only way to salvage the situation was
an "Asiatic Security and Mutual Aid Pact" much like that of the North
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Atlantic Treaty Organization for Europe. In 1949, NATO was created to
defend various nations from Soviet expansion. Koo wanted an Asian
NATO, but his security scheme got nowhere because the Americans were
not interested. Their attitudes toward China and Koo reflected the
Truman administration's animosity toward Chiang Kai-shek. In Janu-
ary, when Koo met again with Lovett and Butterworth, the Chinese dip-
lomat felt that Butterworth "looked upon me as if I was the Soviet
Ambfassador], judging [from] the caution and reserve he assumed. Un-
usual for an Am[erican] diplomat toward a  Chinese representative; [I
have] never experienced same in my 36 years of dealing with Ameri-
cans."42
If not a pact, American aid remained essential. But China could
not expect others to help until it helped itself. If Chiang returned to
Nanjing from retirement, there was hope that reform measures could be
implemented. Koo felt that several steps had to be taken. Chiang, who
still wielded much power despite his retirement, first, needed "a new set
of selfless, courageous, experienced advisers to assist him." Then he had
to "reorganize the army and put it on a really modern basis" replacing
the deadwood with younger, "honest, capable and experienced officers."
Another step would be to appoint civilians as provincial governors "in
order to regain [the] confidence and cooperation of people," and find
positions for college and university graduates. Finally, Koo believed that
the government should pursue laissez faire trade and economic policies
so as to give people a chance "to make their living more easily and to
[allow] foreign merchants to do business in China" so there would be no
disgruntlement.43
In February, Koo tried to speak with Dean Acheson, who replaced
Marshall as secretary of state the previous month, about the China situ-
ation, but Acheson gave Koo the "impression [that] he did not attach
great importance to it." In fact, Acheson was quite blunt. He told Koo
that the United States had given the Chinese much advice, but "the Chi-
nese Government had been ingenious in making so many mistakes to a
point where its armed forces had refused to fight the communists." Run-
ning down a list of American assistance to China, Acheson said he "did
not know what the United States could further do to help her." Being
forthright himself, Koo retorted that while there had been mistakes on
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the Chinese side, he pointed to the "decisions taken at Yalta" which "had
adversely affected the situation, especially in Manchuria where the com-
munist success had really started." Yalta illustrated how another
government's policies and actions might affect another. But when Koo
asked for an American statement of support for what remained of the
GMD government, Acheson refused to answer.44 Such conversations con-
vinced Koo that Marshall wielded considerable influence in the State
Department, and he believed that Butterworth "was trying to carry out
even more loyally" Marshall's "policy of abandonment of China." Marshall
aside, the GMD was losing the war, and for months to come, the Ameri-
cans watched Koo strain to make the case that the GMD forces were
putting up effective resistance.45
As the situation grew hopeless for the GMD, the State Department
decided that this was an opportune time to state its position on past
Sino-American relations by publishing what became known as the China
White Paper. This document absolved Washington of any responsibility
for the GMD government's imminent demise, but instead blamed cor-
ruption and incompetence on the part of the GMD and Chiang Kai-
shek for its defeat. Nanking's Foreign Ministry instructed Koo to remind
Americans of China's eight-year war effort against Japan and the Yalta
Agreement. Expecting the White Paper to have a detrimental effect on
Sino-American relations, Koo did his best to limit the damage.46
In the meantime, Koo continued to look to drastic reform to save
the day. He dispatched telegrams to what remained of the government
in China to pursue a three-point plan of unifying the anticommunist
elements, resisting the communists with a unified military command,
and winning popular support. Such reform would not only shore up the
government's position in China, but would convince the United States
that a liberal government existed.47 All such efforts on Koo's part proved
in vain. Chiang Kai-shek was in Taiwan, and President Li Zongren, who
replaced Chiang, remained in China. Neither was willing to cooperate.
In the months to come, the Chinese communists would announce the
creation of their own government in Beijing. GMD China, the so-called
great power, had nearly disappeared.
In reflecting on its defeat, Koo believed that the GMD debacle
showed "something had been wrong" internally. Koo's government was
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not 100 percent at fault because he believed that U.S. policy had been
wrong; not in the entire period running from 1945 to 1949, but at cer-
tain moments, particularly Yalta and during the Marshall Mission. Still,
Koo could see that "something had been wrong for years past in our
political, military and economic policies. The principle of observing the
will of the people in governing a country had been neglected to the det-
riment of China. . . . They are the stockholders of the country and the
government is only the board of directors. The latter cannot run the
company against the interests of the stockholders without arousing their
suspicion, losing their support, and making them rise in protest and op-
position." The imminent fall of the GMD government in 1949 also led
Koo to reflect "that personal government, no matter how well meant, is
never so desirable as government by law. The latter is [the] only solid
foundation on which to build a nation."48 Koo thus returned to the no-
tion that constitutional government was preferable to dictatorship. It
was this "personal government" in the form of Chiang Kai-shek that re-
jected Koo's solutions to the myriad problems facing China after 1945.
Early on Koo saw the futility of civil war. He wanted China to unite and
rebuild so that it could truly be a great power. He wanted to see the
creation of a liberal government that would permit the participation of
the Chinese communists if they were willing to shed their military and
act like a true political party.
Yet his leader was a man who was far more conservative and less
willing to accommodate either the Chinese communists or the Ameri-
cans. In 1948, Koo criticized Chinese political parties who were "com-
posed mostly of politicians and scholars who attach too much academic
importance to theories and doctrines and are not solidly grounded in
the support of practical interests in the country like labour, farmers,
business groups, etc."49 By contrast, Mao Zedong understood mass poli-
tics and, partly for that reason, defeated Chiang Kai-shek. Koo's reform
solutions were also flawed by his lack of understanding of the situation
on the ground. Koo did not comprehend the extent to which the Sino-
Japanese War had weakened the government. Nor did he fully appreciate
the extent to which the government had lost popular support or the fact
that consequently his reform measures would have met with popular
resistance.50 Chiang's government was beyond salvation.
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This explains why years later, Koo still could not comprehend the
defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. He still could not answer the question: "How
could things have come to such a pass so soon after the great success of
our war of resistance, how could the situation have deteriorated so fast,
as to make it a real grave danger to the continuing existence of the gov-
ernment, and how to explain the popularity of the communists." Koo
knew from Chinese history that dynasties changed every few hundred
years or so, but he could not believe that anticommunist Chinese masses
welcomed Chinese communist forces into their cities and villages. Koo
never dreamed that the people would reject Chiang Kai-shek despite all
his faults because communism was unpopular: "It was something quite
unintelligible to me."51
Chapter 9
THE ROC ON TAIWAN
AND THE EARLY COLD WAR
ON OCTOBER 1,1949, THE PRC WAS PROCLAIMED in Beijing. Mao
Zedong told the Chinese people that China had finally stood up. Once
again, Koo stood on the opposite side of revolution. As ambassador, he rep-
resented a government whose diplomatic recognition would soon be en-
dangered. Despite efforts by the United States, Britain and India immediately
recognized the new PRC government followed by nine other noncommu-
nist regimes. Even the status of Taiwan as a base remained in question. Tai-
wan was a colony of Japan's from 1895 until 1945, and Koo knew that
"juridically" Taiwan's status was "open to challenge" being based upon the
Cairo and Potsdam agreements. There were reports that the United States
considered proposing a UN trusteeship for Taiwan, an idea that Chiang
Kai-shek opposed. Koo preferred that the Americans jointly occupy Tai-
wan with the GMD in order to deny the PRC any claim to the territory.1
In Washington, Truman and Acheson did not lean toward recogni-
tion of the PRC. Instead, they initially pursued a policy of Titoism in
China. In 1948, Josef Tito's Yugoslavia split from Stalin, and for the first
time there was a communist nation independent of the Soviet Union.
Truman and Acheson likewise hoped to prevent closer ties between the
PRC and the Soviet Union. Such a policy meant that the Truman admin-
istration was unwilling to throw complete support behind Chiang Kai-
shek and might even sacrifice Chiang to bring about Chinese Titoism.
Truman and Acheson (neither of whom knew very much about Asia or
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bothered to learn) rejected calls from within Congress and the military
to take Taiwan by force or turn it over to the UN. The U.S. Navy espe-
cially saw Taiwan as valuable because if the Soviet Union acquired a sub-
marine base on a PRC-controlled Taiwan, the Soviets could threaten U.S.
security in the Pacific. In January 1950, Truman, however, announced
that the United States had no intention of putting military bases on Tai-
wan, and that the United States would not prevent the PRC from attacking
Taiwan. That same month, Acheson gave his famous National Press Club
speech in which he reiterated the point that intervention by the United
States into the Chinese civil war would only anger the Chinese people,
who were glad to see Chiang Kai-shek out of power. Acheson's speech was
a response to critics in the United States who pressed Washington save
Chiang Kai-shek, but Acheson refused to take any action that would drive
the PRC closer to Moscow. Hence, in laying out his "defensive perimeter"
strategy for East Asia, it was no coincidence that Taiwan was excluded.2
While Taiwan's fate hung in the balance, Koo spent the last years of
his career trying to obtain the necessary political, economic, and mili-
tary assistance to defend Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek complicated this ef-
fort because he, so it was said, was the central obstacle to bringing the
United States fully behind Taiwan. Over the next several years, Ameri-
cans reiterated time and again to Koo and his compatriots that a "Third
Force" was needed in China. By a Third Force, it was meant a liberal,
democratic alternative to both the conservative, authoritarian generalis-
simo and the CCP. Those opposing the generalissimo pointed to the large
amount of aid given in previous years that brought few returns. And
there was the perception, one not off the mark, that Chiang was willing
to sit on his military funding and supplies and wait for World War III to
save him, just as World War II did nearly ten years before. Chiang also
carried with him political baggage that stretched back to World War II.
He represented all that had gone wrong in China since 1944 if not be-
fore. U.S. government officials, Congressmen from both political parties
and military officers (some of whom preferred that the U.S.-educated
Gen. Sun Liren "take charge and that would make it easy for China-U.S.
cooperation in the military field"3), as well as many friends of China,
made it clear to various Chinese officials that Chiang Kai-shek had to go
before Taiwan could save itself or be saved.4
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Koo tried to fix everything that had damaged the prestige of Chiang
Kai-shek, particularly the charges of corruption. Rehabilitating the im-
age of Chiang Kai-shek was a daunting responsibility. Koo needed the
facts: "We cannot hope to pull the wool over peoples' eyes by ignoring
such questions as: Why did our 4 million troops not fight the
Com[munists] with favorable odds of 10-1 in number and with added
advantages of an air force and navy? Why did we not manage our fi-
nances better to forestall the collapse of our currency? Why did the people
refuse to support the Gov't?" Fortunately for Koo, the political atmo-
sphere of the early 1950s was ripe for using public opinion against the
Truman administration. The communist takeover of China came as a shock
to the American public as did the announcement that the Soviet Union
exploded its first atomic weapon in September 1949. Increasingly, Repub-
licans, especially Senator Joseph McCarthy, accused the Truman adminis-
tration of being a hotbed of communist spies. Republicans, conservative
Democrats, and members of the China Lobby denounced Truman's re-
fusal to support Chiang Kai-shek. Some members of Truman's adminis-
tration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff held clandestine meetings with GMD
officials and surreptitiously supplied military aid to Chiang Kai-shek.5
In an effort to change U.S. foreign policy, Koo launched a propa-
ganda campaign that portrayed Taiwan as the last bastion of noncom-
munist Chinese who were essential for containing communism in Asia.
In an article for Reader's Digest, Koo declared that the "Chinese Commu-
nists are tools of the Soviet Union!' (Italicized in original). He called for an
end to the appeasement of communism and for assistance in defending
Free China. Finally, he made the plea that the United States not recog-
nize the new regime in Beijing. All of these steps were necessary to pre-
vent the enslavement of the Asian people and ultimately the enslavement
of the free world. In another speech, he declared that Chiang Kai-shek's
army was the "largest single unit in whole Asia bent upon fighting Com-
munist imperialism," and used the analogy of Churchill "offering aid
unsolicited to [the] U.S.S.R" in 1941 in arguing for providing Taiwan
with military assistance.6 Such rhetoric not only had the purpose of gar-
nering support from the U.S. government, but Koo's pleas for help were
also a way of using public opinion against the Truman administration.
He had faith in Americans in general to assist the Chiang's government,
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and Koo assumed that he could do an end run around an administra-
tion that held Chiang Kai-shek in contempt.
Koo also tried to prevent Chiang's accusers from having any am-
munition to use against Chiang's regime. "I found the most difficult ac-
cusation to answer," Koo explained to a Chinese general, "was the
corruption of the high Chinese officials" of the GMD government, espe-
cially Chiang's relatives. "Americans did not know much about the mili-
tary incompetence or economic mishandling, but they all understood
what was meant by corruption." He implored various Chinese officials
that had grudges against Chiang Kai-shek to settle their grievances qui-
etly. He pointed out to one such disgruntled individual that "our only
hope was to work for [a] U.S. change of policy in our favour, without its
aid and support, we would not hope to fight back to our mainland." One
favorite target for Free China's accusers was Lend-Lease. Every six months,
President Truman made it a point to remind Congress that the Soviet
Union and GMD China were the only two countries that had failed to
settle their debts. Intensely annoyed, Koo wanted to take away the Truman
administration's stick. He told Chiang Kai-shek that if the $500 million
credit could be repaid, it would "put an end to talk of corruption . . . and
forestall any backfire on [the] part of [the] U.S. against us in future pro-
posals of financial aid from us."7
Another measure taken by Koo was to maintain unity among the
Chinese in general and support the generalissimo in particular. For a
brief time, Koo was interested (a fact that Chiang Kai-shek was well aware
of) in sponsoring a liberal party that possessed a draft constitution in
order to provide a political alternative that would appease the American
desire for a Third Force.8 The idea originated with Jiang Tingfu, Koo's
old acquaintance from the 1920s who was now the ROC's ambassador to
the UN, who wanted to form what he called a Chinese Liberal Party with
the goal of replacing Chiang Kai-shek. Initially, Koo wanted a cabinet
made up of a "group of well-known, clean, liberal" U.S.-educated stu-
dents that had Chiang's support. The GMD would stand aside and let
the liberal cabinet "have the full power to run the gov't and deal with the
situation in a democratic way." He argued that this would show the Chi-
nese and American people that the government was resolved to get its
act together. "The psychology of looking to U.S. aid to raise the morale
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of our soldiers and people is wrong," Koo wrote in his diary, "We must
show self-help in order to win help from [the] U.S." If Chiang Kai-shek
dealt only with military affairs, leaving "politics and government to the
civilians, we still could pull China out of her present plight." Koo and
Jiang Tingfu wanted Hu Shi, another old friend that was also one of the
most famous Chinese liberals inside or outside of China, to head this
party, but Hu refused, not wanting to reenter politics.9
Over time, a Third Force alternative seemed impossible. Jiang
Menglin, former chancellor of Beijing University, explained to Koo that
"Americans think Chinese liberals should and could take charge of the
situation, b u t . . . there were no such 'animals' in China. The trouble is . . .
China cannot get along with Chiang and also cannot get along without
him because of [the] lack of new leaders, and because Chiang is self-
centered and likes to dictate and [is] unwilling and unable to surround
himself with other than 'yes' men." Koo and his friends likewise reached
the same conclusion that their party scheme did not hold water. Although
they faulted the United States for the "loss of China," they also blamed
Chiang for not implementing the reforms that Koo and others had urged.
Since they could not get rid of Chiang, Koo and his compatriots had no
choice but to support the man. When the Americans argued that an alter-
native was necessary, Koo continually replied, "No other leadership could
be created overnight." Koo deemed Chiang to be "a patriot and, in spite of
the mistakes he had made while ruling the mainland, is still respected there
as the outstanding leader to liberate them from Communist oppression."10
To support the propaganda and publicity effort, Koo traveled to
Taiwan in the summer of 1950 to obtain facts for himself. Relations be-
tween the mainlanders and the Taiwanese were strained. When GMD
forces took over Taiwan after 1945, they engaged in a large-scale carpet-
bagging operation. When the Taiwanese revolted in 1946 and asked for a
new governor, Chiang Kai-shek sent thousands of troops that killed hun-
dreds if not thousands of Taiwanese. By now though, Chiang Kai-shek
was entrenched on Taiwan with little hope of being toppled by an inde-
pendence movement. Under martial law, the GMD's authority could not
be legally challenged. The forming of new political parties and newspa-
pers were prohibited. Besides creating a GMD bastion on Taiwan, Chiang's
government had to deal with economic problems. In 1950, Taiwan's in-
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flation rate was 300 percent, and the island needed to undergo land re-
form in order to increase agricultural yields.11
During Koo's short visit, he heard the "complaints and aspirations
and hopes" of the "so-called" Taiwanese people. And he found their atti-
tude toward Chiang and the government on the whole "loyal and trust-
ing and their grievances were being taken care of." Not everything was
rosy though. Koo observed several areas in which GMD control had a
negative effect, "such as [the] harsh manner of collecting special defense
tax; occupation of school buildings by troops, thus preventing children
from getting their education regularly; indiscriminate arrests by special
police to root out Communist spies and break up spy-rings; denial of
full opportunity to [Taiwanese] in lower echelons of employment [but]
rather [a] preference for mainlanders in filling such posts in railway,
postal, police and school teaching service."12
These problems aside, Koo was encouraged to see partial success in
running the government "in accordance with the Constitution." Seem-
ingly, Chiang dictated less and less and permitted more debate in the
cabinet. Such changes were necessary, since the United States had lost
confidence in Chiang and "were desirous of finding a new face." Indeed,
strong supporters of Chiang Kai-shek, including Republican Represen-
tative Walter Judd, former missionary to China and longtime backer of
Chiang Kai-shek, suggested to Koo and others that Chiang Kai-shek "be-
come a Constitutional President with the task of governing to be performed
by the others—constitutional organs without his interference or control."13
And there were Chinese supporters of Chiang Kai-shek who wanted
him to distance himself from the GMD. Some liberal intellectuals, such
as Hu Shi, wanted the generalissimo to "divest himself of the presidency
of the [GMD]—a party of rotters or a rat hole" in order to get U.S. back-
ing. Koo agreed and allegedly spoke frankly with Chiang on this issue,
because Koo knew that people rarely spoke their minds to the generalis-
simo: "Too many people told him only agreeable things—things which
he would like to hear and withheld unpleasant comments or opinions."
Koo told Chiang and the GMD Central Reform Committee that Ameri-
can friends deemed three steps as necessary in order to improve the
GMD's image in America. One was to, "Change the name of the party."
Another was to put the "Principle of the People's Livelihood" before the
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"Principle of Nationalism" and the "Principle of Democracy." Finally,
"Democratize the structure and system of control of the party" by throw-
ing out those aspects of the government that Americans considered as
"characteristic of the Communist or Fascist Party." Koo argued that the
"Principle of Nationalism" was the underlying cause for India's and
Burma's anti-GMD policy. Sun Yat-sen's Pan-Asianism under Chiang
struck many as hegemony. Koo also impressed on Chiang the fact that
the GMD "had become an international target and was looked upon as a
symbol... of reaction in politics." By 1952, a number of reforms brought
new blood into the GMD and a number of members were purged for
corruption or incompetence.14 Nevertheless, Chiang remained firmly in
power and the GMD maintained a one-party dictatorship.
Koo's overall attempt to reform the generalissimo's image met with
only limited success. President Li Zongren went to the United States where
his subordinates accused Koo of being uncooperative and publicly criti-
cized Chiang Kai-shek for being a dictator and an unconstitutional presi-
dent. "It is a typical case of washing dirty linen in public," Koo wrote in
his diary, "and much to be deplored."15 Charges of corruption continued
as well by Chinese officials and Americans alike. Drew Pearson of the
Washington Post accused Koo of doing under-the-table favors for vari-
ous Chinese, and claimed that Koo's wife did not pay her income taxes.
Koo responded quickly to these charges, showing them to be unfounded,
but he could not do the same with those made against GMD officials,
including the accusation that Chiang Kai-shek received millions of dol-
lars from the "China Lobby." The continued attacks took their toll on
the Chinese ambassador. "I and many private Chinese feel much hurt,"
Koo told a friend, "by the persistent talk of corruption of our
Government], as if every Chfinese] official could not be trusted but
was a corrupt man."16
The change in U.S. policy that Koo anxiously awaited in response
to his efforts to make Chiang Kai-shek worthy in American eyes did not
materialize. However, international events worked in Chiang's favor. In
February 1950, Mao and Stalin signed the Treaty of Friendship, a thirty-
year alliance that committed both communist countries to assist one
another militarily if either were attacked by Japan and/or its allies, mean-
ing the United States. This treaty undermined the U.S. policy of Titoism
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and the potential for Soviet aircraft and naval vessels operating out of
Taiwan would likewise undermine the defensive perimeter strategy.17
Then came the Korean War. On June 25, North Korea invaded South
Korea. The reaction to the attack, according to Koo, was reminiscent of
Pearl Harbor. Truman ordered Gen. Douglas MacArthur, top U.S. com-
mander in Occupied Japan, to send U.S. forces there to Korea to stop the
communist onslaught. The Truman White House also sent units of the Sev-
enth Fleet into the Taiwan Straits to prevent both a PRC-invasion of Taiwan
and Chiang Kai-shek from launching attacks against the mainland. A commu-
nist victory in Taiwan or a broader war would threaten Japan, the vital
key to the U.S.'s containment policy for Southeast Asia. The Korean War
further moved Truman to approve a military assistance package for Tai-
wan that included the dispatch of a military advisory mission.18
Although Koo thought that the war forced the United States "to be
more realistic in dealing with" Taiwan, he quickly saw that June 25 did
not signal a change in attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek. When Chiang
proposed to send troops to Korea (an idea that appealed to MacArthur
who visited Chiang in Taiwan), Koo found the U.S. State Department
rather cynical and sarcastic in its response to Chiang's proposal. The
Americans were probably correct in their estimate of the GMD Chinese
fighting man at the time, but their appraisal more than annoyed Koo. He
thought the real reason why the Americans refused Chiang's request was
because of the White Paper. "Acceptance [of Chiang's request] would
mean acknowledgement of the error of judgment on the part of the
United States Government in the past." In fact, Koo's reading of the
Truman administration was not too far off the mark. Initially, Truman
and Acheson did not want to reestablish close political ties with Chiang
nor make U.S. aid readily available to the ROC government. Still, even if
the American attitude toward China remained the same, Koo welcomed
the change in policy toward Taiwan because "it served to open the door
a little more for us to work for improvement of our relations with them."19
If the Korean War saved Chiang Kai-shek from communist take-
over, for many, it seemed to be the next step to World War III, which
could lead to GMD victory over the communists on the mainland. The
notion of world war breaking out in the near future had been prevalent
in Chinese military circles since 1949. Koo knew that this was a view that
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U.S. "officials laugh at and even resent." The Chinese were not laughing.
Many were convinced that world war was imminent and saw this as the
true salvation of Chiang Kai-shek because the United States might back
Chiang in launching an attack against the mainland. Koo demurred. The
Soviet Union was still recovering from the ravages of the last war, and
there was no evidence that the United States wanted war either. And
even if World War III broke out and the United States won, this would
not guarantee that the United States would support the generalissimo in
recovering the mainland. The former was, in Koo's opinion, more likely
to "look for some group, noncommunist and liberal minded, on the main-
land, or even a mixed group."20
As the Korean War grew in intensity and expanded, Taiwan's posi-
tion became increasingly secure. In September 1950, Douglas MacArthur
made his brilliant landing at Inchon, thirty miles from Seoul and miles
behind North Korean lines farther south. In October, MacArthur's forces
moved across the 38th Parallel into North Korea. In response, Mao or-
dered PLA forces to Manchuria, including many units previously poised
to attack Taiwan, and across the Yalu River into North Korea. The next
month, MacArthur assured the American people that their boys would
be home by Christmas, but on November 28, PLA troops hit MacArthur's
armies, inflicting a humiliating defeat on U.S. troops who now scrambled
pall-mall for the 38th Parallel. PLA and North Korean troops captured
Seoul, but by the end of 1950, UN forces retook Seoul. A seesaw of
offensives continued before the lines stabilized in 1951.
The PRC's entry into the war indeed convinced the United States
to provide military assistance to Taiwan. In 1951, the U.S. established the
Military Assistance and Advisory Group-Taiwan. For the next fourteen
years, MAAG-Taiwan provided Chiang with $100 million per year in
nonmilitary aid and twice that amount in military assistance.21 PRC in-
tervention in Korea also helped the ROC's representation in the UN. At
the UN, the Soviets initially attempted to get the PRC a seat there. In-
deed, the Soviets boycotted the UN for several months in 1950 because
of the refusal to oust the ROC and were not present when the UN passed
U.S.-sponsored resolutions demanding an end to hostilities and the with-
drawal of North Korean forces back across the 38th Parallel. Wanting to
ensure that the PRC remained dependent on the Soviet Union, the So-
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viet delegation to the UN stopped raising the issue of giving the PRC a
seat and ousting the ROC. Another irony was that at a time when the
Soviets were silent on the ROC's place in the UN, noncommunist states
supported the PRC's entry at the ROC's expense. After the PRC inter-
vened in Korea, the British suggested to Washington that the PRC be
permitted entry into the UN and that China's claim to Taiwan be recog-
nized in order to conciliate Beijing. Acheson rejected the idea, saying
that he could not see how sacrificing Taiwan would make China more
peaceful. And the ROC's support of U.S. resolutions proved vital. Without
ROC support, U.S. resolutions regarding Korea would have been defeated.
Not wanting to alienate its U.S. ally and frustrated with the PRC for not
ending the Korean War on Western terms, Britain in 1951 supported a
U.S. resolution that called for a moratorium on discussion of the ques-
tion of which China deserved to be in the UN.22
Although the moratorium lasted ten years and even though the
ROC's seat in the UN seemed fairly secure, Chiang Kai-shek's penchant
to withdraw from any international organization once the PRC became
a member deeply disturbed Koo. He thought it "inadvisable" to with-
draw "on our own initiative" because "withdrawal would only be a sign
of weakness and facilitate admission" of the PRC. "Better to face expul-
sion and protest against it," argued Koo, "than voluntarily withdraw for
fear of sure expulsion in [the] end."23 Koo's advice went unheeded. Chiang
Kai-shek's narrow-minded ideology that dominated his foreign policy
did not permit compromise and contributed to Taiwan's gradual isola-
tion from the world.
Despite the confidence inspired by America's change of policy to-
ward Taiwan in which the United States now protected Taiwan from the
PRC, Koo had evidence that there were enemies of GMD Taiwan in Wash-
ington, especially in the State Department and Congress, who sought to
"besmirch" Chiang and to advocate Titoism in China. It was true that
while the Korean War changed U.S. policy toward Taiwan, some in the
Truman Administration still clung to the idea of Titoism in China.24
Much to Koo's annoyance, the Truman administration was not al-
ways willing to use its leverage to protect Chiang Kai-shek's prestige. A
clear example was the signing of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951. Since
the end of World War II, a treaty officially ending the Pacific War had yet
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to be signed with Japan. In the months after Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to
Taiwan, the issue received a great deal of attention from the Pacific allies,
particularly the United States and Britain. John Foster Dulles, an old
acquaintance of Koo's who was a respected lawyer, assisted the State De-
partment in drawing up the treaty. Two aspects of the proposed treaty
that troubled Chiang and Koo were the U.S. insistence that Japan not
pay reparations to the ROC and the provision that Taiwan's status be
settled by the United Nations. Worse, neither Britain nor the U.S. could
agree on which China should be permitted to sign the treaty, so a com-
promise was reached: Neither China would be invited to San Francisco
to sign the treaty and Japan was free to determine what attitude to take
toward the PRC. (In reality, Britain wanted Japan to renew ties with the
PRC while Dulles wanted Japan to follow a pro-Taiwan policy.) Not only
was the PRC furious, but so was the ROC. Koo told Dulles that the Anglo-
American compromise was "not only a blow to its [the ROC's] prestige"
but likewise would be a blow to U.S. prestige in Asia, because people
there would conclude "that the friendship of the United States was never
dependable because at a critical moment the United States might let its
friends down." Koo blamed the British for trying to counterbalance the
power of the United States in the Pacific by opposing the ROC.25
Dulles' formula was to have Japan grant diplomatic recognition
and trade agreements so that the ROC would not lose prestige. The ROC
would benefit from the treaty without having to sign the treaty. Koo
expected that formula to be rejected by Taibei, so he suggested that all
the countries sign, but at different times, with the ROC signing near the
end in order to give face to the countries who recognized the PRC.26
Dulles went to London where a formula was worked out that permitted
the ROC to sign a bilateral treaty with Japan separately from the multi-
lateral treaty. Dulles thought this was a 90 percent success for the ROC.
Koo disagreed, saying that the ROC stood not "on an equal footing with
the other Powers and . . . was really a discriminatory treatment." Dulles
reminded Koo that the ROC could get the blame for blocking the treaty,
but Koo remarked that it seemed more important to not have the ROC
sign than to have a peace treaty and that the blame should go to the U.K.
and others, not the ROC. The Chinese diplomat went on to say that the
ROC signed the Yalta Agreement "against its better judgment... in order
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to shows its spirit of cooperation with the United States." In his opinion,
Koo felt that the Chinese people would not look upon the separate sign-
ing of the treaty as a "diplomatic success" either for Taiwan or the U.S.27
Naturally, Chiang Kai-shek insisted that either the ROC sign the
multilateral treaty or sign a bilateral treaty at the same time that the
other countries signed a multilateral treaty. Dean Rusk, a member of the
State Department, rejected both scenarios and reminded Koo that the
ROC was in various international organizations "due solely to the sup-
port of the United States" and that rejection of the ROC's participation
was not unrealistic since the ROC had no power over the mainland. Koo
retorted that that during World War II, the numerous governments-in-
exile in London received diplomatic recognition from the allies and par-
ticipated in all important proclamations "for the sake of upholding the
moral principle as well as the principle of allied solidarity in common
defense of the cause of freedom." Koo's government was simply asking
"to be treated on a footing of equality with other Allied Powers, a prin-
ciple of equality for which China had been struggling and fighting for
the last fifty years beginning with the struggle for the abolition of un-
equal treaties."28 Despite providing Dulles with different formulas, the
Americans stuck to the one agreed on by the British.
This "loss of face" infuriated Chiang Kai-shek who wanted some
face saving formula. In July, Koo suggested to Dulles that the United
States invite the ROC to the San Francisco Conference, and pressure Ja-
pan into negotiating a ROC-Japan bilateral treaty at the San Francisco
Conference. Chiang wanted a treaty with Japan as soon as possible, be-
cause he wanted Japan's military strength to be rebuilt so that both sides
could cooperate in containing communist expansion. Japanese military
experts, veterans of the Sino-Japanese War, were already assisting in the
training of GMD troops.29 Washington eventually forced Tokyo to sign a
Peace Treaty and to recognize Chiang's government. The price Taiwan
paid was that the treaty signed with Japan only recognized Chiang's au-
thority as encompassing Taiwan and the Pescadores, and the ROC never
received an invitation to San Francisco. Still bitter with the Americans,
Chiang said that exclusion of his government from the San Francisco Peace
Conference "would stand as one of the darkest pages in U.S. history."30
The exclusion of the ROC from San Francisco angered Koo. He
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deemed it a humiliation. His conclusion was that "Power politics domi-
nated even U.S. policy with expediency overriding considerations of
moral principles and international justice." Koo could see too that "in-
ternational law has lost much of its prestige and authority in the Post-
War rivalry bet [ween] the Free World and [the] Communist group." A
decade had not passed since millions died as a result of Japan's attempt
at Pacific hegemony, but the treaty with Japan treated the Japanese not
only as equals, but as friends. When a Filipino diplomat remarked that
the Americans did not understand the Japanese mentality, Koo replied
"the American people were young and emotional. It seemed that they
must have some country to pet upon at a given time and now it was
Japan." And although they liked to picture the Cold War as an ideologi-
cal conflict, the Americans had no qualms about humiliating their anti-
communist allies in Taiwan or elsewhere in the name of expediency.31
Given the Truman administration's persistent antagonism toward
Chiang, Koo and others looked to the 1952 election to bring in a new
Congress and president to effect a positive change in the status quo. There
was much for the Chinese to like in Dwight D. Eisenhower. His party ran
on a platform that called for ending the Korean War and for taking on
communism and corruption in the U.S. government. The man who would
become Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, also called for
the liberation of those peoples in Europe and Asia living under commu-
nist rule. The election of Eisenhower to the presidency in 1952 made the
Chinese community in the U.S. "more cheerful and optimistic." Indeed,
when Eisenhower gave his first State of the Union address, he declared he
was unleashing Chiang Kai-shek, meaning that the generalissimo, in theory,
had a free hand to attack the PRC. Nevertheless, Koo warned his close
friends "against expecting too much too soon." He knew that Eisenhower
was a "Europe-firster, and, if elected, unlikely to change his stand much in
favour of Asia." In his opinion, Eisenhower "knew little about the Far East"
and doubted that Eisenhower would show much interest in Asia.32
Koo's understanding of Eisenhower's foreign policy views was more
accurate than that of his compatriots. When Eisenhower decided to run
for the presidency, he generally agreed with Truman's foreign policy ini-
tiatives and opposed the unilateralism of conservative Republicans like
Robert Taft of Ohio who wanted to withdraw the United States from
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international affairs. Although he had reservations about Truman's China
policy and although Eisenhower spoke of "liberation" and unleashing
Chiang during the presidential campaign, Eisenhower had no intention
of mounting a military campaign to "liberate" mainland China.33
Despite Dulles' and Eisenhower's public rhetoric of liberation, Koo
(and eventually Chiang Kai-shek) understood that no one in the admin-
istration thought a GMD recovery of the mainland realistically possible.
In the U.S. military establishment, opinion toward Taiwan remained di-
vided, as Marshall's supporters were "still influential," or so Koo claimed.
The State Department was not as antagonistic as before, but individuals
opposed to Chiang remained. Hence, Koo knew that he had to work
"more cautiously." Whether Koo understood or not, neither Dulles nor
Eisenhower liked Chiang Kai-shek. And the Chinese recognized in no
time that having the party of their choice in the White House was a two-
edged sword. Madame H.H. Kung told Koo that when the "Democrats
were in power, we could say to Republicans what we thought of the U.S.'s
policy toward Free China. Now with Republicans] in power and they
have been friendly on the whole, we could not always complain or ask
for more and more aid."34
Over the next several years, Koo and his government would have
much to complain about. Time and again, Koo pressed the Americans to
take direct actions against the communists. Eisenhower bluntly rebuffed
a proposal to support Chiang in retaking the mainland. On one occasion
when Koo made a similar proposal, Dulles retorted that the "danger in
vigorous application of a policy of pressures was that a totalitarian re-
gime when near the point of break-up may lash out recklessly in order to
avoid or postpone an internal crisis." Koo disagreed. In Koo's mind, the
only way to deal with the communist threat was through a long-range
policy that "would take in the whole free world as a unit and which would
help the weak nations to build up their military strength for resisting
Communist aggression and at the same time develop their respective
economies and raise their standards of living." The latter was important
because as "long as the under-developed and unfortunate countries were
weak and poor, they could not but become happy hunting grounds for
Communist imperialism which would seize every opportunity to push
forward its objectives."35
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Koo's feelings about the whole issue of the United States actively
rolling back communism revolved around his sense of history and the
present relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and the United States.
Throughout Koo's life, he watched Japan slowly encroach on Chinese
territory before expanding throughout the Pacific, and he was in Europe
when Hitler nearly conquered that continent. Those personal historical
experiences led Koo to view past Japanese and German expansionism
and the present threat of communism as similar, if not the same, in means
and methods.
Koo's stance against power politics did not mean that he was un-
sympathetic to Western Europe's defense needs, but rather that he thought
the United States too Eurocentric for its own good. Koo told American
audiences that Asia was the prime target of the Kremlin in its plan for
world domination. He rejected what he called the "Churchillian view of
Europe being the center of gravity" because the Soviet Union was a "bi-
continental Eurasian mass" making it just as much a threat to Asia than
Europe. Koo and other Asians wanted the United States to provide the
Asian equivalent of NATO to ensure Asia's security and protect the Free
World everywhere.36 And he called on the Europeans to follow the U.S.'s
lead and "not hamper the efforts of the U.S. in defending its own vital
interests, which in the long run, is also of importance to the Allies." Both
Western Europe and Asia were "faced with a common danger and they
should not discriminate against or underestimate or disregard the dan-
ger in Asia." "[M]utual coexistence" was an impossibility.37
Even more disturbing to Koo was the premium that the Eisenhower
administration placed on political expediency. Seeing that the Korean
War was hurting the U.S. economy, Eisenhower determined to end the
conflict. The issue that prevented all sides from ending the fighting was
the question of what to do about Chinese prisoners who wanted to go to
Taiwan. Initially, the PRC demanded that all Chinese prisoners be repa-
triated to China. There was a possibility that the political problems cre-
ating that conflict would not be solved, and that a dishonorable peace
would be the result. With more enemies than friends in the UN, the anti-
ROC countries were, in Koo's words, "bent upon admitting Red China
into [the] U.N." More importantly, Koo blamed the White House for
being "overanxious to get an armistice at any cost for domestic political
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reasons and because of the pressure of the Allies." Koo wanted the Ameri-
cans to ignore the communist-appeasing allies, and "stand firm on prin-
ciples and not yield to the argument of expediency."38 In 1953, though,
the deadlock in negotiations over the fate of the Chinese POWs was bro-
ken. Stalin's death in March, the war's toll on the communist powers'
economies, and fear that the U.S. would expand the war were among
several factors that led the communists to agree that Chinese prisoners
could choose whether or not to return to the PRC. Meanwhile, Korea
remained divided.39
The stalemate in Korea was not to Koo's liking. The unwillingness
to roll back communism in Korea gave the ROC government little hope
of U.S. support against the PRC. In Koo's opinion, the U.S. ended the
war in the name of political expedience, which he viewed as dangerous
to collective security. For example, it undermined the UN. In 1950, Koo
warned John Foster Dulles that "If this world organization should fail by
sacrificing principle to expediency which, in this case, would mean put-
ting a premium on aggression, then . . . the whole free world would lose
its hope for the future. The United Nations would then go the way of the
League of Nations." By 1954, Koo believed the UN to be ineffective be-
cause of political expediency. "But the peace and security of the world
must be built," Koo argued, "upon the more solid foundation of moral
principles as well as military strength."40
Koo had other reasons to worry about ROC-U.S. relations in the
mid-1950s. In the United States, he heard descriptions of Taiwan as a
"police state," lacking in democracy, and Chiang Kai-shek was accused
of trying to build his own dynasty. Koo regarded those criticisms as too
harsh. Taiwan was "threatened with invasion by the Communists from
the mainland, and the question of security must be regarded as [a] top
priority matter." The ROC was in a state of war and could not make all
the reforms being demanded of it. Koo saw no difference between the
actions of Taiwan and that of the Western democracies during World
War II. He remembered that democracy was suspended in Britain "in
the interest of national security," and believed the GMD government was
correct in its actions.41
Of particular concern was Taiwan's economy. Since 1950, the
economy had improved considerably. Inflation dropped to 8.8 percent a
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year, and higher agricultural yields meant that Taiwan's agricultural ex-
ports amounted to $114 million in 1952. The United States pumped
money into Taiwan, but there were limits to the Taiwanese "consump-
tion of commodities." Farmers were not exporting much rice for fear of
war, and people were buying more land because the GMD was about to
implement a program to buy land from the landlords and resell it to the
peasants.42 And "American capitalists" refused to invest money in Tai-
wan because of the instability in Asia and because, Koo wrote, "our laws
governing foreign investment are too restrictive." In 1953, the govern-
ment sent several representatives to "explore the possibility of the U.S.
market for Taiwan products." Improving Taiwan's economy was critical,
particularly since despite high taxes to eliminate the deficit, Taibei could
never balance its budget without U.S. aid.43 Failure to do so limited the
amount of money that the foreign ministry could spare to Koo to use
for propaganda purposes. People continually complained to Koo that the
American people did not know the truth about Taiwan, but Koo was too
limited financially to do the kind of publicity work necessary. He reached
the conclusion that Taiwan was spending far less money on propaganda
than states like India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and South Korea.44
In 1954, Koo visited Taiwan again. By this time, the GMD imple-
mented land reform and spent most of its nonmilitary U.S. aid building
communication, transportation, and electrical infrastructure that enabled
Taiwan to undergo agricultural and industrial development. The gov-
ernment also instituted Economic Development Plans that targeted the
development of electricity, fertilizers, and textiles. After many days of
inspection, Koo was impressed by "the spirit of solidarity of the officers
and men, the modernization of our military prisons, the progress and
achievements in raising the living standard of our farmers." And he was
confident that the GMD's reforms made it a "more compact body and a
more effective instrument to help implement the Government's basic
policies." He ignored the fact that Taiwan was undergoing a "white ter-
ror" in which thousands were arrested and executed on charges of being
communist spies. Opposition forces and criticisms from liberals, such as
Hu Shi, were not tolerated by the regime. In any case, Koo made a trip to
the outer islands from where he could see the mainland only a mile away.
The high mountain ranges and "feeling the continental smell of the air"
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made him long "to go back to the mainland." The experience gave him
more confidence "that one day I, in my life time, would be able to see the
recovery of the mainland and the liberation of the people under the lead-
ership" of the generalissimo.45
Back in the United States, Koo put his propaganda skills to work by
portraying Taiwan as representing the "real China." He told Americans
that the PRC was a totalitarian regime that did not have the full support
of the Chinese people, that it implemented anti-Chinese policies (such
as banning Confucian texts), and pursued "a policy of flagrant aggres-
sion and constitutes a menace to peace in Asia." In Taiwan, however,
Chiang Kai-shek's government was the legitimate government of China
because he had been elected by delegates representing all the provinces
of China. On the local level, mayors were elected by the people. Taiwan
was far more democratic and protected the constitutional rights of its
citizens. Naturally, Koo did not explain that Chiang and GMD were a
one-party dictatorship like that of the CCP. At any rate, Koo claimed
that Taiwan sought peaceful cooperation with other countries, was a
believer in the principle of collective security, and was a supporter of the
UN. In an effort to make Taiwan even more appealing to Americans, Koo
laid out examples of the PRC's anti-Americanism which contrasted with
the alleged pro-Americanism that could be found in Taiwan. He declared
that "While every major power in the world in the past century committed
aggression or waged war against China, the United States, like China her-
self . . . has always pursued a policy of peace and friendship toward her."
Now, the "real China" and the United States cooperated in their anticom-
munist policies. Even more important, once the ROC government returned
to mainland China, there would a "true and new China" because it would
be based on Chinese tradition and "the pattern of the United States."46
The hope of returning to the mainland died for the most part the
next year. In September 1954, the PRC commenced shelling linmen and
Mazu, two GMD-controlled islands located in the Taiwan Strait. Koo
believed that Taiwan was safe as long as the Seventh Fleet was in the area
and as long as the United States gave Taiwan the logistical support neces-
sary for its defense. But with November Congressional elections coming
up, he did not think that the United States would do "much in the way of
actual participation in our defense against actual invasion" of those is-
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lands. Previously, Koo had proposed to the State Department that Tai-
wan and the United States sign a mutual defense pact, much like those
signed between the United States and other countries in Asia. Dulles
frowned on the idea, not wanting to commit the United States to recov-
ery of the mainland, and he believed such a pact would make the Chi-
nese communists think "that they are immune from attack so long as
they do not start an invasion" of Taiwan. The Americans also wanted to
avoid being dragged into a general war over Taiwan .47
Now with the PRC shelling the islands in the Strait, there was an
opportunity for such a pact to become reality. The United States, using
New Zealand as a proxy, had already submitted a cease-fire resolution to
the UN. Since 1950, the U.S. tinkered with the idea of using the UN to
neutralize Taiwan and eventually lay the basis for two Chinas. Chiang
angrily rejected the idea of turning to the UN because he did not want to
see two Chinas, like two Koreas, two Vietnams, and two Germanies. Be-
sides, neutralizing Taiwan prevented Chiang from attacking the PRC.
The generalissimo did agree to a mutual defense pact on the condition
that the offshore islands were included and that the treaty be signed be-
fore the New Zealand proposal was taken up by the UN.48
When Koo learned that the U.S. proposed to enter into a security
pact with Chiang, he was surprised and wanted time to better ascertain
the "origin, the motivation, and object" behind this U.S. conversion to a
treaty that Koo had previously sought to no avail. Did Washington want
to create two Chinas through the UN, "in whose lap, the U.S. had been
anxious to throw the delicate and difficult [Taiwan] question?" Was the
United States afraid of a general war being sparked by the Jinmen-Mazu
crisis? In meetings with Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson,
Koo and George Yeh, the foreign minister, Koo explained that while the
ROC did not intend to drag America into a war, it did not want to limit
its sovereignty to Taiwan and the Pescadores.49
When Dulles presented a draft of the treaty to Koo and Yeh, the
offshore islands were excluded. Dulles restated his support for the New
Zealand resolution, which he believed "promised to pay big dividends."
Dulles did not elaborate on what those "big dividends" were, but appar-
ently they far outweighed the alternative, which was a resolution being
presented by a "less friendly delegation." The U.S. also introduced a pro-
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tocol that said that Chiang Kai-shek would not undertake offensive op-
erations against the PRC without the consent of Washington. Koo could
see that the Americans were trying to "tackle the problem of [the] off-
shore islands and our policy of fighting back one day to recover the main-
land." The Chinese could not accept such a protocol, because it was
tantamount to declaring that the GMD had given up all hope of return-
ing to China. Koo thought the protocol was "embarrassing for the Chi-
nese Government." He argued that "it would raise a wave of protest and
despondence among the Chinese" on Taiwan and overseas. He added:
"At present, so far [as] the public was aware Free China had at least the
nominal right to reclaim the Mainland. The U.S., so far as the Chinese
public knew, could not exercise a veto of this right." Recovering the main-
land was a hope. "Whether the hope was well founded or not, the pros-
pect was a sustaining and motivating force." But Koo warned, "If you
publicly take this away and let all the world see a U.S. leash around the
neck of Free China, you have lost something very important."50
Upon hearing the Chinese objections, Dulles decided that instead
of inserting the protocol into the treaty, there would be an exchange of
notes in addition to the treaty. Koo said that the Taiwan government
would accept this if the exchange of notes were signed "on a different day
from the signature of the Treaty so that they would not seem to be di-
rectly connected." In fact, Koo wanted at least a ten-day span between the
signing of both, and he thought it preferable for the notes to be kept con-
fidential to prevent Taibei from losing face. Robertson rejected these pro-
posals, saying that one could not keep notes secret from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and he thought a seven- to ten-day delay too long.
Then, Koo submitted the ROC's counterproposal, which Robertson
complained essentially suggested "that the Chinese Government be given
joint control over use of American forces stationed on the U.S. islands in
the West Pacific." Koo defended the proposal based on the need for reci-
procity. Chiang Kai-shek did not want an actual voice over U.S. opera-
tions in the Pacific, but he would accept the leash only if the Americans
put it down on paper so that they, too, were leashed by Taiwan. Other-
wise, the treaty looked too "one-sided."51 The Americans, though, were
not about to accept the Chinese counterproposal.
Despite displeasure with continued American insistence on restrain-
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ing Taiwan's military, the Chinese agreed to accept the leash as long as
the United States committed itself to protecting the offshore islands. But
the Eisenhower administration refused to make that concession, though
it did agree to ambiguous language in the treaty that permitted the U.S. to
defend those islands should it choose to do so. Thus, the U.S.-ROC Mutual
Defense Treaty was signed on December 2. Koo had his treaty, but it was not
what he had expected, and there seemed no hope of changing it. Koo tried to
put a positive spin on the notes by saying that they were "reciprocal" and
"[did] not mean we have given up [the] right of recovering [the] main-
land."52 Nearly three weeks later, Yeh and Koo delivered to Eisenhower a
message from Chiang Kai-shek asking the president "to nip in the bud" the
"promotion of a 'two-China' theory" and to give Taiwan more "assurance"
as to the safety of the offshore islands. Eisenhower explained why it was
impossible to extend the treaty to the islands, and in Koo's opinion, "did
not give a satisfactory answer to any of the proposals put to him."53
The situation in the Taiwan Strait, meanwhile, turned for the worse.
On January 10, 1955, the PRC air force launched raids against the
Dachens, a group of islands north of Jinmen and Mazu, followed on
January 18 with an assault. Reports arrived as well of massive PRC troop
movements toward that area. The next day, Eisenhower made the deci-
sion to aid the evacuation of GMD troops from the Dachens and to de-
fend Jinmen. Koo explained to the State Department that his government
was desirous of "strong moral and logistic support" from the United
States because the loss of the Dachens would be a "grave [psychological]
blow to the Chinese Government." On January 21, Dulles revealed to
Koo part of the message that Eisenhower would present to Congress in
asking for a resolution that would give the president broad power in
protecting the GMD-held islands. The message mentioned not only
Jinmen, but Mazu. It was only a draft that had not yet been seen by
Eisenhower and was subject to revision. Yet, the message was encourag-
ing. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, was highly suspicious of the
U.S. desire to evacuate the Dachens and of Eisenhower's insistence on
getting a Congressional resolution. He feared that there was a secret ar-
rangement between Dag Hammarskjold, the UN secretary general, and
Zhou Enlai, the PRC's foreign minister, to call a cease-fire, evacuate the
Dachens, release eleven American airmen, and push for two Chinas. And
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he thought Eisenhower's resolution would be used to "pigeon-hole rati-
fication of the Mutual Defense Treaty." Despite his reservations, Chiang
agreed to the American proposals.54
As Eisenhower sent the Formosa Resolution to Capitol Hill, which
if passed by Congress, gave the president full authority to take whatever
actions he thought necessary to defend Taiwan, the Pescadores, and "such
other territories as may be determined." Eisenhower decided not to men-
tion any islands by name when presenting his message before Congress
because Britain opposed the defense of Jinmen. Eisenhower did use dip-
lomatic channels to convey to Chiang the American commitment to pro-
tect Jinmen and Mazu. Koo implored Dulles to publicly state that
commitment, but Dulles refused given the opposition to the treaty by
some senators. Chiang Kai-shek was furious with this omission. He had
been led to believe that Eisenhower would mention the islands by name,
and now he was adamant in his refusal to evacuate the Dachens. Eventu-
ally, Washington applied pressure that brought him around to the Ameri-
can point of view, but Chiang remained sore for months over
Washington's "vacillating policy."55
The U.S. handling of the Jinmen-Mazu crisis led Koo to reflect on
Americans and their approach to foreign affairs. Koo described them as
"sentimental" and agreed with the statement made by other foreign dip-
lomats that one never knew for certain what the Americans would do
next. He could see the contradictions inherent in American opinion. On
the one hand, Americans "were predominately anti-Communist" and
"like their government to stand firm against [the] Communist menace
and aggression." On the other hand, they were "peace-loving and op-
posed to war."56 Such attitudes undermined the notion of rolling back
communism in China, and the Chinese ambassador knew that the United
States would not support an invasion of the mainland. In March 1955,
Koo reported to Chiang Kai-shek on the trends in American public opin-
ion. He found Americans favoring easing of tensions in Taiwan and op-
posed to the U.S. defending Jinmen and Mazu, although the "grass root
opinion, while strong for peace, did not like the Government here to
appease the Chinese Communists either." Over the following months,
the State Department likewise made the point that the American people
opposed going to war to unite Germany and Korea, and the same was true
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for China. And it complained about Chiang Kai-shek's statements to re-
cover the mainland, which only "alienated support here and created anxi-
ety generally" as well as weakened Taiwan's "international position." Koo
defended Chiang as a peacelover that "wanted a real, honorable and last-
ing peace." And the generalissimo "felt he must do everything possible to
preserve the legitimate aspirations of his people and to keep up morale."57
From Koo's point of view, the Americans took a contradictory atti-
tude toward communism that spelled doom for hopes of returning home.
Many Chinese like Koo knew that without U.S. help, the invasion of China
was impossible. Time was running out on their chances of returning to
China. A Chinese general observed that if Taiwan did not invade the
mainland by 1957, the window of opportunity would be lost because
Taiwan's military strength would peak at that point. Some intellectuals
told Koo that they "did not think we would see our recovery of the main-
land in our life time."58
There were also signs that the ROC would lose its place in the UN.
The episode that made this fact painfully clear was the controversy over
the admission of Outer Mongolia into the UN. In the summer of 1955,
the United States made a political deal with the Soviet Union in which
the latter agreed to permit thirteen U.S. allies to have membership in the
UN in return for the acceptance of five Soviet satellites including
Mongolia. The United States knew that Taibei would veto such a deal
because of Outer Mongolia, but Washington believed that an ROC veto
would anger many in the UN, leading to calls for admission of the PRC
to the detriment of Anglo-U.S. relations and American public opinion.
Eisenhower asked Chiang to not exercise the veto, saying that the admis-
sion of thirteen free nations was "worth . . . the price" of five Soviet satel-
lites. Besides, the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948 prohibited the United
States from exercising a veto on membership questions. Chiang's reply
to Eisenhower was a firm no. He blamed the United States for the inde-
pendence of Outer Mongolia that resulted from Chiang's 1945 treaty
with Stalin "which we entered into on the well-intentioned advice of the
United States Government."59
After the ROC exercised its veto, Koo faulted the United States and
other members of the free world for failing to recognize a spade as a
spade. He was firm in his conviction that one could not give any ground
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to the enemy, and remarked that "the real difficulty of the free world . . .
was the lack of a firm stand on the part of the free world in dealing with
the Communist countries." Earlier in 1955 when the U.S. welcomed So-
viet farmers to their country, Koo "thought the Americans were rather
naive, which was perhaps due to their lack of experience in tackling world
problems." In his opinion, the communists held the initiative while the
Western powers simply reacted to crises. Koo could understand the West-
ern people's abhorrence of war, but "that did not mean that they should
not pursue a positive and long-range policy . . . to check further Com-
munist expansion and gradually push it back."60
In any case, Koo and his government grew more sensitive to any
perceived moves by the United States to secure the admission of the PRC
into the UN. During the Geneva Conference of 1956, the United States
and the PRC tried to reach an agreement that renounced the use of force
in resolving the Chinese civil war. The proposals gave Chiang Kai-shek
the impression that the United States accorded Beijing de facto recogni-
tion, put Beijing on an equal footing with the United States, and was
working "toward a one China—a Red China—concept." Chiang viewed
the U.S. statements coming out of Geneva as the "worst possible blow to
the Chinese Government." When a State Department official denied all
the above, Koo asked, "Suppose the Communists accept your no force
proposal. Would the United States then consider the Chinese Commu-
nists as peace loving?" Koo, who was referring to Eisenhower's recent
statements that the "UN Charter required members to be 'peace loving,'"
felt that Washington was merely giving opponents to the ROC an open
door by which to pressure the UN to accept the PRC as a member. Al-
though Koo later expressed gratification for the president's remarks in
favor of ROC representation in the UN, he knew that the ROC was living
on borrowed time as far as the UN was concerned.61
Koo's views of the Americans were generally correct, and he was
right to argue that power and influence were based on things other than
military power. Yet he, too, was naive. He completely discounted the pos-
sibility that World War III could have involved nuclear weapons and he
ignored the extent to which the world was war-weary and tired of con-
stant confrontation. And, more importantly, Koo simply did not under-
stand the thinking of the Chinese people, much less that of the Chinese
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communists. He described China as a place of disillusioned youth and
of increasing "popular discontent." Reiterating the old special relation-
ship argument, he described the Chinese people as having "always been
most friendly toward the American people," and he labeled the anti-
American propaganda emanating from the PRC as "unChinese."62 He
wanted to believe that the people there would welcome Chiang Kai-shek
back even though he knew that it was disillusionment with the generalis-
simo that led to his downfall in the first place. Even if the United States had
attempted to recover the mainland there was no guarantee of success, be-
cause the people in China simply would not welcome their former leader.
The Jinmen-Mazu crisis of 1954 and 1955 proved to be Koo's last
as a diplomat. Like international law, he felt old and in need of replace-
ment as ambassador. Besides being tired by forty-four years of service,
he lacked an estate to sustain him in his retirement years. Some of his
homes in China had been destroyed and his land turned into an airfield
by the Japanese during the war. His salary as ambassador was quite low,
so he wanted to find new work in order to earn money for his retire-
ment. Koo seriously considered retiring in 1952, but Chiang insisted that
he remain at his post. In March 1956, Koo finally had his way and re-
signed as a diplomat for the ROC government. Someone once told Koo
that military work was a "thankless job and an endless job." Koo felt that
diplomacy was the same: "One could not see the results of one's effort,
whereas in other fields one could feel one was building something and in
[the] course of time could see it function." Another drawback of diplo-
macy was that "one had to face one crisis [after] another not only calling
for unremitting effort but causing continued anxiety and worry." At his
age, he found it "uphill work all the time turning from one crisis to an-
other." And the last several years had had its share of crises and disappoint-
ments, particularly since the government's defeat on the mainland had "so
radically altered other nations' opinion of our position." "Having lived and
experienced the glory of the heyday during the 2nd world war as represen-
tative of one of the 4 great powers of the world," Koo keenly felt the "differ-
ence in other's regard" for the ROC and its representatives.63 No one treated
him as ambassador from a great power any longer, but as a representative
of a tiny island in the Pacific. Though doyen of the GMD government's
diplomatic corps, his career as diplomat lost its allure.
CONCLUSION
FOR SEVERAL MONTHS FOLLOWING RETIREMENT, Koo served
as one of Chiang Kai-shek's foreign policy advisors. Then in 1957, he
filled a vacancy on the International Court at the Hague where he served
as a justice for the next ten years. After stepping down from the Court,
he became an American citizen and lived in New York City. He never
returned to China, even though Mao Zedong issued an invitation in 1972.
The year before, the ROC walked out of the United Nations once it was
clear that it would be replaced on the Security Council by the PRC. Mao
asserted to one of his diplomats that he respected Koo's diplomatic tal-
ents, and that the reunification of Taiwan with China was the common
goal of all Chinese patriots. Koo rejected the invitation, and remained in
the United States until his death in 1985.' He lived long enough to see
Richard Nixon's visit to China and Jimmy Carter's decision to cut off
diplomatic recognition to Taiwan in 1979.
Nearly twenty years after his death, V.K. Wellington Koo might have
been surprised at the attention that his life and career received in both
Taiwan and the PRC at the turn of a new century. Numerous articles
appeared in scholarly and popular magazines on both sides of the Tai-
wan Strait. In 1999, PRC moviegoers watched a film entitled "1919" that
looked, in part, at Koo's heroic stand at Paris. The next year, a three-day
conference on Koo and Chinese foreign policy was held in China, bring-
ing together a group composed of scholars from China, Taiwan, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.2 These conference papers,
as do most studies of Koo's diplomacy between 1912 and 1956, tend to
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be uncritical and portray Koo as a hero. Ultimately, Koo's diplomacy
must be scrutinized. Where did he succeed and where did he fail? What
part did Koo play in the emergence of modern China? These questions
can be answered by assessing separately his efforts to revise the unequal
treaty system and his handling of crises created by Japanese expansion
and the tensions with foreign allies.
Wellington Koo chose a career as diplomat with the intent of sav-
ing a country perceived by its people as standing on the verge of breakup
and removing the "humiliations" imposed on China by foreign powers.
He wanted to adjust China's relations with the foreign powers by revis-
ing the unequal treaties and recovering territory lost either to the impe-
rialists or independence movements. Koo's diplomatic objectives were
very similar to those pursued by the People's Republic of China after
1949: regain a freedom of initiative in foreign relations; make China the
center of the Asian system of states; attain cooperative relations with
other states in order to enhance security and develop the economy; tie
economic development to foreign policy; and involve China in interna-
tional organizations.3 In Koo's mind, his measures constituted reform
designed to put China on the road to modernization and eventually great
power status. His tools were international law, alliances, propaganda, and
economic coercion and enticements. Unlike agricultural or educational
reform, Koo's diplomatic reform was a top-down approach to China's
problems. The fact that he served his country all those many years as
diplomat, foreign minister, and prime minister was somewhat unique.
Chinese nationalists bemoaned China's condition as a semicolony, but
at least China, and Japan before it, had the advantage of possessing a
diplomatic corps that could fight to improve China's international stand-
ing. The same could not be said of other Asian countries colonized by
Westerners and Japan.
In assessing Koo's contribution to the emergence of a modern China,
one can point to some successes. The China of 1912 was very different
from that of 1949, at least in terms of the imperialist presence in China.
When Koo entered government service, the foreign powers had imposed
unequal treaties, leased Chinese territory, and stationed military forces
in China. In the fight to make China free, Koo succeeded in representing
China's interests before the world. The greatest moment in Koo's diplo-
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matic career was, of course, the Paris Peace Conference. Not because he
secured any concrete changes, such as revising the unequal treaties or
recovering the German leasehold in Shandong, but because he took the
initiative and presented China's case before the world. Koo stood up to
the powers by not signing the Versailles treaty and sealed his place in
Chinese history as a defender of China's rights.4 Public opinion abroad,
the rise of Chinese nationalism, and World War I's weakening of the
European powers ultimately forced the powers to talk about revising the
unequal treaty system at the Washington Conference. In the 1920s, Koo's
patriotic diplomacy chipped away at the imperialist system using inter-
national law and the notion of rebus sic stantibus. In the end, he laid a
foundation for the more unified GMD government that appeared in
1928.5 During World War II, Koo's efforts proved crucial in the negotia-
tions behind the Sino-British treaty of 1943 that eliminated what re-
mained of the unequal treaty system. By 1949, Koo played a major role
in the collective effort that abolished the unequal treaties, recovered some
of the territory lost to the imperialists, laid the groundwork for eventual
recovery of parts of the empire, and enabled China to enter the interna-
tional system.6 Mao proclaimed in 1949 that China had finally stood up.
The statement was not entirely true because much work remained to be
done. Nevertheless, much had already been accomplished and, the PRC
came to power on a foundation built by Koo and others.
Despite Koo's successes and contributions, there is no denying that
he ended up on the wrong side of revolution twice in his career. He rep-
resented the best that China could produce to play the game of interna-
tional politics according to the powers' rules. Nevertheless, Koo paid a
price in that his Americanization opened him to charges of being a col-
laborationist if not a traitor. Warren Cohen once observed that Koo's
"nationalism was political, not cultural. He loved the nation, but not its
culture."7 There is some truth to this statement. He was not antiforeign,
and proved willing to compromise in negotiations if he could avoid do-
mestic pressure to do otherwise. However, Koo's gradualist approach to
treaty revision did not sit well with the Chinese in the 1920s who grew
impatient in demanding change, and he became tainted by his attempts
to cooperate with the powers and by his association with the warlords.
Worse, Koo's top-down approach to China's ills offered no solution for,
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say, improving the lot of the peasant other than to support education
initiatives.
Several years after the communist revolution of 1949, Koo told
Chiang Kai-shek that one reason for failure on the mainland was "attrib-
utable, in essence, to the love of ease and mutual comforts and the lack
of a guiding philosophy of life based upon devotion to principle and
loyal service and personal integrity."8 Koo's career generally reflected loy-
alty and integrity, but even that was not enough. He never had an ideol-
ogy, such as that of Sun Yat-sen's or Mao's, that appealed to a broad mass
of people. After the PRC came to power in 1949, Koo found himself
lumped in a group known as reactionaries. Such labels proved meaning-
less in the end. Chiang Kai-shek praised Koo for his treaty revision in the
late 1920s and Mao Zedong admitted that Koo was a patriot. Today, schol-
ars consistently judge him to be a nationalist and not a puppet of any
foreign country. Even his wife, who had plenty of grievances against her
ex-husband, acknowledged that Koo "had fought all his life to keep China
from being partitioned."9 Still, Koo did not lead China in a glorious revo-
lution that enabled the Chinese people to stand up, and he had to live
with the bitter irony that his patriotic aspiration to make China a "free
and independent country" was fulfilled by others.
One other aspect of Koo's diplomacy that must be assessed re-
gards his handling of various crises between 1914 and 1956. Somewhere
in the middle or on the periphery of those crises stood V. K. Wellington
Koo. As he explained to an acquaintance years later, it was his "fate to be
mixed up with every major crisis in China's international relations ever
since 1912."10 During that time, China stood on the verge of complete
domination by a foreign power, primarily Japan. Koo's diplomacy, in
part, played a role in preventing the colonization of China. The Chinese
dealt with the crisis of Japanese expansion during World War I by using
various tactics, such as declaring neutrality, creating and canceling the
war zone in Shandong, stalling in negotiations, leaking information to
the powers, declaring war on Germany and becoming an ally, and then
taking their case to the Paris Peace Conference. For the most part, these
tactics failed, but leaking the existence of the demands did bring enough
outside pressure on Japan to drop the worst of the Twenty-One Demands
that would have made China a protectorate of Japan. Koo played a direct
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role in both, suggesting such a tactic and implementing it. However, Koo's
advice that China resort to military force was wrong. Yuan Shikai's policy
of appeasing Japan and avoiding war proved the correct one, given Japan's
military superiority.
In the 1930s, Chinese diplomacy shifted again from rolling back
imperialism in general to focusing on preventing Japanese expansion.
Koo proved active on the international scene, especially at the League of
Nations, but again his advice to Chiang was unrealistic. Although he con-
demned Yuan Shikai publicly for appeasing Japan during World War I,
Chiang Kai-shek recognized that his government was in no position to
wage war with Japan. Chiang tried to use the Western powers to pressure
Japan. Failing this, he appeased Japan and correctly rejected the advice
of Koo and others who wanted to take a stronger stand against Japan.
Koo preferred that China engage in self-help, but that option did not
exist because preparations for war with Japan would have been inter-
preted by Japan as a threat. Instead, Chiang bided his time, looking for a
favorable international environment that would help him to build a coa-
lition against Japan.
In the late 1930s to early 1940s, Koo's record as a diplomat was
mixed. Koo never succeeded in bringing about an anti-Japan coalition.
This was too heavy a burden for just one individual. Convincing the
foreign powers to provide concrete assistance was nearly as heavy a bur-
den. Koo did secure various forms of assistance particularly during the
Sino-Japanese War, but more often than not he failed to win aid. The
obstacles that prevented such assistance were not of Koo's making, and
his rhetorical skills could not always overcome those obstacles. From 1941
to 1945, Koo tried to use diplomacy not only to destroy the imperialist
system but to ensure the victory of China and the creation of a better
security system for China in the postwar world. More than Chiang Kai-
shek, he was willing to moderate his patriotism in order to maintain
China's position within the United Nations' alliance. Koo exerted much
energy in trying to maintain good relations with both Britain and the
United States. To a certain degree, China's weakness from both civil war
and war with Japan, the impression that China was not carrying out the
fight, and the conflict in war aims between the powers and Chiang Kai-
shek undercut to a certain extent Koo's more cooperative approach. Still,
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China proved to be a member of a winning coalition, became a member
of the major international organizations of the time, and emerged from
years of war bloodied but unfettered and free.
In dealing with the crisis of civil war, Koo faced numerous obstacles
and experienced little success. His greatest difficulty and failure was the
inability to convince the United States to throw its lot entirely behind
Chiang's government. He tried but could not exert enough influence on
Americans that convinced them of the need to fight the CCP to defend
Chiang's forces. International events such as Pearl Harbor or the Korean
War did more to save Koo's government than years of effort on his part.
His attempts to circumvent Washington by appealing to U.S. public opin-
ion likewise failed. In fact, Koo's diplomacy betrayed the weakness of
overreliance on the United States in both assisting China in revising the
imperialist system and protecting China from other powers. Like his nine-
teenth century predecessors,11 Koo assumed that the United States could
be enticed into the balance of power game by waving the China market
and other concessions in the faces of U.S. officials. Despite being disap-
pointed by Wilson at Paris or U.S. officials at the Washington Confer-
ence or the Brussels Conference, only Yalta finally awakened Koo to the
reality that United States would not resort to military force to support
China and would do whatever was necessary to avoid conflict with other
powers over China. Even if the United States proved willing to play the
role of aiding and democratizing China as envisioned by Koo in the late
1940s, most Chinese, many of whom were antiforeign, would have op-
posed U.S. expansion into China. Indeed, people like Hu Shi came under
increasing attack not only from the Chinese Communists, but even non-
communist Chinese who were angered by the U.S. presence in China at
the time and by Washington's China policy.12 In this respect, Koo was
also out of touch with his own people.
The story of Koo's role in Chinese foreign relations from 1912 to
1956 is a bittersweet one. He established his place in the history of his
own people as well as that of world history, but heroism in the face of
insurmountable odds usually did not translate into success. The fact that
he survived numerous domestic and foreign crises was no small feat, but
that in itself was no consolation for a man whose patriotic aspirations
were fulfilled by others. The modern China that the CCP established was
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nothing like he dreamed. No liberal or democratic China emerged to
forestall the campaigns of the early 1950s that eliminated thousands who
were deemed enemies of the revolution; Mao's Great Leap Forward of
the late 1950s combined with famine to kill millions, or the Cultural
Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. The China that Koo wanted to create
was a benign great power that somehow held the balance of power with-
out threatening its neighbors. Instead, post-1949 China earned respect
for the manner in which it fought the Korean War, but the PRC also
became feared, especially when it possessed its own nuclear weapons.
No matter how Koo reflected on his career later in life, there must have
been a tinge of pain and disappointment mixed in with the few pleasant
memories of the distant past. Maybe after all those years, Koo took con-
solation in the words that John Bassett Moore quoted in a letter to Koo
after the Paris Peace Conference: "It is a cause, not the fate of a cause,
which is a glory."13
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